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This study examined the relationship between the outsourcing of 
organizational impression management activities and the effectiveness of this 
work.  Organizational impression management work, as defined in this study, was 
work that sought to improve the reputation of the organization.  The study 
examined several possible indicators of the effectiveness of organizational 
impression management work: changes in reputation, the flow of key 
organizational resources, and the client’s (outsourcer’s) perceptions of 
outsourcing effectiveness.  Data were collected on private colleges using several 
archival sources and a survey of chief public relations officers.   
This research focused on two factors that are likely to influence 
outsourcing effectiveness: the nature of the task that is being outsourced and the 
nature of the relationship between the client and the agency (provider of 
outsourced services).  The study hypothesized that when the task was strategic in 
nature, outsourcing would be less effective than completing the task internally.  
This hypothesis was partially supported.  The study hypothesized that when the 
task was tactical in nature, outsourcing would be more effective than internal 
 x
completion; this hypothesis was also partially supported.  The study also 
hypothesized that outsourcing would be more effective when there were long 
relationships between clients and agencies, clients used limited number of 
agencies simultaneously, and outsourcing intensity was low.  The hypothesis for 
the duration of relationships between clients and agencies was supported.  
However, the hypotheses for the number of agency partnerships and the 
outsourcing intensity were generally not supported. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Purpose, Contributions and Key Definitions 
Organizational impression management work goes by various titles.  Some 
organizations call this type of work public relations, but other common titles 
include public affairs, external affairs, external communications, and corporate 
communications.  By whatever name this work is called, it has at its core the goal 
of improving both the image and the reputation of the organization to different 
target audiences, so that they will be more likely to aid the organization in 
completing its goals.  These targets can be either inside (Dutton and Dukerich, 
1991; Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail, 1994) or outside (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach 
and Sutton, 1992) of the organization.  This dissertation will focus on targets 
outside of the organization. 
The term public relations was first used in its current context in 1922 
(Grunig and Hunt, 1984), and the most current directory of public relations firms 
lists 2900 organizations (O’Dwyer, 2001).  Looking at the top 10 public relations 
firms for 2000, as published on O’Dwyer’s website, the oldest firm, BMSG 
Worldwide, was founded in 1922 (odwyerpr, 2001).  And taking the revenues of 
these same top 10 public relations firms for the year 2000, the total was $2.5 
billion (odwyerpr, 2001). 
From this information, it is obvious that the outsourcing of organizational 
impression management work supports a large and growing population of service 
providers.  In general, outsourcing allows firms to limit their fixed investment in 
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organizational impression management activities and to more easily expand or 
contract these activities in response to unanticipated exogenous shocks.  Since 
which activities to retain within the organization and which to outsource is an 
important organizational design decision for many firms, the purpose of the 
proposed research is to investigate the relationship between the outsourcing of 
organizational impression management activities and the success of efforts to 
improve the reputation of the organization.   
Conceptual discussions of outsourcing have suggested several situations in 
which outsourcing is an appropriate organizational design.  Williamson (1981) 
argues for a transaction costs view of these decisions.  He states that an 
organization can use the characteristics of a transaction, such as asset specificity 
and small numbers bargaining to assess the costs of the transaction and to 
determine whether a product or service should be provided within the 
organization’s hierarchy or should be purchased in an arms length transaction in 
the market.  Those tasks with high transaction costs should be completed within 
the organization and those with lower transaction costs should be arranged 
through a market transaction.  Williamson (1991) also notes that hybrid forms that 
blend hierarchical and market transactions are possible.   
Resource dependence theory suggests that outsourcing is an appropriate 
decision when the resource acquired through outsourcing is not critical to the 
organization and there are substitutes for the resources readily available (Pfeffer 
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and Salancik, 1978).  Agency theory implies that outsourcing should occur for 
those activities where external controls will be more effective than internal 
controls in insuring that the agent completes the work without undue loss to the 
principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Finally, institutional theory suggests that firms may 
attempt to gain legitimacy by imitating other firms’ outsourcing practices 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Suchman, 
1995; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). 
Despite the existence of several conceptual predictions about outsourcing, 
there has been very little empirical research about the effectiveness of outsourcing 
relative to performing activities internally, particularly the outsourcing of non-
manufacturing activities such as organizational impression management work.  
One exception is work by Ulrich and Ellison (Ulrich, 1994; Ulrich and Ellison, 
1998), which discusses the outsourcing of product design.  Another exception is 
outsourcing IT work, a literature specific to this particular type of outsourcing and 
focused on the technological aspects of outsourcing (see Ang and Cummings, 
1997; Ang and Straub, 1998; Lacity and Willcocks, 2000; Lacity and Willcocks, 
1998; Steensma and Corley, 2000 for some examples).  Given that the larger 
agencies involved in outsourcing organizational impression management work 
often charge minimum monthly retainers of $25,000, the question of outsourcing 
effectiveness is important to address.   
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The paucity of research on outsourcing effectiveness is an important gap 
in the literature since the decision about what will be maintained within an 
organization and what will be outsourced can be important to the overall 
effectiveness of the organization (Gulati, 1995).  Moreover, the outsourcing of 
service activities can be extremely sensitive and hard to reverse, since the 
decision almost always affects the human resources of an organization.  Once an 
organization’s employees are replaced by outsourcing, it is hard to regain the trust 
that was present before this decision was made (Pfeffer and Baron, 1988).  On the 
other hand, once employees are hired it is difficult to dismiss them to make way 
for outsourcing (Pfeffer and Baron, 1988).  Thus there is a great deal of inertia to 
overcome when making or reversing outsourcing decisions. 
There has been considerable debate about the appropriateness of 
outsourcing staff functions such as organizational impression management work.  
An argument for outsourcing organizational impression management work is that 
this work is often not a directly value-adding activity for the organization; in fact 
its impact on the profits of an organization can be difficult to measure.  Thus 
when focusing on core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), firms could 
consider outsourcing this peripheral function.  On the other hand, the reputation of 
an organization, which is not easily copied by competitors, or completely 
transferable from one organization to another, can be a source of competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Barney, 1986; Conner, 1991; Fombrun, 1996).  
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Consideration of this attribute of reputation may lead management to shy away 
from outsourcing organizational impression management work.  Even if 
management still chooses to outsource, this consideration may lead them to 
selectively outsource their organizational impression management work.  Thus, 
the question that remains unanswered in the literature is: should seemingly non-
core competency services, that are a potential source of competitive advantage, be 
outsourced?  If so, when and how?  In beginning to fill this gap in the literature, I 
will study outsourcing of the organizational impression management function.   
Purpose of the Proposed Research 
In general this research takes a contingency view of outsourcing.  
Therefore, I am interested in under what conditions outsourcing is more or less 
effective, since most organizational design decisions are contingent on factors 
such as those that I study here.  Thus, the overarching question I propose to 
address in this study is, how does the nature of the organizational impression 
management tasks that are outsourced and the nature of the relationship between 
the client and the agency influence the effectiveness of outsourced organizational 
impression management work?  This study will address the following four 
specific research questions about the relationship between outsourcing 
organizational impression management and the success of these efforts: 
1.  How does outsourcing of strategic and tactical organizational 
impression management activities affect the client’s reputation and the 
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client’s perception of the effectiveness of its organizational impression 
management activities?  Does outsourcing strategic activities have 
different effects than outsourcing tactical activities? 
As developed in more detail in Chapter Two, strategic activities have more 
impact, are more complex, and are more uncertain than tactical activities.  These 
differences have several implications for the effectiveness of outsourcing 
impression management work.  For example, strategic activities require the 
transfer of firm-specific knowledge to the agency for their successful completion.  
Since reputation is a potential source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), 
some of this information may be proprietary in nature.  The transfer of proprietary 
information to agencies increases their ability to engage in opportunistic behavior 
that may harm the client (Williamson, 1985).  In addition, an extended time 
period usually must be allowed to elapse before an accurate evaluation of the 
effectiveness of strategic activities can be performed.  This extended time frame 
increases the effects of bounded rationality because the client must collect data 
over a longer period of time to fully evaluate the work.  Since the effects of 
bounded rationality increase with the greater uncertainty inherent in an extended 
time horizon, bounded rationality is an important limitation on the perceived 
effectiveness and the actual effectiveness due to actions taken in response to the 
early perceptions of the effectiveness of outsourcing strategic organizational 
impression management activities.  For these reasons and others to be further 
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developed later, I argue that it is more difficult to outsource strategic activities 
effectively than to outsource tactical activities effectively. 
2.  How does outsourcing intensity affect the client’s reputation? 
As the number of activities that are outsourced to agencies increases, 
outsourcing intensity increases.  As intensity increases, the difficulties of 
coordination and control increase, due to the complexity of integrating and 
coordinating many outsourced activities (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  These coordination costs strain the interface 
between the client and the agencies, potentially limiting outsourcing 
effectiveness. 
3.  How does the duration of the relationship between the client and its 
agencies affect the client’s reputation and the client’s perception of the 
effectiveness of its organizational impression management activities? 
4.  How does the number of agencies used in outsourcing affect the 
client’s reputation? 
Relationship duration is an important determinant of outsourcing 
effectiveness because the longer that an agency and a client have worked together 
the more effective they become through the development of relationship specific 
assets (Baker, Faulkner, and Fisher, 1998).  At the same time, as the number of 
partners increases, coordination costs increase, reducing the effectiveness of any 
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specific relationship maintained by the client (Galbraith, 1977; Thompson, 1967; 
Williamson, 1985). 
In the following sections, I provide a brief overview of the theoretical 
foundation for these questions.  I also define key terms to be used in this research 
and set some initial boundary conditions that define the scope of the study.  
Finally, I explain the potential contributions of this study to both theory and 
practice. 
Overview of Theoretical Foundation 
In addressing the questions above, I draw on multiple theoretical 
perspectives.  The key perspectives used in this study are transaction costs 
economics, resource dependence theory, and population ecology, although other 
theories play less important roles in this research. 
From a transaction costs perspective, Williamson (1985) argued that asset 
specificity, opportunism, uncertainty, and bounded rationality are important 
determinants of whether a product or service can be purchased effectively in the 
marketplace.  Each of these four factors is likely to be present in organizational 
impression management work.  Williamson (1985) described four different types 
of asset specificity: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity, and dedicated assets.  He defined asset specificity as “durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the 
opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by 
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alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated” 
(Williamson, 1985: 55).  He also argues that when assets are specific the 
continuity of the relationship becomes increasingly important, and both 
contractual and organizational safeguards should be put in place to protect the 
parties to such an agreement (Williamson, 1985). 
For this study, human asset specificity is the most important type.  In 
outsourcing organizational impression management work, knowledge can be 
gained by the individuals involved in the work that is specific to the client 
organization.  Williamson (1985: 96) argues that “any condition that gives rise to 
substantial human asset specificity—be it learning-by-doing or chronic problems 
of moving human assets in team configurations—favors an employment relation 
over autonomous contracting.”  In a study of outsourcing of the pre-project 
planning and design phases of capital facility construction projects, researchers 
found that one of the largest constraints on outsourcing effectiveness reported by 
owner firms was the high turnover of contractor personnel (Davis-Blake et al., 
1999).  This type of disruption can have serious consequences for work that has 
been outsourced, due to a loss of productivity while new individuals are 
incorporated into existing relationships and trust is rebuilt with these new 
individuals.  To further compound this difficulty, firm-specific knowledge often 
must be retransferred to the new personnel with all the original difficulties once 
again decreasing the possibility of a successful transfer of this knowledge.  This 
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reoccurring transfer of knowledge is an important element of human asset 
specificity. 
Opportunism is another concept from transaction cost economics that is 
important to this study.  Williamson (1985: 47) defines opportunism as “self-
interest seeking with guile,” and goes on to provide the following description: 
“opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, 
especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 
otherwise confuse.”  Opportunism plays an important role in this study, because 
while agencies are involved in organizational impression management work for 
the client, they may gain access to information that is of a sensitive and 
proprietary nature.  The potential for agencies to use proprietary information to 
promote their own interests may reduce reputational gains from outsourced 
organizational impression management work.  This proprietary information could 
be used opportunistically by the agency to further their interests in multiple ways.  
One example may be the use of this information to gain business from 
competitors of the client.  Another possible risk from opportunism arises when an 
agency is let go from an organizational impression management project for 
inferior performance.  In this case, to retain the quality of their own reputation, 
the agency may use the knowledge gained to expose details about the organization 
that could be damaging to its reputation.  This could be done in an attempt to 
place the blame for termination of the relationship on the client or to divert 
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attention from their own failing so as to not lose additional business from current 
or potential future clients.  Thus future opportunistic motives by agencies may 
reduce the gains made by the work outsourced to these agencies. 
Thus, the potential costs of opportunistic acts to an organization when 
outsourcing organizational impression management work can be high, since 
knowledge important to the reputation of the organization is shared with outside 
agencies.  Since organizations are cognizant of the potential for opportunistic 
behavior ex ante, the client may take steps to protect their interests.  However in 
most cases, protective behavior will also limit the effectiveness of the outsourcing 
relationship, since these protections may limit the ability of the organizations to 
work together effectively.  For example, personnel of the agency may only be 
allowed contact with identified boundary spanning personnel within the client 
organization.  These few individuals may lack some of the information that will 
aid the agency in its work and may either lack the resources, especially if dealing 
with multiple agencies at one time, or the desire to locate the information that 
would be helpful to the agency.  Compounding this difficulty, the agency may be 
unaware of the loss of information since they have so few contact points within 
the client organization. 
Finally, uncertainty and bounded rationality play an important role in this 
study.  Organizational impression management work can involve a great deal of 
uncertainty because the goal of this work is to create an image of an organization 
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that different constituencies will use, simultaneously with other factors, to create 
their perception of the organization’s reputation.  The possibility that the 
determinants of an organization’s reputation can be different for different 
organizational constituencies increases the uncertainty associated with predicting 
the effects of any set of organizational impression management activities 
(Bromley, 1993; Freeman, 1984; Ginzel, Kramer, and Sutton, 1993). 
In addition, as a perceived attribute, reputation is difficult to measure with 
precision (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  Reputation is also relatively static in the 
short run due to its historical component (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  This 
attribute of reputation extends the time frame required to accurately assess the 
effectiveness of organizational impression management work.  Therefore, as 
previously described, the limitations imposed by bounded rationality increase.  
These greater limitations take the form of a greater likelihood that important 
environmental change could occur before an accurate assessment of effectiveness 
can be made.  For example, environmental shifts can change how munificent the 
environment is toward the organization.  This could potentially confound the 
effects of organizational impression management work with the effects of the 
changed environment.  Thus decisions made to outsource under one set of 
environmental conditions may not be completed effectively due to a change in 
environmental conditions and not due to the quality of the original outsourcing 
decision.  The risk of a change in outsourcing effectiveness through a change in 
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the environment that was unforeseen due to uncertainty and bounded rationality 
increases as the time frame between the decision to outsource and the actual 
completion of the outsourced work increases.  This is one way in which bounded 
rationality and uncertainty may have a significant effect on outsourcing 
effectiveness. 
Resource dependence theory is also important to this study.  As described 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), organizations are dependent on the environment 
for resources and attempt to control important resources for which there are not 
readily available substitutes.  Important resources are those that are large in 
magnitude and/or are critical, or in other words they may affect the “ability of the 
organization to continue functioning” if they were not available for use by the 
organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 46).  Resource dependence theory 
argues that relationships are formed between partners to acquire these important 
resources and to control resource dependencies (Aldrich, 1979; Das and Teng, 
2000a; Pfeffer and Nowack, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Saxton, 1997; 
Thorelli, 1986).  Attempts to control important resource are particularly crucial to 
organizational effectiveness when the dependence between the resource provider 
and the resource user is asymmetric. 
In this study, the reputation of an organization is viewed as an important 
resource to the organization because it can affect almost all of its transactions.  
Reputation can allow an organization to charge a price premium (DeJong, 
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Forsythe, and Lundholm, 1985; Dranove and Shanley, 1995).  Reputation can also 
create opportunities for organizations to partner with the best suppliers or 
distributors or to gain access to limited resources.  Reputation is also not easily 
substitutable.  Barney (1991: 111) argues that no substitutes exist for a resource 
for which there is “no strategically equivalent valuable [resource] that [is itself] 
either not rare or imitable.”  An overall good reputation cannot be considered a 
unique attribute of any particular organization, but a good reputation is a resource 
that allows an organization to “conceive of and implement certain strategies” 
(Barney, 1991: 111), which will be difficult for other organizations to duplicate.  
This is in part because reputation takes into account the history of an organization 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), which is not shared by other organizations.  Thus 
if the formation of partnerships with agencies allows greater control over this 
important resource then outsourcing should be effective, but when the formation 
of relationships with agencies reduces the client’s control over their reputation, as 
is more likely in some relationships than others, then outsourcing should be 
ineffective and avoided by the client. 
Finally asymmetries of dependence in an exchange are likely to be present 
in outsourcing relationships.  Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that asymmetries 
exist when the relationship is not of equal value to both organizations and suggest 
that this may occur when the organizations involved are of different sizes.  Many 
of the relationships in this study are likely to involve significant differences in the 
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size of the client and the size of the agency.  Asymmetry due to size differences, 
where either the client or the agency is significantly larger than their partner, may 
affect the outsourcing relationship, thereby influencing outsourcing effectiveness.  
This concept also applies to the number of partners used by a client for 
organizational impression management work.  Clients that have few partners may 
have lower coordination costs, but may leave themselves in an unfavorable 
asymmetry of dependence.  On the other hand, clients that maintain many 
partnerships may be less dependent on any one agency but may increase their 
coordination costs while attempting to create asymmetries in their favor.  Thus 
this concept is important to this study and the correct balance between these 
forces should increase the outsourcing effectiveness of organizational impression 
management work. 
The last theory that I briefly overview in this section is that of population 
ecology.  This theory is not as widely used in this study, but there is one 
contribution made by this theory that is important to the study: structural inertia.  
Hannan and Freeman (1984: 151) define structural inertia as an attribute in which 
“the speed of reorganization is much lower than the rate at which environmental 
conditions change.”  They go on to explain that organizations attempt to be 
reliable and accountable and therefore must reproduce the same structure day 
after day; this they argue creates structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
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This is an important concept in this study for two reasons.  First, 
reputation is an organizational attribute built by constituents through the use of 
past organizational information to predict the future of an organization (Fombrun 
and Shanley, 1990).  Thus, maintaining reputation requires stable, consistent 
messages that may be difficult to consistently reproduce in outsourced 
relationships.  In addition as mentioned previously, when changing between 
providing organizational impression management work inside an organization and 
outsourcing, structural inertia must be overcome.  While overcoming structural 
inertia, it is likely that effectiveness will be reduced (Amburgey, Kelly, and 
Barnett, 1993). 
Second, structural inertia is important for the arguments in this study 
related to relationship duration.  After an interorganizational relationship is 
established and the firms make investments in relationship specific assets, 
structural attachment is created within the relationship (Baker et al., 1998).  
Structural inertia through this structural attachment may serve as a benefit, since it 
allows the relationship to be reliable and to reproduce the same structures 
repeatedly.  However, at the same time, structural inertia makes it more difficult 
to end the relationship even if the original benefits have already been lost.  This 
rigidity can decrease the long-term effectiveness of outsourcing organizational 
impression management work.  This decrease will be most obvious in situations 
where changes in the environment are not matched due to structural inertia.  Thus 
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in a setting that is relatively dynamic, structural inertia may be a liability to both 
the client and the agency.  Additionally, the longer the relationship is maintained 
the greater the potential structural inertia through structural attachment and the 
more likely that change will be required to meet the demands of the environment.  
Thus structural inertia and adaptability should be kept in balance to maximize 
outsourcing effectiveness. 
In this section I provided a brief overview of the theoretical foundation for 
this study.  I briefly reviewed the potential contributions to this study made by 
transaction cost economics, resource dependence theory, and population ecology.  
These arguments are more fully developed later in this document. 
Definitions of Key Terms 
In this section, I provide brief definitions of some key terms used in this 
study.  These definitions are conceptual in nature, and are designed to improve the 
understanding of the arguments within this document.  The terms that I define in 
this section are: reputation, organizational impression management, outsourcing, 
clients, agencies, and perceived effectiveness of organizational impression 
management activities. 
Reputation:  In this study, multiple outcome measures will be considered.  
The first of these is reputation.  The reputation of an organization is a perceived 
attribute, formed by an organization’s constituencies, using multiple signals either 
originating from the organization or other available sources, about the quality of 
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its goods or services and the expectations of its actions in the future (Bromley, 
1993; Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  Reputation takes into 
account the past, present, and potential future of an organization (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990).  Because multiple constituencies of an organization form 
perceptions of reputation, it is dependent on the signals that are salient to each of 
its constituencies.  Thus reputation will vary based on the signals used by each 
constituency to assess the reputation of the organization (Bromley, 1993; 
Fombrun, 1996; Freeman, 1984; Ginzel et al., 1993). 
Organizational Impression Management:  For this research organizational 
impression management will be defined as work that is performed with the goal 
of improving the organization’s reputation in either the short run or the long run.  
Thus the work will be defined by the objective in pursuing it and activities do not 
need to yield results in the study period to be included in the study. 
Outsourcing:  Outsourcing occurs when organizations contract with 
individuals or organizations external to their hierarchical control to perform work 
for the organization.  Outsourcing is widespread across many industries and is 
rapidly increasing (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Gulati and Lawrence, 1998; Hui, 
Davis-Blake, and Broschak, 2000).  While outsourcing need not mean the 
replacement of internal employees, this often occurs, since many tasks that are 
outsourced were previously performed within the organization. 
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Clients:  In this study, clients are defined as organizations that hire other 
firms to do organizational impression management work for them.  Even though 
large organizations may internally “hire” other portions of their organizations to 
do work for them, such relationships will not be included in this research unless 
they are arms-length market transactions.  This criterion will exclude most intra-
organizational work.  However, this will not necessarily preclude relationships 
where a parent organization uses an agency that has been spun off from the 
parent.   
Agencies:  In this research, agencies are defined as the organizations that 
are hired by clients to perform organizational impression management work.  The 
only limitation to this definition is, as mentioned above, that an agency will only 
be considered as such when interacting with a client external to their organization, 
even if they do organizational impression management work within their own 
organization. 
Perceived effectiveness of organizational impression management 
activities:  Another important outcome variable for this study is the perceived 
effectiveness of organizational impression management activities.  For this study, 
this is defined as whether the organizational impression management activity is 
perceived as being more or less effective by a representative of the client 
organization.  The dimensions of effectiveness that I will look at are the 
interpersonal relationships between the employees working on a particular 
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activity, the effective use of funds, the completion in an appropriate amount of 
time of outsourced activities, and the achievement of the goals that were set for 
the activities.  This definition does not assume that these perceptions are accurate.  
Decisions made by internal staff about outsourcing organizational impression 
management work are based on their perceptions, whether they are accurate or 
inaccurate.  Perceptions are therefore particularly important measures of the 
effectiveness of outsourced organizational impression management, since the 
more favorable the internal perception of the outsourced organizational 
impression management work, the more likely it is to be continued by 
organization members responsible for future decisions regarding the outsourcing 
of organizational impression management work. 
Boundary Conditions 
Now that I defined some key terms to be used in this study, I point out 
some boundary conditions that limit the scope and generalizability of this study.  
The first boundary condition has to do with the enhancement of reputation.  As 
mentioned earlier, attempts to enhance reputation can be targeted at audiences 
inside or outside of the client.  For purposes of this research, I only consider 
external audiences and the effect of the outsourcing decisions on external 
perceptions of reputation.  The partial exception to this boundary condition is that 
I measure the perceived effectiveness of organizational impression management 
work as perceived by a key individual on the client’s organizational impression 
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management staff.  However with this measure, I am not studying internal 
constituents’ overall perceptions of reputation.  This boundary condition will limit 
the generalizability of the results to external organizational constituencies. 
The second boundary condition of this study involves the population that I 
will use for my data collection.  The population that I will use to test my 
hypotheses is small and medium-sized, private colleges and universities.  Any 
relationships that I find in this study may not be generalizable beyond this setting.  
The strong reliance on reputation by these private colleges and universities sets 
these organizations apart from organizations that are not as reliant on their 
reputations for continued success.  Examples of situations where reputation is less 
important than for colleges and universities include settings in which an 
organization is in a monopoly or near-monopoly situation or where there is strong 
government support for the organizations within a particular industry.  However, 
many organizations operate between the strong reliance of private colleges and 
universities on their reputations and the monopoly or government controlled 
situations mentioned above. 
Therefore, the setting of private colleges and universities is a deliberate 
choice because it provides a liberal setting for testing the effects of outsourcing on 
reputation.  This improves the chance of determining if there is any effect of 
outsourcing decisions on reputation, since a liberal test gives a better chance of 
finding an effect.  Further studies can later expand the understanding of this 
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relationship to settings where reputation is less salient and less closely and 
publicly monitored.  In addition, if this liberal test fails to find a relationship 
between outsourcing decisions and reputation it will be unlikely that further 
studies in settings that are less dependent on reputation will find such an effect. 
Selecting only organizations in the United States also limits the external 
validity of this study.  Although there are many reasons that this limits 
generalizability, one reason is that key factors affecting the persistence and 
formation of interorganizational relationships vary across countries.  For example 
in studying the transaction costs of interorganizational relationships, Dyer (1996) 
discusses how transaction costs operate differently between Japanese and 
American firms.  He finds that transaction costs are lower for Japanese 
organizations in their interorganizational relationships than for American 
organizations, and therefore that Japanese organizations gain benefits from hybrid 
forms that American organizations do not.  Thus, there are cultural factors to 
consider in forming interorganizational relationships, and my study is limited to 
one cultural setting. 
A final boundary condition of this research is that data are only gathered 
from client firms.  Thus, it limits the understanding of the relationship to its effect 
on the reputation of the client in these outsourcing relationships.  Perhaps there 
are different effects for the agency, but these will have to be developed in future 
studies. 
 23
Contributions of the Proposed Research 
Contributions to Theory.  This study contributes to theory by advancing 
the understanding of the implications of the organizational design decision to buy 
a specific service in the marketplace rather than generate that service within the 
organization.  Since most of the empirical research in make or buy decisions is in 
a manufacturing setting (Dyer, 1996; Eccles, 1981; Gulati and Lawrence, 1998; 
Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Stinchcombe and Heimer, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi, 
1996) this will be a valuable extension of current theory because it is an attempt 
to determine if current research on the effectiveness of outsourcing relationships 
in production settings can generalize to service settings.  This is especially 
important since service industries are increasingly involving a larger proportion of 
the economy and the workforce; therefore, it is important to determine which 
research done in production settings will likely generalize to service settings. 
In addition, this research explores in more depth the issue of 
organizational impression management, which has received only limited attention 
in the literature (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Elsbach, Sutton, and 
Principe, 1998).  Thus, this research is one of very few quantitative, empirical 
tests of the effect of organizational impression management activities on the 
reputation of an organization.  In fact, much of the work that has been done in the 
area of organizational impression management up to this point is of a theoretical 
or qualitative nature.  I am not aware of a study examining the impact of 
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organizational impression management activities on archival measures of 
reputation. 
This research also determines if there is a relationship between the nature 
of organizational impression management outsourcing and the perceived 
effectiveness of organizational impression management activities.  This is 
important for the study of these relationships and could contribute to theory by 
exploring how different types of activities which differ in their levels of impact, 
complexity, and uncertainty may affect the perception of the effectiveness of 
those activities, and also how interorganizational relationships of differing length 
and quantities may affect the perception of the effectiveness of those activities. 
In addition to archival measures of reputation, two measures of the quality 
of incoming students are also used as dependent variables.  These additional 
measures are important because of the extended time frame necessary to evaluate 
the effect of organizational impression management activities on reputation.  Thus 
clients may make a decision to retain or discontinue use of an agency independent 
of the actual long-term effect of that agency’s work on the reputation of the 
organization.  This is especially likely given that many clients may not be willing 
or able to measure the effect of organizational impression management activities 
on their reputation.  However, such premature decisions may lead to ineffective 
outsourcing of organizational impression management work.  This study 
examines the impact of outsourcing organizational impression management work 
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on intermediate outcomes that clients may use when making decisions about 
continuing or terminating relationships. 
This study also contributes to limited research on the effects of 
relationship duration on the effectiveness of interorganizational relationships.  
There have been a few studies in this area, but most of these investigate whether 
or not a relationship will endure, not whether a longer relationship is more 
effective (Baker, Faulkner, and Fisher, 1998; Broschak, 1999; Levinthal and 
Fichman 1988; Seabright, Levinthal, and Fichman, 1992).  This study also 
provides similar extensions of the limited work on the effect of the number of 
relationships and the intensity of the outsourcing on outsourcing effectiveness.  
These areas have been explored in only a very limited number of early studies 
(Baker, 1990; Broschak and Davis-Blake, 1998; Hui, Davis-Blake, and Broschak, 
2000; Uzzi, 1997). 
The study also investigates the differential effects of outsourcing strategic 
and tactical activities.  Several researchers have discussed this distinction (Chen, 
Smith, and Grimm, 1992; Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; 
Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Miller and Chen, 1994; Mintzberg, 1979), but no 
empirical work has been done to determine what the actual effect of outsourcing 
these different types of tasks has on the effectiveness of outsourcing.  Therefore, 
this study provides an empirical test of this question in one setting. 
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Contributions to Practice.  This research contributes to practice by 
providing some guidelines that practitioners can use when deciding whether or 
not to outsource organizational impression management work.  This research also 
provides some guidelines that practitioners can use to determine whether or not to 
outsource many different types of work that are not core to the organization’s 
mission, vision, and competencies.  Some examples may be human resources, 
government compliance programs, or purchasing.  The practitioner literature often 
recommends outsourcing but provides little guidance beyond anecdotal evidence 
and case studies about how to decide which non-core activities can be outsourced 
to gain the greatest improvement in productivity, competitive advantage, and 
performance (Cross, 1995; Kiely, 1997; Lacity, Willcocks, and Feeny, 1995; 
Quinn, 2000; Quinn, 1999).  Thus I believe that this study applies to many 
organizations that are considering the best option for outsourcing organizational 
impression management work and other similar services. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Within this chapter, I review streams of literature with the goal of 
discussing key findings about the following topics that are particularly relevant to 
the research proposed here: the nature of the organizational impression 
management activity that is outsourced, whether strategic or tactical; the nature of 
the relationships between client and agency specifically the duration of these 
relationships, the number of partners, and the outsourcing intensity; and the 
effectiveness of this work at improving reputation.  As a first step in addressing 
these three topics, I show that outsourcing organizational impression management 
activities is likely to affect reputation.  To accomplish this, I review relevant 
articles from both the corporate reputation literature and the outsourcing 
literature.  Much of the literature review focuses on studies that do not specifically 
address outsourcing, since the study of outsourcing is a rather recent 
phenomenon.  However, the literature reviewed can be used to assess the likely 
consequences of outsourcing on reputation. 
Outsourcing and Reputation 
To demonstrate that outsourcing of organizational impression 
management activities is likely to affect key determinants of reputation, I review 
portions of the corporate reputation literature.  I then review portions of the 
outsourcing literature with the same purpose in mind. 
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Corporate Reputation 
In this section on corporate reputation, I review the implications of the 
definition of reputation given in Chapter One.  Then, I briefly review the 
importance of reputation to an organization and address why it is an important 
phenomenon to study.  Finally, I review the key determinants of reputation. 
Implications of the Definition of Corporate Reputation: Reputation is not 
an easy organizational attribute to define.  Due to the intangible nature of this 
attribute, there is some disagreement about the details of the definition.  As 
defined in the first chapter of this study, the reputation of an organization is a 
perceived attribute, formed by an organization’s constituencies, using multiple 
signals originating from the organization, about the quality of its goods or 
services and the expectations of its actions in the future (Bromley, 1993; 
Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
From this definition, it is important to point out that the reputation of an 
organization is a perceived attribute and not an objective measure (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990).  Constituents both inside and outside of the organization may 
form perceptions of reputation.  For the purpose of this study, I focus on external 
constituents such as potential members of the organization, consumers of its 
goods or services, and the general public.  An important consequence of the 
perceptual nature of reputation is that the reputation of an organization can be 
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different for different constituents of the organization (Bromley, 1993; Freeman, 
1984; Ginzel et al., 1993).   
Reputation also has global expressions, in which an organization is viewed 
as having a reputation that is not bound by any specific events or people, and 
specific expressions which refer to the reputation based on a specific event or the 
actions of a specific person (Bromley, 1993; Carter, 1997; Theus, 1993).  An 
example of a global expression of reputation is the name recognition carried by a 
slogan.  For example in Texas there is a common slogan: “Don’t mess with 
Texas.”  This has little to do with any specific event, person, or place in Texas, 
but is an expression of an overall reputation.  An example of a more specific 
reputation is the reputation that a particular instructor at a school has for being an 
excellent teacher.  This is part of the reputation of the school within which the 
instructor works, but if this instructor were to leave the school, the overall 
reputation of the school, in most cases, would not be greatly affected. 
Especially important to the definition of reputation for this study is that 
reputation is formed from both intrinsic and extrinsic referents (Perrow, 1961; 
Thompson, 1967).  Perrow (1961: 336) describes intrinsic referents as 
“fundamental to official purposes of the organization and … regarded by the 
organization as essential to maintaining standards of production set forth in 
official goals.”  Some examples of intrinsic referents are the quality of faculty 
research, the quality of education received by a student, or a particular product 
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line; in other words, any portion of an organization that is important for meeting 
organizational goals and purposes can be an intrinsic referent (Perrow, 1961; 
Thompson, 1967). 
On the other hand, Perrow (1961: 336) describes extrinsic referents as “not 
essential to maintaining production standards though they may be vital in insuring 
acceptance and resources.”  Thus Perrow (1961) gives examples of extrinsic 
referents such as its charitable foundations, physical appearance of facilities, and 
the organization’s political leanings.  Thompson (1967) uses the term “measures” 
in place of “referents” in his discussion of the assessment of organizations and 
gives the following examples of extrinsic measures: accreditation evaluations, 
testimonials about value, fellowships and grants awarded, and placement 
statistics.  From this discussion it can be argued that the work of organizational 
impression management falls almost always into the area of providing, creating, 
and maintaining extrinsic referents of reputation. 
This distinction is important, because these two types of referents differ in 
their attributes.  Extrinsic referents are designed to be understandable to 
constituents so that they can improve public perception or even reverse a period 
of unfavorable reputation (Perrow, 1961).  Thompson (1967) describes the 
advantage of extrinsic referents as being that they can be used selectively, such 
that only referents that give positive information about the organization can be 
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presented; referents that give negative information can be omitted from any 
reporting. 
In contrast to extrinsic referents, constituents cannot always accurately 
evaluate intrinsic referents either due to a lack of required knowledge or a lack of 
information necessary to do so (Perrow, 1961; Thompson, 1967).  Intrinsic 
referents are central or core to an organization and are often buffered from the 
environment (Thompson, 1967).  This buffering may improve efficiency, but it 
also may serve the function of concealing information about the true nature and 
status of the technical core.  Thus, it is not always in the organization’s best 
interest to rely on intrinsic referents to improve reputation either because they 
cannot or should not be understood by external constituents. 
Thus extrinsic referents are utilized to provide information to constituents 
who for various reasons cannot or should not judge intrinsic referents (Perrow, 
1961; Thompson, 1967).  One way in which extrinsic referents provide 
information about the reputation of the organization to its constituents is through 
organizational impression management activities (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach and 
Sutton, 1992; Elsbach et al., 1998; Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
Importance of Corporate Reputation:  Reputation is important to 
organizations for a variety of reasons.  The literature identifies several areas in 
which reputation improves the effectiveness of an organization.  Thompson 
(1967) refers to prestige or reputation as a way to gain power over the 
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environment without making commitments or yielding power.  Perrow (1961) 
argues the following benefits from a high level of prestige or reputation: better 
applicants for positions, legislative influence, informal community power, and a 
greater pool of clients, customers, donors, and investors. 
Additionally, researchers have found that a positive reputation can lead to 
the ability to charge a price premium (DeJong et al., 1985; Dranove and Shanley, 
1995).  This may be in part because, as discussed by economists, quality must be 
maintained for reputation to remain positive (Allen, 1984; Rogerson, 1983).  
Rogerson (1983: 508) describes this process by stating that “owing to the effect of 
reputation, high quality firms have more customers, because they have fewer 
dissatisfied customers who leave, and word-of-mouth advertising results in more 
arrivals.”  Increased profit margins are important to organizations and attributes 
that lead to higher profit margins are one important area for the study of 
organizations. 
Additionally, a number of studies have found that reputation is more 
important when information about the true state of the organization is incomplete, 
or when consumers cannot differentiate between high and low quality before 
purchasing a good or service (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992; Kreps and Wilson, 
1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988).   For those 
organizations where the technical core is not open to public scrutiny, reputation is 
more important than for organizations for which information about the technical 
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core is available and understandable, and therefore reputation is an important 
attribute to consider when studying these types of organizations. 
Reputation is also important to an organization because it is an 
organizational resource that due to its social complexity is imperfectly imitable 
(Barney, 1991; Hillman and Keim, 2001).  For this reason, Barney (1991) states 
that it is a potential source of sustained competitive advantage (see also Fombrun 
and Shanley, 1990).  Thus, reputation is obviously important to organizations and 
also important to the study of organizations. 
Finally, research has suggested that reputation can be a potential measure 
of the performance of an organization, although researchers do not agree on how 
to best measure reputation (Brown and Perry, 1994; Chakravarthy, 1986; Fryxell 
and Wang, 1994; Ruf, Muralidhar, and Paul 1998).  Performance is also discussed 
in the literature as a determinant of corporate reputation (Hammond and Slocum, 
1996; McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997), 
and therefore the relationship between reputation and performance is recursive in 
nature.  Thus as a potential indicator of performance, reputation is indeed 
important to organizations and their study.  From the arguments in this section, I 
argue that reputation is important to organizations and the study of organizations. 
Determinants of Reputation:  As mentioned above in the definition of 
reputation, determinants of reputation come from both intrinsic and extrinsic 
sources.  Researchers have more specifically broken down these sources into 
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signals that constituents use to determine their perception of the reputation of an 
organization.  Researchers have not been able to agree on the exact categories or 
the relative importance of such signals (Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton, 1997; 
Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Sobol and Farrelly, 1988).  However in their article, 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) describe the following four types of reputation 
signals: market, accounting, institutional, and strategy.   
Market signals are publicly available indicators that external constituents 
use to judge the overall performance of an organization.  These signals include the 
activities, results, and prospects of an organization.  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) 
propose that high performance, low risk (e.g., a firm’s beta coefficient), and low 
dividends (indicating high growth potential) are market signals that will lead to 
increased reputation.  Another example of a market signal is the quality of an 
organization’s products.  As mentioned previously, quality must remain constant 
for reputation to be maintained (Allen, 1984; Rogerson, 1983).  Researchers have 
also argued that pricing and costs can serve as indicators of quality and thus 
determinants of reputation (Hammond and Slocum, 1996; Weigelt and Camerer, 
1988).  Newsletters to shareholders are one example of an organizational 
impression management activity that might provide market signals to an external 
constituency (Russ, 1991). 
One market signal that has been used in studies of reputation is Fortune 
magazine’s most admired lists (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  Although not all 
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researchers agree on the usefulness of Fortune magazine’s list as a measure of 
reputation, there is agreement that it is correlated highly with financial 
performance (Brown and Perry, 1994; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fryxell and 
Wang, 1994; Hammond and Slocum, 1996). 
Accounting signals are made up of figures reported on balance sheets and 
income statements and their accompanying ratio calculations.  These signals are 
closely tied to market signals.  However, they are more historical in nature than 
the current performance of an organization.  The importance of positive 
accounting data is obvious when observing the manipulations that are regularly 
undertaken by organizations to present the best quarterly or annual results 
possible (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
Institutional signals are attributes of the organization that project the 
nature of the organization to external constituents.  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) 
examined four types of institutional signals: institutional ownership, social 
responsibility, media visibility, and firm size.  Dollinger and colleagues (1997) 
examined the effect of one institutional signal, the reputation of an organization’s 
management, on decisions to enter into joint ventures.  They found that a positive 
reputation of an organization’s management was one of the most important 
predictive factors increasing the probability of being chosen as a joint venture 
partner.  Examples of organizational impression management activities designed 
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to use institutional signals are charitable donations and selecting “celebrity” or 
“star” directors (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988).   
Strategy signals are publicly available information about management’s 
choices of business and corporate strategies.  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) 
examined two strategy signals: differentiation and diversification posture.  
Differentiation, as conceptually defined by Fombrun and Shanley (1990), is the 
pattern of resource allocations across functional areas.  Diversification posture, or 
the mix of related and unrelated businesses in which an organization was 
involved, affected reputation through increased reputation for related 
diversification and reduced reputation for unrelated diversification (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990).  These are only two examples of strategic decisions that when 
communicated to constituents may affect the reputation of an organization.  
Examples of organizational impression management activities that primarily use 
strategy signals are CEO speeches, and alliances with organizations possessing 
higher reputations (Ferguson, Deephouse, and Ferguson, 2000; Ginzel et al., 
1993; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997; Stuart, 2000). 
Organizations can affect each of these four types of signals through the 
use of impression management activities.  In addition to the activities mentioned 
above, some activities, such as press releases, annual reports, and media story 
placements regularly provide more than one of the four types of signals (Bromley, 
1993; Carter, 1997; Deephouse, 2000; Ferguson et al., 2000; Fombrun, 1996; 
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Ginzel et al., 1993).  A limited number of studies have begun to investigate the 
overall impact of the use of organizational impression management activities 
more completely.  Elsbach (1994) described the use of organizational impression 
management to manage organizational legitimacy after controversial events in the 
cattle industry.  In her study, organizational impression management was used to 
combat attacks on legitimacy and to improve institutional signals.  Elsbach and 
Sutton (1992) similarly showed how organizational impression management 
affected legitimacy in social movements whose members were attributed with 
participation in illegitimate actions.  Finally, Elsbach and colleagues (1998) 
demonstrated how organizational impression management could be used to 
anticipate reactions of constituents in the area of hospital billing for the purpose 
of eliminating or reducing challenges from patients.  Institutional, market, and 
accounting signals were manipulated in their study.  By participating in 
anticipatory organizational impression management activities to reduce 
challenges to hospital billing, organizations were able to improve the future 
financial performance of the hospital. 
In their study, Elsbach and colleagues (1998) also mention the importance 
of being perceived as sincere and subtly using organizational impression 
management. Other researchers have also discussed that the use of organizational 
impression management activities may have a negative effect if the constituents 
view the activities as “protesting too much” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  Thus 
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reputation can be enhanced or degraded by organizational impression 
management activities. 
Outsourcing 
In this section, I review the implications of the definition of outsourcing 
given in Chapter One.  Then I briefly review some of the consequences of 
outsourcing.  Finally, I address how consequences of outsourcing are likely to 
affect reputation.  
Implications of the Definition of Outsourcing:  As mentioned in Chapter 
One, outsourcing occurs when organizations contract with individuals or 
organizations external to their hierarchical control to perform work for the 
organization.  It has become very common in some settings, for example offshore 
oil production (Stinchcombe and Heimer, 1985), garment manufacturing (Uzzi, 
1996; Uzzi, 1997), pre-project planning and design phases of capital facility 
construction projects (Davis-Blake et al., 1999; Gibson et al., 1998), and 
residential construction (Eccles, 1981).  However, even though outsourcing is 
being widely practiced there is limited empirical research about its determinants 
and consequences.   
Consequences of Outsourcing: Research has proposed several different 
consequences of outsourcing.  Some of these are generally viewed as beneficial to 
an organization, while others are viewed as detrimental.  The overall evidence 
from research is mixed on this point.  However, researchers agree that proper 
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decisions regarding the use of outsourcing are important to developing 
competitive advantage (Matusik and Hill, 1998; Quinn, 1992).  Some researchers 
have gone so far to argue that outsourcing decisions can be a factor in 
organizational survival (Uzzi, 1996).  In the automobile industry, researchers have 
found “significant differentials in cost, quality, and new product development 
across automotive manufacturers that are driven primarily by the extent to which 
they outsource and the nature of those relationships” (Gulati, 1998: 310). 
The first potential consequence of outsourcing reviewed here is that 
outsourcing can lower the costs incurred by an organization in completing a 
particular task.  This consequence has received more attention in the literature 
than others.  Lower costs usually take the form of a reduction in fixed costs and a 
lower break-even point (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000).  They can also be realized 
through reduced investment in physical assets (Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel, 1992).  
Reduced investment in physical assets can decrease organizational commitment 
that might develop due to purchases of expensive physical assets; such purchases 
have been documented as one source of exit barriers that decrease the flexibility 
of future decisions. (Harrigan, 1985, 1980). 
However, lower costs often take the form of a reduction in the number of 
employees within the client organization.  This may result from a strategic 
decision to increase the flexibility of human resources (Pfeffer and Baron, 1988; 
Harrison and Kelley, 1993).  For example, organizations may recognize 
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environmental forces that will limit their ability to control demand for their 
products, and to limit the potential losses associated with the psychological 
(Brockner, Davy, and Carter, 1985) and financial costs of downsizing to the 
organization, they outsource the aspects of production that are most vulnerable to 
a reduction in demand.  Outsourcing may also be in response to prior downsizing 
and its accompanying loss of manpower and technical knowledge (Davis-Blake et 
al., 2001; Gibson and Ryan, 2000).  For example, after an organization completes 
a round of downsizing, managers within the organization realize that critical 
knowledge for a production process has been lost.  Outsourcing is used to restore 
this knowledge to the organization on an as-needed basis.  Whether outsourcing is 
engaged in proactively or reactively, this type of use of outsourcing allows an 
organization to meet changes in product demand (Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson, 
1985; Von Hippel et al., 1997), and to fulfill the needs of non-recurring projects 
(Abraham, 1990).  In addition outsourcing of human resources allows the 
organization to import knowledge and skills that are too expensive to maintain 
within the organization (Abraham, 1990; Kochan et al., 1994). 
A second benefit of outsourcing that has been discussed in the literature is 
that it allows an organization to focus more of its resources on its core 
competencies (Dess et al., 1995; Quinn, 1992; Venkatraman, 1989).  This ability 
to contract for goods and services from organizations that specialize in them may 
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improve the quality of goods and services received due to competition among 
suppliers (Kotabe and Murray, 1990). 
A third benefit of outsourcing is that it allows the organization to spread 
its risk to other organizations (Quinn, 1992).  For example, many organizations 
desire to use new technology with a minimal investment (Gilley and Rasheed, 
2000), because new technology is a potential risk to organizations (Henderson, 
1993; Mitchell, 1989).  At times those who adopt new technologies reap benefits 
from early adoption, but many new technologies fail and the costs for 
organizations that are invested in these can be large.  Thus through outsourcing, 
an organization can have a limited stake in a new technology that can be increased 
or decreased with smaller losses than would have been incurred had the 
organization directly invested in the technology. 
A final benefit discussed in the literature is that outsourcing can provide 
access to industry knowledge, which can be integrated with current organizational 
knowledge to create new knowledge within an organization (Matusik and Hill, 
1998).  This new knowledge can be valuable to an organization and many 
increase its competitive advantage.  However as will be discussed below, 
knowledge transfer is often reciprocal.  Knowledge transfer is also more difficult 
than often assumed (Szulanski, 2000), and there are potential costs to knowledge 
transfer.  Knowledge that is proprietary or tacit creates the greatest challenges to 
the successful outsourcing of these tasks.  In partial support of this argument, 
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Kogut and Zander (1993) found that less codifiable knowledge was more likely to 
be transferred to wholly owned operations rather than to other interorganizational 
partners. 
Even though much of the research highlights the benefits of outsourcing, 
researchers are not blind to the potential costs of this practice.  Among the costs 
that have been described in the literature are losses of competitiveness due to 
outsourcing knowledge-intensive tasks.  From the literature, tasks of this type 
seem to be particularly ill suited to outsourcing.  For example, Pisano (1990) 
argued that small numbers bargaining hazards in R&D, due to the difficulty in 
transferring tacit knowledge, led successful organizations to internalize this 
activity.  In a study of entrepreneurial organizations in the computer industry, 
Mosakowski (1991) found that organizations that outsourced R&D had lower 
subsequent performance than organizations that did not do so.  She also found that 
the greater the intensity of the R&D work done by an organization the more 
performance decreased after outsourcing and hypothesized that this was due to the 
difficulties in outsourcing this knowledge-intensive activity (Mosakowski, 1991).  
Thus from these studies we learn that especially tasks that have high firm-specific 
or tacit knowledge requirements and are performed regularly in an organization 
can result in a reduction in performance when outsourced. 
Additional evidence of problems when outsourcing knowledge-intensive 
work was found in a study of the pre-project planning and design phases of capital 
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facility projects.  In this study, knowledge-intensive work that had the attribute of 
temporal interdependence between tasks was found to increase budget and 
schedule overruns as outsourcing intensity increased (Hui et al., 2000).  Other 
research in this setting found that when outsourced employees took the place of 
internal staff, organizations lost organizational knowledge of technical details, 
social network ties that were important sources of knowledge, and project process 
knowledge (Davis-Blake et al., 2001).  To further implicate the outsourcing of 
knowledge-intensive activities as ineffective, researchers have also suggested that 
outsourcing may shift knowledge from the focal organization to its outsourcing 
partners, thus reducing competitive advantage (Davis-Blake et al., 2001; Bettis et 
al., 1992).  Another potential cost of outsourcing knowledge-intensive work is 
that an outsourcing partner may gain enough knowledge to begin directly 
competing with an organization in its own markets and products (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Willard and Savara, 1988).   
A second potential cost of outsourcing involves conflicts between the 
organizations involved in the outsourcing relationship.  One level at which this 
can occur is through an increased possibility of conflicts due to differences in 
status and unclear relationships between employees of the organization and 
employees of its outsourcing partners (Broschak and Davis-Blake, 1998; Geary, 
1992; Hui et al., 2000; Smith, 1994).  Conflict can also occur if the cultures of the 
organization and its partners are significantly different.  Researchers have argued 
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that integrating cultures can be very difficult and disruptive to an organization 
(Schein, 1992; Trice and Beyer, 1993).  These difficulties and conflicts can 
weaken, neutralize, or overcome potential benefits from outsourcing. 
A final potential cost of outsourcing is related to the allocation of 
overhead.  As more of the organization is replaced by outsourcing, the overhead 
of the organization is allocated to fewer and fewer remaining units within an 
organization.  Since the overhead is allocated to fewer units, each unit receives a 
greater portion and can then artificially appear to be a good target for additional 
outsourcing (Bettis et al., 1992; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000).  Such a cycle can be 
destructive to an organization, since outsourcing decisions are not easily reversed. 
Outsourcing Consequences and Reputation Determinants: As discussed 
above, outsourcing can affect costs, quality, innovation, organizational 
knowledge, competitive advantage, interpersonal conflict, and even organizational 
survival (Bettis et al., 1992; Broschak and Davis-Blake, 1998; Davis Blake et al., 
2001; Gulati, 1995; Matusik and Hill, 1998; Quinn, 1992; Teece, 1987; Uzzi, 
1996).  All of these consequences of outsourcing can affect the reputation of an 
organization.  In fact in many cases the consequences of outsourcing are the same 
as the determinants of reputation.  I develop a couple of these arguments in more 
detail below. 
The list of consequences of outsourcing above includes many items that 
affect organizational performance.  From the review of the literature on 
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reputation, I have established that financial performance is an important 
determinant of reputation (Hammond and Slocum, 1996).  Therefore any of the 
items listed above that could affect performance could have an effect on 
reputation as well.  For example deterioration in competitive advantage can effect 
reputation, since an organization that loses competitive advantage is also likely to 
experience deteriorating financial performance.  This deteriorating financial 
performance will affect the accounting signals that constituents use to determine 
the reputation of the organization (Fombrum and Shanley, 1990). 
Organizational knowledge and innovation have been found to affect 
performance as well (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
March, 1991; Porter, 1985; Teece, 1986), and thus a change in these areas is also 
likely to affect reputation.  Additionally, outsourcing may affect the quality of the 
goods or services produced by an organization (Kotabe and Murray, 1990); 
therefore, it is likely to affect the organization’s reputation, since this is an 
important determinant of reputation (Allen, 1984; Rogerson, 1983).  These 
consequences of outsourcing can affect the reputation through changes in market 
signals that are important determinants of reputation (Fombrum and Shanley, 
1990). 
Conflict between client and agency employees can also affect reputation.  
A positive human resources reputation, as cited by an external source such as a 
magazine ranking, has been found to have a positive effect on the performance of 
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an organization (Hannon and Milkovich, 1996).  If outsourcing offsets a positive 
human resources reputation by introducing sources of unresolved conflict 
between client and agency employees, then benefits from these practices are 
likely to be lost and the human resources reputation is likely to suffer, which may 
affect the overall reputation of the organization.  This is one example of a change 
in an institutional signal, which was mentioned as an important determinant of 
outsourcing above (Fombrum and Shanley, 1990).  In addition, partnering with an 
agency that possesses a reputation for partnering with only high status clients or 
environmentally friendly clients would affect the institutional signals that 
constituents use to determine the reputation of an organization. 
Finally, the overall level of outsourcing that an organization utilizes or the 
types of activities that an organization chooses to outsource and what they retain 
internally can affect strategy signals.  These organizational design decisions affect 
the determinants of reputation through strategy signals, which are an important 
determinant that constituents use to determine the reputation of an organization 
(Fombrum and Shanley, 1990). 
One of the reasons that evidence for the consequences of outsourcing may 
be mixed is that the consequences of outsourcing are contingent on its 
management and organization.  In the next section, I review two contingencies 
that may influence the effectiveness of outsourcing efforts.  The first area is the 
nature of the work that is outsourced.  In discussing this area, I focus on the 
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difference between strategic and tactical activities.  The second area is the nature 
of the relationship between the client and the agency.  This area reviews the 
literature on the effectiveness of an interorganizational relationship based on the 
duration of a relationship and the number of simultaneous partnerships that a 
client has. 
Nature of the work 
The effect of the nature of the work on the outcome of that work has been 
the source of much study in the literature.  In particular, many researchers have 
discussed the distinction between strategic and tactical activities and their 
differential effects on organizational performance and survival. 
Strategic vs. Tactical Activities 
Whether an activity is strategic or tactical is of great importance to an 
organization.  Strategic activities have generally been viewed as being more 
important to the organization and having a greater impact on it and on its 
environment.  Strategic activities have also been labeled as being more proactive 
in nature.  On the other hand, tactical activities have been viewed as being less 
important and more routine and day-to-day for an organization.  They often have 
very little impact on the organization’s environment and may be labeled as 
reactive in nature.  These differences will be more fully developed in the 
following review of the literature about this important distinction. 
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While there is no clear, agreed upon definition of this distinction, 
researchers have discussed several different defining attributes.  Another 
important note to preface this discussion is that the authors cited in this section 
may be referring to actions, activities, tasks, or issues.  In developing the 
conceptual distinction between strategic and tactical for the purpose of this study, 
I do not treat these as different, even though I recognize that in finer-grained 
analyses there are differences.   
Dutton and Jackson (1987) describe one of the reasons that a definition for 
this distinction has been difficult to determine, when they argue that a strategic 
issue is not inherently imbued with meaning and thus may be interpreted 
differently by different organizations or individuals.  Thus what might be 
considered strategic by one organization could be considered tactical by another.  
One important consideration in categorizing strategic and tactical issues is 
determining which attributes are salient and meaningful in making this distinction 
(Dutton and Jackson, 1987).  Keeping this in mind, there are some suggestions set 
forth in the literature to categorize a particular issue as strategic or tactical in 
nature.  For this review, I address the following three key attributes that 
differentiate between strategic and tactical activities:  impact, complexity, and 
uncertainty. 
Impact.  The first attribute that separates strategic and tactical activities is 
the impact on the organization and its environment.  Researchers have simply 
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stated that strategic activities have greater impact on the organization than tactical 
activities (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984).  Strategic activities have also been 
generally described as larger in scope than tactical activities (Galbraith and 
Kazanjian, 1986; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984).  In fact, Mitroff and Emshoff 
(1979:1) state that strategic issues impact “nearly every aspect of an 
organization.” 
However, impact occurs on many dimensions.  The first of these is 
described by Dutton and Duncan (1987: 280), when they define strategic issues as 
those “which have the potential to influence the organization’s current or future 
strategy.”  Thus strategic activities can impact the strategy of the organization 
(King, 1982).  Researchers have also described another dimension on which 
strategic activities impact an organization when they argue that they require more 
time to complete than tactical activities (Ansoff, 1980; Hayes and Wheelwright, 
1984; Mintzberg, 1979).  Thus, the impact of a strategic activity occurs over a 
longer period of time than a tactical activity.  All things being equal an activity 
with a longer duration is likely to impact the organization more than an activity 
with a shorter duration.  A truly strategic activity is not merely a response to 
management fashion (Abrahamson, 1996), but a long-term commitment to a 
course of action, and as such it will not merely fade away.  Another dimension of 
the impact of strategic activities is that they involve many people and other 
resources of the organization (Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan, 1983; Miller and 
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Chen, 1994; Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976; 
Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979). 
Researchers also describe the impact of strategic activities as being 
disruptive of the status quo.  Disruption due to strategic activities has been 
described as being likely to cause controversy, requiring large-scale change on 
multiple organizational dimensions, involving opportunity costs for other 
alternatives, changing current power structures, rejecting parts of the old culture, 
and departing from industry norms (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986; Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984; King, 1982; Miller and Chen, 1994).  In a related dimension 
of impact, strategic activities are also described as impacting an organization 
through the creation of new systems and structures within the organization (Miller 
and Chen, 1994).  Researchers describe this dimension in various ways, such as 
setting off a wave of other activities in support of the central strategic activity, 
establishing new management systems, and setting precedents for future decisions 
(Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986; Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
Tactical activities on the other hand are described as having less impact 
than strategic activities because they require only minor, routine, relatively short-
term actions that involve fewer resources and are relatively easier to complete 
without significantly changing current policies (Chen et al., 1992; Miller and 
Chen, 1994).  These activities also can usually be undertaken with changes to 
process and do not require structural changes in an organization that might change 
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the distribution of rewards or power within the organization (Chen et al., 1992; 
Miller and Chen, 1994).   
Complexity.  The second attribute of strategic tasks that I will address is 
the level of complexity inherent in these tasks.  Organizational researchers 
propose that strategic tasks are usually novel, complex, and open-ended; involve 
multiple sequential and supportive decisions; and require a recursive process that 
is discontinuous, extended, and dynamic (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; 
Mintzberg et al., 1976).  Mitroff and Emshoff (1979:1) similarly describe this 
type of activity as involving “complex mixtures of highly interdependent 
important problems that by definition cannot be formulated, let alone solved, 
independently of one another.”  Mintzberg (1979) adds that strategic activities are 
not routine or programmed and are high in complexity.   
On the other hand, researchers have described tactical activities in very 
different terms than strategic activities.  For example, tactical activities are 
described as having relatively limited options, fairly well understood criteria, a lot 
of precedent, and having limited consequences for wrong decisions (Parry, 1994).  
Tactical activities often involve routine operating decisions that are easier to 
define precisely and analyze quantitatively (Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
Uncertainty.  Tactical activities are also described as being undertaken to 
correct a situation that has already occurred, an area of low uncertainty, while 
strategic activities are taken to plan a future course into unknown territory (Parry, 
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1994).  Chen and colleagues (1992) also argue that tactical activities have lower 
levels of uncertainty and require fewer resources.  Strategic activities, on the other 
hand, are described by Dutton and colleagues (1983: 308) as “likely to be broad, 
diffuse, and ill-specified,” especially in their early stages.  Chen and colleagues 
(1992) found that tactical activities are easier for competitors to respond to 
because they are easier to understand.  Thus, according to their findings, a greater 
number of competitors may respond to a tactical activity, and competitors may 
respond more quickly than to a strategic activity (Chen et al., 1992).  The delayed 
response to strategic activities is both suggestive of and increases the uncertainty 
associated with these activities. 
Strategic vs. Tactical and Impression Management.  From the above 
discussion it is obvious that there is a long-standing tradition of differentiating 
between the strategic and the tactical.  One specific description of this difference 
is important for the current study because it was presented in the impression 
management literature.  Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) define strategic impression 
management activities as seeking to develop long-term benefits to the individual 
or organization.  On the other hand, they describe tactical impression management 
activities as seeking to accomplish short-term and clear objectives.  This 
description does not imply that the objectives of strategic organizational 
impression management activities are not clear, only that those of tactical 
organizational impression management activities involve less uncertainty and 
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bounded rationality plays a more limited role due to their more limited scope and 
shorter time horizons. 
Interorganizational relationships 
How the interorganizational relationship affects the success of outsourced 
work is the next issue addressed in this literature review.  Several factors may 
affect the success of an interorganizational relationship, and this general issue has 
been the focus of many studies.  For this study, I focus on two of these factors:  
the duration of the interorganizational relationship and the number of partners that 
an organization maintains simultaneously.  I selected these two factors because 
theory suggests that they play an important role in outsourcing.  They also have 
not been tested extensively and so there is need for additional empirical work.  I 
review these two factors to determine how the nature of the relationship between 
two organizations in these two areas can affect the success or failure of the work 
that they do together.   
Duration of Interorganizational Relationship 
The first area that I review is that of the duration of the relationship 
between two organizations and the effect of duration on the ability of the 
organizations to effectively work together.  Much of the work in this area is aimed 
at predicting the determinants of relationship duration.  Thus in some cases, it is 
necessary to speculate about the impact of duration on the effectiveness of 
interorganizational relationships based on the findings from studies of the 
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determinants of duration.  Three attributes of interorganizational relationships that 
change with duration influence the effectiveness of these relationships:  
relationship-specific investments, embeddedness, and structural attachment. 
Relationship-Specific Investments.  Williamson (1981; 1985) argued that 
organizations involved in ongoing interorganizational relationships make 
investments that are specialized to the relationship.  This form of asset specificity 
tends to increase the duration of the relationship because these investments lose 
all or most of their value when transferred to another relationship.  This is similar 
to the effects of sunk costs or exit barriers (Cash and Konsynski, 1985; Harrigan, 
1985, 1980; Rosenbaum and Lamort, 1992).  Once relationship specific assets are 
developed, their most effective use is in the interorganizational relationship in 
which they were developed. 
Das and Teng (2000b) argue that a tension exists between a short-term, 
exploitive orientation and a long-term, investing orientation.  Therefore the 
development of relationship specific assets increases the likelihood that 
organizations will value the relationship, since they have entered the long-term, 
investing orientation.  Research has found that partners in an interorganizational 
relationship will only make the relationship-specific investments that are 
necessary to create a successful relationship when some guarantee of a longer 
duration for the relationship exists (Joskow, 1987).  In addition, researchers have 
suggested that only when future interactions are likely will opportunistic behavior 
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be minimized (Axelrod, 1984; Heide and Miner, 1992).  Thus, longer duration has 
the potential of increasing investments in the relationship and decreasing 
opportunistic behavior and thus potentially increasing effectiveness.  Uzzi (1997, 
1996) proposed that long-term relationships were beneficial to both manufacturers 
and suppliers and improved information sharing and joint problem solving.  Thus, 
investment in relationship specific assets can decrease coordination and control 
costs and improve interorganizational effectiveness. 
The effectiveness of interorganizational relationships of longer duration 
has led researchers to coin terms indicating their similarities to activities 
performed within an organizational hierarchy.  For example, interorganizational 
relationships of long duration have been called “quasi-firms” in the Massachusetts 
home building industry (Eccles, 1981).  Researchers have also referred to this 
form of interorganizational form as “vertical quasi-integration” in settings where 
there are large buyers and small sellers (Blois, 1972; Diamantopoulos, 1987). 
Embeddedness.  The second perspective that explains the role that 
duration plays in the effectiveness of interorganizational relationships is the 
sociological perspective of embeddedness.  Granovetter’s (1985) argument is the 
best known and states that both social and economic factors determine the 
effectiveness of interorganizational relationships.  However this argument 
predates his contribution.  While studying businesses in Wisconsin, Macaulay 
(1963) found that they were not consistent in enforcing the terms of the contract, 
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nor did they always refer to the contract to settle disputes.  In many cases, norms 
of exchange, good faith between firms, interpersonal relationships, and a desire 
for the continuation of the relationship took the place of contractual exchanges, 
thus potentially increasing the effectiveness of the relationship.  One of the early 
writers on boundary-spanning functions suggested that one of the requirements of 
interorganizational relationships was a role that interacted across the boundaries 
of the organizations (Adams, 1976).  He argued that a boundary role person 
(BRP) developed relationships with the BRPs in the other organizations that he or 
she interacted with.  One of the goals of these relationships was to increase the 
effectiveness of future transactions. 
As mentioned above, Granovetter (1985) offered the most recognized 
argument for the importance of social ties between organizational actors.  He 
argued that the social ties in which interorganizational relationships are embedded 
facilitate the development of trust and reduce opportunism.  For this reason, many 
interorganizational relationships continue over time.  Parkhe (1993) also 
discussed the importance of a history of trust in partnerships between 
organizations.  In addition, these long-term relationships allow for easier 
resolution of any disagreements that occur between the organizations much as 
Macaulay (1963) found years earlier.   
Researchers have found significant empirical support for the 
embeddedness argument.  For example, in a study of ties between investment 
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banks and corporations, Baker (1990) found that most corporations had a core 
group of investment banks that they relied on regularly.  These corporations used 
shorter relationships, but they also developed trust in a few partners and 
reemployed them repeatedly over time.  Levinthal and Fichman (1988) found 
non-monotonic, inverted U-shaped duration dependence in the failure of auditor-
client relationships.  This relationship showed that early on relationships were 
more likely to dissolve, but that with time the likelihood of relationship 
dissolution was reduced.  In advertising agency-client relationships, Baker and 
colleagues (1998) found this same pattern with a peak around eleven years 
duration.  Embeddedness arguments may explain the downturn in the inverted-U 
shaped relationship through the mechanism of the trust formed in embedded ties, 
which acts as a substitute for more formal forms of coordination between 
organizations and can reduce the costs of coordination (Macaulay, 1963; Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994, 1992). 
The presence of this interorganizational trust in a current relationship 
raises the costs of establishing a new relationship (Broschak, 1999), which opens 
the possibility of less effective relationships persisting over time.  At some point, 
the effectiveness of the relationship may deteriorate to a level at which the costs 
of establishing a new relationship are less than the costs associated with 
maintaining the current relationship.  Das and Teng (2000b) suggest that failure of 
a relationship may occur when too much emphasis is placed on relationship 
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building and short-term performance is ignored.  Similarly, Uzzi (1997) found 
that overembeddedness was harmful to organizational performance. 
Research about the formation of interpersonal relationships across 
organizational boundaries also supports the embeddedness argument (Adams, 
1976; Granovetter, 1985).  Interpersonal relationships become more likely the 
longer the duration of an interorganizational relationship.  In fact, a recent study 
found that attachment between boundary spanners increased with the length of the 
tenure overlap (Luo, 2001).  Another study suggested that the longer the 
boundary-spanning personnel were in their positions in both organizations, the 
less likely the relationship between the organizations was to dissolve (Seabright et 
al., 1992).  In a recent study of advertising executives, Broschak (1999) also 
found support for this effect.  As a potential explanation for this effect, Uzzi 
(1996) proposed that embedded ties increased interorganizational trust.  When 
boundary spanning interpersonal relationships are effective, they can facilitate the 
creation and maintenance of effective interorganizational relationships.  In fact, 
Broschak (1999) found that some of these relationships were so important that 
clients moved with an account executive from agency to agency.  This finding 
shows that interpersonal relationships are important to facilitating exchange 
between organizations.  These ties increased the survival likelihood of the 
organization involved in them and possibly the effectiveness of the organizations 
(Uzzi, 1997, 1996). 
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Structural Attachment.  In combining the transaction cost and 
embeddedness arguments, Baker and colleagues (1998) argued that 
interorganizational relationships persisted because of a structural attachment 
between the organizations.  Structural attachment includes both the transaction 
cost argument of relationship-specific assets and the trust argument of 
embeddedness.  The theory behind structural attachment suggests that as 
relationships endure, the investments and embeddedness that have developed 
takes hold within the actual structures of the organizations (Baker et al., 1998).  
This may occur through shared software and hardware systems that influence 
future asset acquisition or relationships that give individuals positions of greater 
power and influence over decision-making within both organizations. 
Research has found support for both a transaction cost argument and a 
socially embedded argument, and researchers suggest that studies that only 
consider one or the other are incomplete in their understanding (Gulati, 1995; 
Saxton, 1997).  Other researchers have also argued that interorganizational 
relationships become structurally embedded in organizations through institutional 
processes (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Zucker, 1977).  A recent study found that 
goal congruence between organizational partners was an important determinant of 
increased attachment between the organizations (Luo, 2001).   
Number of Partners 
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The second area covered in this literature review of the interorganizational 
relationship is the effect of the number of partners involved in the relationship on 
the success of the relationship in accomplishing its objectives.  Uzzi (1997) found 
that at some point additional relationships decreased the firm’s chance of survival.  
Thus he found that a large number of relationships could decrease the 
effectiveness of interorganizational relationships at enhancing organizational 
performance.  I review the following three attributes of the number of partners 
that influence the effectiveness of interorganizational relationships: coordination 
costs, competition, and relationship-specific investments. 
Coordination Costs.  As the number of partners increases, coordination 
costs also increase.  Transaction costs economics predicts that an increase in the 
number of partners, will lead to an increase in the transaction costs and a decrease 
in the performance of the relationships (Williamson, 1985).  This is due to the fact 
that with additional resources and especially additional partners that are 
independent in their operation from one another but potentially interdependent in 
their effect on the organization comes increased coordination costs (Galbraith, 
1977).  This increase in the complexity of the maintenance of the relationships 
can decrease the performance and effectiveness of the relationships (Thompson, 
1967). 
In a study of corporations and investment banks, Podolny (1994) found 
that conditions of high uncertainty and high risk led corporations to reselect 
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investment banks with which they had previous relationships.  His argument for 
this behavior was that in the absence of information in the environment about the 
upcoming transaction, the corporation chose a bank that they had a previous 
relationship with to reduce the uncertainty of the actions of the investment bank.  
As mentioned above, Baker (1990) also found that organizations tend to reuse 
partners with whom they have established previous relationships.  Another 
possible explanation for reuse of partners is to decrease the coordination costs of 
developing additional relationships.  When the number of partners increases 
above the level of the organization’s capacity to maintain the ties, the 
effectiveness of each relationship may be decreased. 
Competition.  As the number of partners increases, the ability to maintain 
high quality relationships with each partner may decrease.  This occurs for two 
reasons.  The first is related to the level of competition between different partners 
of the client, which usually increases as the number of partners increases (Baker, 
1990).  Competition may affect relationship quality through a decrease in trust 
between the organizations involved in the partnerships.  Trust is likely to be low 
between agencies that are in competition with a large number of other agencies 
working with the same client.  This loss of trust between agencies can play a role 
in reducing effectiveness as the number of partners increases.  Effectiveness will 
be reduced when the competition between agencies increases to the point that 
 62
agencies actions are targeted at harming or discrediting another agency or 
increasing their status with the client instead of serving the interests of the client. 
The effect of this increase of competition has been described as upsetting a 
balance between cooperation and competition (Das and Teng, 2000b).  Without 
the proper balance between cooperation and competition, an interorganizational 
relationship is less likely to continue and even less likely to be effective.  In 
further support of this argument, Baker (1990) argued that an increase in the 
number of partners would likely increase the external market discipline that will 
be imposed upon the relationships.  However, this may be at the potential cost of 
the benefits of loyalty and good faith negotiations that come with higher quality 
relationships with fewer partners (Macaulay, 1963). 
Relationship-Specific Investments.  The trust mentioned by Granovetter 
(1985) requires maintenance of the interpersonal and interorganizational 
relationships.  This is usually accomplished through relationship-specific 
investments.  As the quantity of interorganizational relationships increases, the 
resources available to make these types of investments decreases, for at least 
some of the partnerships.  Thus organizations are limited in the number of such 
relationships that they can effectively maintain.  
Resource dependence theory also predicts that the organization involved 
in the relationship with the greater availability of substitutes will likely have more 
influence and be able to dissolve any one substitutable relationship with less cost 
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(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Thus, when a client with more partners does not 
invest individually in each relationship, it is more likely one relationship will be 
substitutable for another.  Clients may pursue this course to decrease their 
dependence on a particular agency.  However, over time as the client does not 
invest specifically in its interorganizational relationships, the relationships do not 
become uniquely valuable to the client and it becomes less likely that each 
relationships will be effective. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature on reputation and outsourcing to 
reveal the link between the determinants of reputation and the consequences of 
outsourcing.  I then reviewed some of the literature that differentiates between 
strategic and tactical activities of an organization.  This review provides 
information that is used in Chapter Three and Chapter Four for hypothesis 
generation and operationalization of these differences.  I also reviewed a limited 
portion of the literature on interorganizational relationships, focusing on the 
duration of an interorganizational relationship and the effect of the number of 
partners on the effectiveness of the relationship.  This literature review prepares 
for the discussion of the hypotheses to be tested in this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
This research explored some of the factors that were likely to influence the 
effectiveness of outsourcing organizational impression management work.  I 
examined three specific indicators of effectiveness: reputation, quality of 
incoming students, and perceived effectiveness of organizational impression 
management activities.  Although reputation is the primary target of 
organizational impression management activities, I also examined student quality, 
because as mentioned in the previous chapter, reputation is not readily or quickly 
changed.  Thus I have selected this additional dependent variable that is more 
malleable and may potentially foreshadow changes in reputation.  The quality of 
incoming students is a key determinant of reputation in the setting for this study.  
In preliminary interviews with organizational impression management 
professionals in colleges and universities, they mentioned this variable as a 
measure that they used to determine whether their activities were successful.  
Thus I selected this variable as a dependent variable that changes more quickly 
than reputation.  Due to the organizational-level nature of these dependent 
variables, the hypotheses developed in this chapter were tested only at the 
organizational level. 
Factors that may influence the effectiveness of the outsourcing of 
organizational impression management were divided into two overarching areas.  
The first of these was related to the nature of the specific task that was being 
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outsourced.  The second overarching area was related to the relationship between 
the client and the agency.  Hypotheses for all of these factors are detailed in 
Figure 1 and Table 1. 
Nature of the task 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the distinction between strategic and tactical 
activities is important for many types of work, including organizational 
impression management work.  Strategic activities have greater impact, 
complexity, and uncertainty than tactical activities.  All strategic organizational 
impression management activities do not necessarily possess all of these 
attributes, but when compared with tactical organizational impression 
management activities, they have greater levels of the attributes they do possess.  
This is also not to say that a sequence of tactical organizational impression 
management activities might not possess these attributes, but that a single tactical 
organizational impression management activity does not.  A sequence of tactical 
organizational impression management activities may constitute a strategic 
organizational impression management activity (Mintzberg, 1978).  As an 
example, the creation and implementation of a plan outlining the direction and 
goal of organizational impression management activities for the next three years 
would be a strategic organizational impression management activity.  This 
activity has high impact, is highly complex, and includes high levels of 
uncertainty.  However, creating a brochure describing a single product or service 
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to a single constituent of the organization would be a tactical organizational 
impression management activity.  This activity has limited impact, and 
comparatively low levels of complexity and uncertainty.   
The previous examples are not meant to suggest that all three attributes 
need to be present to classify an activity as strategic or tactical.  For example, the 
coordination of publications across departments would be high in impact and 
complexity, but would not be as high in uncertainty as the creation of the overall 
organizational impression management plan from the example above.  This would 
still be a strategic activity.  Below, I discuss several reasons why it is likely to be 
more difficult to outsource strategic activities effectively than it is to outsource 
tactical activities effectively. 
Due to the extended timeframe and broad scope of strategic activities, as 
described in the previous chapter, proprietary knowledge about the organization 
and its routines, procedures, policies, and relevant constituents is necessary to 
enhance the reputation of an organization through strategic organizational 
impression management efforts.  Detailed proprietary knowledge about the 
organization is needed because any effort to enhance an organization’s reputation 
with false, misleading, or ignorant claims is unlikely to succeed and may indeed 
backfire, especially if deception is attributed to an organizational impression 
management activity (see Alsop, 2001 for an example). 
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Using these types of claims is less troublesome in tactical organizational 
impression management activities due to the nature of the activities, since they 
have a more targeted audience and usually unfold over a shorter period of time.  
For the output of a tactical activity, to which the constituents are only minimally 
exposed, such false, misleading, or ignorant claims may not be noticed.  Thus, the 
cost of ignorance is much lower for the output of tactical activities than for 
strategic organizational impression management activities to which constituents 
are exposed over a long period of time.  Thus, to be successful outsourcing 
strategic activities, a client would usually have to transfer firm-specific 
knowledge to the agency or agencies working on these activities so that the 
agencies do not make misrepresentative claims when completing a strategic 
organizational impression management activity. 
There are at least two obstacles to the transfer of this firm-specific 
knowledge.  First, some of this firm-specific knowledge may be of a proprietary 
nature.  From the viewpoint of the client, this leads to the possibility that the 
agency could use the knowledge to take advantage of the organization.  For 
example, an agency may learn detailed information about consumer preferences 
during client focus groups.  Similarly, an agency might also learn about the 
preferences of media representatives and how they affect the client’s interactions 
with the media.  Such knowledge could be a source of competitive advantage for 
an agency, because they could use it to provide solutions to strategic 
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contingencies either for their current client or for other clients (Hickson et al., 
1971).  Thus opportunism is a potential threat and contracts would have to be 
particularly complex in this type of relationship.  This increases the transaction 
costs associated with this type of outsourcing (Williamson, 1985). 
Second, from the viewpoint of the agency, the transfer of this type of 
knowledge would require a large investment in the relationship with the client.  
The knowledge gained through such a transfer has a high level of human asset 
specificity because it is not very useful when working with other clients.  Thus 
transaction costs are high for an agency to engage in this type of work 
(Williamson, 1985).  Unless the agency has sufficient spare resources to tie up 
with one client, they may be more likely to attempt to complete the activity 
without making the long-term investments that are required.  This concern for the 
investment in work with such high human asset specificity and the associated 
attempt to avoid making long-term investments may be heightened if the agency 
fears that the relationship could be terminated before the knowledge transfer has 
been completed.  In this case, there is a large opportunity cost of the investment 
required to obtain knowledge where the largest pay-offs do not come until much 
later. 
The probability of early termination when working on strategic activities 
is relatively high because, given the complexity and uncertainty of strategic 
activities, these activities often take a long time to generate results.  Also 
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reputation is much more difficult to enhance than to degrade (Alsop, 2001).  
Many agencies work on monthly retainers, and unless there are spare resources 
within the client organization it will be difficult for members of the client 
organization to continue to justify to either top management, board members, or 
investors the continued use of organizational resources for an effort that does not 
seem to be achieving its intended results in the short-run. 
In addition, the costs of organizational impression management activities 
when completed in-house may be less visible and harder to determine than when 
these same activities are outsourced.  Therefore, when outsourced these activities 
may seem more costly than when completed in-house.  Thus even if the barriers 
detailed above are overcome in the short run, the greater visibility of the cost of 
outsourced activities may cause the efforts to be cut off before they can be 
effective at enhancing reputation. 
Although not immediately obvious, the impact of early termination is 
significant for an agency, even considering the large retainers they receive.  The 
resources assigned to a client’s strategic impression management activities are 
being shaped to serve the specific needs and systems of one client instead of being 
shaped to gain the general knowledge and experience that will be required to 
work with a broad base of clients in the future.  This becomes especially pertinent 
should the client in which these resources have been invested discard the agency 
prematurely.  At the point in which the agency is discarded, these resources will 
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be difficult to reallocate, since by definition they are specific to the client and lose 
much of their value in any other deployment.  For example, extensive knowledge 
of the bureaucratic and political structure of a client may be very valuable in a 
relationship with that client, but almost useless in another relationship. 
Agencies with such specific assets will be limited in their ability to 
compete with agencies that have not deployed their resources in client-specific 
activities over a long period of time.  Therefore, in the long run, agencies that 
place their resources into these types of relationships may find that their resources 
cannot compete with the resources of other agencies that have been used for a 
wide variety of jobs at various clients. 
Because both clients and agencies have strong disincentives to invest in 
the transfer of firm-specific knowledge necessary to complete strategic activities, 
when strategic organizational impression management activities enhancing 
reputation are outsourced they are much less likely to be effective than when they 
are maintained within the organization.  It is possible that an organization could 
overcome these limitations through a superior interface with an agency and 
successfully outsource these types of activities.  However, I do not expect to find 
these superior interfaces to be the modal form because of the barriers that exist to 
their formation.  Some barriers to forming these superior interfaces include 
unclear long-term specifications for agency work, uncertain costs to achieve 
strategic objectives, and difficulty in measuring performance (Stinchcombe, 
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1985).  In addition, a superior interface would require complex coordination and 
communication on multiple dimensions within the dyad, which would increase 
coordination costs (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986; Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Thompson, 1967).  Therefore, I believe that such superior interfaces will be rare.  
Without a superior interface, it will be difficult for agencies to execute strategic 
activities effectively.  Agencies may also be at substantial risk of taking actions 
that will not improve, and may possibly degrade, the reputation of the client.  
Therefore, this discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1a: There will be a negative relationship between the level of 
outsourcing of strategic organizational impression management 
activities to agencies and both the client’s reputation and the 
quality of incoming students. 
The difficulties of creating reputational gains through outsourced strategic 
organizational impression management activities are also likely to influence the 
perceived effectiveness of organizational impression management activities.  
Considering the difficulty of measuring reputation and the nature of strategic 
organizational impression management activities, it is possible that an activity 
could be effective at improving reputation in the long run, but not be perceived as 
effective at the time of the client’s measurement (e.g., at the time of an annual 
budget cycle or contract renewal).  Therefore, it is important to consider the effect 
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of outsourcing strategic organizational impression management activities on the 
perceived effectiveness of organizational impression management activities.   
Because strategic activities are complex and uncertain and often evolve 
over an extended period of time, they are more difficult to coordinate than tactical 
activities.  Also, internal organizational impression management staff may feel a 
need to reinforce the value of their own work and put the work of agencies as 
second in importance.  Since outsourced strategic activities are difficult to 
objectively judge and internal staff will frequently underrate the contributions 
made by agencies, outsourced strategic activities are more likely to be perceived 
as ineffective than similar activities performed internally.  In addition, as 
mentioned above the results of such activities are achieved over time and are hard 
to measure and thus easier for the client to perceive as ineffective in the short-
term.  This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1b: There will be a negative relationship between the level of 
outsourcing of strategic organizational impression management 
activities to agencies and the perceived effectiveness of 
organizational impression management activities. 
Tactical vs. Strategic Outsourcing Effectiveness 
While strategic organizational impression management activities are 
unlikely to be effective when outsourced, tactical organizational impression 
management activities do lend themselves well to outsourcing.  Tactical 
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organizational impression management activities address the current impression 
of the client organization on one content-specific and audience-specific 
dimension.  For example, an agency may be asked to create an informational 
brochure for a single product to be distributed to potential first-time buyers of that 
product.  Or an agency may be asked to write a press release about the opening of 
a new production site in the city in which the agency is based.  There are three 
variables that might explain why outsourcing tactical organizational impression 
management activities is likely to be more effective than outsourcing strategic 
organizational impression management activities and more optimal than 
completing tactical organizational impression management activities internally: 
knowledge requirements, shorter timeframe, and resource allocation.  Review of 
the first two variables suggests why outsourcing tactical activities is more optimal 
than outsourcing strategic activities.  The third variable suggests why outsourcing 
tactical activities is more optimal than internal completion.  
Knowledge Requirements.  While strategic organizational impression 
management activities often require proprietary or tacit knowledge of the 
organization and a willingness to continue efforts over a long period of time, 
tactical organizational impression management activities do not require as much 
knowledge of the organization or as long of a commitment.  Instead they require 
knowledge of the current situation and of the likely range of responses to this 
particular event and audience(s). 
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Since only limited knowledge transfer is required to perform tactical 
organizational impression management activities, the risk of opportunism is 
decreased and contracting is much simpler.  For example, the risk of agency 
opportunism is reduced because the agency has relatively little client-specific 
information to share with competitors.  These differences reduce the transaction 
costs associated with outsourcing this type of organizational impression 
management work (Williamson, 1985). 
Shorter Timeframe. Also in contrast to outsourcing strategic 
organizational impression management activities, tactical organizational 
impression management activities have a shorter timeframe in which success or 
failure can be determined.  A change in reputation limited to one constituency on 
one issue can be made more quickly and completely than the more global change 
usually sought by strategic organizational impression management activities.  
Thus agencies do not have to invest into their efforts as long before they, and their 
clients, see returns on their efforts.  Thus the risk of premature termination is less 
for tactical than strategic activities.   
Also due to the limited scope of these activities, clients can measure 
success more accurately.  Therefore, clients can more quickly, easily, and 
completely assess the results of the resources that are being used to enhance 
reputation through these activities.  Thus they can be satisfied more quickly with 
work that is enhancing reputation or cut off efforts that are not.  Thus outsourcing 
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decisions for tactical activities can be adjusted and evaluated regularly and over 
time are more likely to be effective as those that are less effective are quickly 
discarded by the client.  Also since these activities are less uncertain and complex 
and more likely to be similar from year to year, the client can apply their 
experience from past successes and failures more accurately to their future 
decisions.  Thus the original decisions about outsourcing tactical activities are 
likely to be more accurate and the work completed due to these decisions more 
effective. 
The two reasons described above significantly reduce the problems 
associated with outsourcing strategic activities when outsourcing tactical 
organizational impression management activities.  The third reason, below, 
describes why it is superior to outsource tactical organizational impression 
management activities than to retain them in-house. 
Resource Allocation.  Most organizations have limited resources to devote 
to each task within the organization.  Limits to organizational impression 
management resources will limit the ability of the organization to keep sufficient 
staff on hand to deal with all of the tactical organizational impression 
management activities that could potentially benefit the reputation of the 
organization. 
Since there is limited transfer of firm-specific knowledge and human asset 
specificity is low in tactical organizational impression management activities 
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when compared to strategic organizational impression management activities, 
these activities have relatively low transaction costs and can be purchased as a 
market commodity.  In other words, there are many substitutes available to 
internal staffing, in the form of agencies, to do this work.  According to resource 
dependence theory, organizational resources are best used to reduce the 
dependency of the organization on important resources that do not have readily 
available substitutes (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Therefore, for an organization 
to invest significant resources in tactical organizational impression management 
activities would usually be an unwise and sub-optimal use of those resources. 
The development of resources within the organization to address 
organizational impression management activities, by similar logic, should focus 
on the areas of organizational impression management for which there are limited 
substitutes.  Thus the internal resources that are developed should address 
organizational impression management issues that are unique to the organization 
or at least that are uncommon to other organizations.  This could include gaining 
an in-depth knowledge of the various constituencies of an organization and 
developing relationships with these constituencies.  It might also include 
positioning the role of organizational impression management as an important one 
to the internal leadership of the organization. 
Such activities are examples of addressing areas of organizational 
impression management work where substitutes for internal staff are not available 
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and the knowledge that is gained is firm-specific.  By developing in these areas, 
the organization uses its resources to know and understand how to deal with its 
specific organizational impression management needs better than anyone else in 
the world.  Many tactical organizational impression management activities do not 
require this type of knowledge and development of the knowledge required to do 
these activities will incur opportunity costs as discussed above.  For example, a 
client can instruct an agency in the desired content of a brochure and the goals 
that the brochure would accomplish without maintaining the ability to create and 
produce the brochure internally (a fairly generally available ability). 
Under the assumptions that organizations have limited resources and that 
they cannot develop both superior, non-substitutable knowledge of firm-specific 
organizational impression management needs and substitutable knowledge of 
non-specific organizational impression management needs, they should focus on 
those aspects of organizational impression management work that are most 
critical to the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  In addition, any 
development in either type of knowledge required to do organizational impression 
management work constitutes sunk costs that can increase exit barriers for future 
decisions (Harrigan, 1985, 1980; Rosenbaum and Lamort, 1992).  Thus 
organizations cannot necessarily reallocate resources between strategic and 
tactical activities quickly, and their past choices constrain future actions. 
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From the above discussion, I argue that because of the limited types of 
knowledge required to complete tactical organizational impression management 
activities and the shorter timeframe required to complete these activities they will 
be more effective when outsourced to agencies than strategic organizational 
impression management activities.  In addition, I would propose that clients that 
develop firm-specific organizational impression management knowledge would 
be more successful in enhancing their own reputation than those that do not 
because their investments are centered in important resources for which there are 
few substitutes.  Further I would suggest that the internal development of non 
firm-specific organizational impression management knowledge to provide 
tactical organizational impression management activities within the organization 
would limit the development of the knowledge required for the optimal internal 
use of organizational impression management resources.  The discussion above 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: There will be a positive relationship between the level of 
outsourcing of tactical organizational impression management 
activities to agencies and both the client’s reputation and the 
quality of incoming students. 
Nature of the relationship 
The second overarching area of this research concerns the relationship 
between the client and the agency.  For this study, three factors will be assessed to 
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determine the nature of the relationship: outsourcing intensity, duration of client-
agency relationship, and number of partners. 
Outsourcing Intensity 
Outsourcing intensity considers the difference between clients that 
outsource a limited amount of work and clients that outsource a great deal of their 
work.  Researchers have found that when organizations move from low levels of 
outsourcing to higher levels that performance decreases and outsourcing is less 
effective (Hui et al., 2000).  One could argue that this takes place because of 
increased coordination costs due to management of the additional workload across 
organizational boundaries (Galbraith, 1977; Thompson, 1967). 
Changes in coordination costs can also explain the finding by researchers 
that, when moving from high levels of outsourcing to complete outsourcing, 
performance improves (Hui et al., 2000).  This switch from high levels of 
outsourcing to complete outsourcing would decrease the coordination costs, since 
the role of the client would be changed from involvement and oversight to only 
oversight.  However, I only found ten cases where clients outsourced all of their 
strategic activities and only two cases where clients outsourced all of their tactical 
activities.  Therefore, I do not hypothesize the improvement found at the right tail 
of the outsourcing distribution by other researchers. 
A second potential consequence of high levels of outsourcing intensity 
that may reduce effectiveness involves an increased possibility of conflicts 
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between employees of the agencies and the client involved in the outsourcing 
relationship, as discussed in Chapter Two.  This potential may increase with high 
levels of outsourcing intensity because differences in status and unclear 
relationships between employees of the organization and employees of its 
outsourcing partners become more salient due to increased interaction (Broschak 
and Davis-Blake, 1998; Geary, 1992; Hui et al., 2000; Smith, 1994).  This loss of 
effectiveness may also occur if the cultures of the organization and its partners are 
significantly different.  Since researchers have argued that integrating cultures can 
be very difficult and disruptive to an organization (Schein, 1992; Trice and Beyer, 
1993), when the level of integration required is high due to high levels of 
outsourcing intensity, differences in organizational culture that were previously 
ignored or relatively minor may create conflict that decreases the effectiveness of 
the interorganizational relationships.  Based on the preceding arguments, I 
hypothesize the following: 
H3: There will be a negative relationship between the outsourcing 
intensity of a client and both the client’s reputation and the quality 
of incoming students. 
Duration of Client-Agency Relationship 
As discussed in Chapter Two, duration can have both positive and 
negative effects on an interorganizational relationship.  Increasing relationship 
duration facilitates investments in relationship-specific investments, creates 
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embedded social ties, and facilitates structural attachment.  However, these 
features also create barriers to exiting the relationship when its value declines.  
Also, it can be argued that eventually an agency may become so enmeshed in the 
culture of the organization that it can no longer offer the benefits of an outside 
third-party to the organization (Matusik and Hill, 1998).  Benefits that may 
decrease with an extended relationship include the transfer of unknown, public 
knowledge (i.e., industry best practices) from the agency to the client, or the 
agency’s ability to evaluate current organizational practices from a disinterested 
viewpoint. 
Even though both a negative effect and a positive effect are argued in the 
literature, and I believe both can be observed in practice, it is unlikely that I 
would find the negative effects in my sample.  These effects require a relationship 
that is longer term and more enmeshed than the relationships that I expect to 
observe in my sample.  Anecdotal evidence from preliminary interviews with 
organizational impression management professionals in colleges and universities 
suggests that these relationships usually last less than ten years, and in my sample 
there are no relationships longer than ten years in duration.  In fact, they often 
change with a change in the leadership within the institution: a new member on 
the board of regents, a new president, a new vice president of advancement, or a 
new director of organizational impression management work.  Therefore, I do not 
hypothesize a negative effect of duration, even though I recognize it as a 
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possibility in some settings.  Thus, the discussion above leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H4a: There will be a positive relationship between the mean 
duration of a client’s relationships with its agencies and both the 
client’s reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
Just as longer duration relationships will lead to greater effectiveness of 
outsourcing organizational impression management work, they will also lead to 
higher levels of perceived effectiveness of activities performed by long-standing 
partners.  As a relationship grows over time, the individuals involved in the 
relationship invest in relationship specific assets.  These assets should improve the 
actual effectiveness of the relationship and therefore the perceived effectiveness.  
Employees who have made these investments may feel that since they have put so 
much into the relationship that it must be worth the investments they have made.  
This is not dissimilar to the arguments made in the literature on escalation of 
commitment and sunk costs (Brockner, 1992; Harrigan, 1985, 1980; Staw and 
Ross, 1987).  Thus the actual improvement in performance and the psychological 
effects of the investment lead to the following hypothesis: 
H4b: There will be a positive relationship between the mean 
duration of a client’s relationships with its agencies and the level 
of perceived effectiveness of organizational impression 
management activities. 
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In addition to the main effects above, I hypothesize that duration 
will interact with the level of outsourcing of tactical organizational 
impression management activities.  When a client has outsourced a high 
level of tactical organizational impression management activities to 
agencies they have used for a long period of time, relationship-specific 
investments decrease the coordination costs involved with additional 
tactical organizational impression management activities.  This occurs 
more easily with tactical organizational impression management activities 
because they are less complex, and involve less uncertainty than strategic 
activities.  Thus, tactical organizational impression management activities 
lend themselves well to the establishment of routine policies and 
procedures.  This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4c:  The mean duration of a client’s relationships with agencies 
and the level of outsourcing of tactical organizational impression 
management activities will have a joint positive effect on both the 
client’s reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
Number of Partners 
The second of the factors related to the relationship between clients and 
agencies considers the number of outsourcing partners that a client maintains 
simultaneously.  As discussed in Chapter Two, some potential disadvantages to a 
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large number of partners are increased coordination costs, dysfunctional 
competition between partners, and less investment in relationship-specific assets. 
On the other hand, Baker (1990) argues that an increase in the number of 
partners can increase the external market discipline that will be imposed upon the 
relationships.  External market discipline leads to anticipation by each agency that 
if it does not perform better than other possible, substitute agencies it will be 
replaced in the future by a more effective agency.  Thus this discipline should 
improve the effectiveness of any one agency in its relationships with a client.  
Another potential benefit to the client with more agency partners is that if client 
has more partners than the agencies, it is likely to have greater influence on the 
agencies than they have on the client and depend on the inputs of a specific 
agency less.  This assumes that the relationships are substitutes for each other and 
that each relationship is not unique in the benefits that it can bring to the client 
organization. 
For the purposes of this study, I recognize that a large number of partners 
may have either a positive or negative effect on the effectiveness of the 
outsourcing of organizational impression management work.  A large number of 
partners can benefit a client through greater available resources, in the form of 
additional human resources, time, and knowledge, to enhance reputation.  
Increased market discipline can keep agencies competing for business, and 
reduced dependencies can increase the power of the organization over portions of 
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its environment.  However, with additional resources and especially additional 
agencies come increased coordination costs (Galbraith, 1977).  I argue that 
increased coordination costs and loss of trust between partners can offset the 
benefits of additional hands and minds to enhance reputation and that 
opportunism can replace trust and good faith.  This is likely to occur, because 
agencies may compete for business and lose sight of the client’s interests.  This is 
also likely due to the reality of coordination costs even in ideal partnerships.  The 
following hypothesis follows from this discussion: 
H5a: There will be a negative relationship between the number of 
agency partners maintained by a client and both the client’s 
reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
In addition to the main effect above, I hypothesize that number of partners 
will interact with outsourcing intensity.  The arguments for reduced effectiveness 
due to increased outsourcing intensity and a large number of partners are even 
more powerful in this setting.  First, coordination costs will be higher since there 
are more partners with which to coordinate the higher level of outsourcing 
activity.  Second, conflicts are more likely between the client and the agencies 
due to increased interaction of individuals and increased collisions of 
organizational cultures.  Third, dysfunctional conflict is more likely because the 
agencies that are competing with each other are aware of the high level of 
outsourcing and the large potential rewards for agencies that survive the 
 86
competition.  Fourth, the need for relationship-specific investments is even greater 
with higher outsourcing intensity, but even less likely with a large number of 
partners.  Thus I hypothesize the following: 
H5b:  The number of agency partners maintained by a client and 
the level of outsourcing intensity will have a joint negative effect 
on both the client’s reputation and the quality of incoming 
students. 
This chapter has presented the theory and the hypotheses that were 
tested in this study.  The next chapter presents the research methodology 
that was used to test these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the research methodology to be used in the 
proposed study.  First, I describe the setting for the study.  Second, I describe the 
sample, sampling technique, and data sources.  Third, I describe the dependent, 
independent, and control variables.  Finally, I review the estimation methods used 
to test the hypotheses. 
Setting 
The setting for this study was the population of four-year private colleges 
and universities with between 500 and 5000 students.  This size criterion was 
bounded at the upper end by Peterson’s Guide to Four-Year Colleges, which 
differentiates smaller from larger institutions at 5000 students.  The lower bound 
of the size criterion was selected after discussions with chief public relations 
officers at private colleges and universities in which they stated that institutions 
with fewer than 500 students would approach organizational impression 
management work through qualitatively different methods than larger institutions, 
since these smaller institutions in many cases would have one-person shops for 
these functions.   
This study used private institutions instead of public institutions because 
reputation is likely to have a substantial impact on the ability of private 
institutions to attract students and perform well.  Public institutions have more 
limited reliance on reputation than private institutions due to regional loyalties 
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that many state-sponsored, public schools benefit from and the funding that is 
granted to public institutions by legislative bodies, decreasing their reliance on 
tuition.  Given that research in this area is limited and in an early stage of 
development, this setting was chosen, since it was appropriate to test the 
hypotheses in a setting where they were likely to be confirmed.  Data were 
collected for this study for the academic years 1997-1998 through 2001-2002 
inclusive. 
The phenomenon studied within this setting was the organizational 
impression management work done by this group of colleges and universities.  In 
this setting, as in others, organizational impression management goes by multiple 
names.  In private colleges and universities some of the departments within which 
this work is done are public relations, press relations, media relations, public 
affairs, institutional advancement, institutional development, information services, 
college relations, institutional relations, external relations, and external 
communications. 
This setting was ideal for testing the hypotheses for three reasons.  First, 
reputation is important to the performance of this group of colleges.  While for a 
corporation, its reputation may be less important than its overall profitability, the 
reputation of a private college is central to its success.  Like all colleges and 
universities, private colleges have many of the attributes of organizations for 
which reputation is important to success, as discussed in Chapter Two: those who 
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interact with the organization can only imperfectly observe the organization’s 
strategy (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992; Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982), information about the true state of the organization is incomplete, 
and consumers cannot differentiate between high and low quality before 
purchasing a good or service (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988).  In colleges and 
universities, the outcome of purchasing the service is known only years after the 
initial purchase decision has been made, and the technical core is relatively 
unobservable by most outside the institution. 
Also interesting for a setting of colleges and universities is that, in a study 
of auditing firms, DeAngelo (1981) found that the more an organization stands to 
lose from a decline in reputation, the more the organization worries about their 
reputation.  The concern for reputation in colleges and universities is great which 
suggests that preserving reputation is an important objective.  For example, at 
Hobart and William Smith Colleges a drop in the U.S. News and World Report 
rankings cost a professor her position as senior vice president (Dobbin, 2000).  
Similarly, in a study of interorganizational emulation decisions in colleges and 
universities, Labianca and colleagues (2001) found that reputation, image, and 
identity played important roles in determining a target for emulation.  They found 
that colleges and universities emulated the attributes of institutions that they felt 
had similar reputations.  Thus not only are personnel decisions based on the 
reputation of a private college or university, but many of the operating decisions 
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that are made are based on the reputation of the institution.  This indicates the 
central role played by reputation for these institutions. 
From research on the effects of reputation on colleges and universities, 
Astin and Solmon (1979) reported that perceptions of quality and reputation drove 
the ability to attract good students.  In a related finding, Matthews and Hadley 
(1993) found that a student’s perception of the quality of an institution was 
significantly related to their probability of applying to that institution.  For private 
colleges and universities, with a high level of tuition dependence and a small 
endowment, tuition is a major source of income.  In these cases, effects of 
reputation on student applications reflect directly on the “bottom line” of the 
institution. 
Second, this setting was ideal for this study because reputation for these 
private colleges is measured in a variety of ways and by a variety of sources.  
Therefore, detailed data on the reputation of these private colleges were available 
to test the hypotheses. 
There is a third reason that private colleges were a good setting for 
research involving organizational impression management.  These colleges, like 
other organizations, are vulnerable to macroeconomic conditions.  Typically 
economic downturns are difficult for private colleges and universities because 
they reduce contributions and also increase the economic pressure on students 
who are attending school (Lively, 2001; Van der Werf, 2001).  While it is true 
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that private colleges may be able to weather these conditions in the short run since 
they are less dependent on state budgetary funding than public institutions, this 
merely creates a lag before they will feel the effect of a downturn (Brownstein, 
2001).  Most of the 1990s were great years for private colleges as they rode the 
growth of the economy (Lively, 2001); however, the current downturn increases 
the importance of reputation and its ability to bring in continued revenue.  Thus, 
this was a good time to study private colleges and universities because the period 
of the study covered both good times and the beginning of an economic downturn.  
This window of time provided an opportunity to study the phenomenon at 
different times when the success or failure of impression management efforts was 
both more important and somewhat less important to the performance of these 
colleges. 
This sample of private colleges and universities may limit external 
validity, even within academic settings, because these institutions are different 
than either larger private colleges and universities or public universities in their 
dependence on reputation.  It will also limit generalizability to the private sector.  
However, I feel that the trade-offs for increased internal validity, through holding 
factors constant that might otherwise conceal the effects proposed in this study, 
are worth the limits mentioned above to external validity.  In addition, this was an 
early study in this area and future studies can be conducted to determine the 
generalizability of these findings to other types of organizations. 
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Sample 
In the 2002 Higher Education Directory, there were 962 accredited 
institutions in the universe of private colleges as defined in this study.  This 
directory is published by Higher Education Publications and includes all 
postsecondary institutions that are accredited according to one of two sources:  the 
U.S. Secretary of Education’s list of accrediting agencies and the list of 
accrediting agencies from the Council on Higher Education Accreditation 
(CHEA).  If schools are accredited by an agency not included in one of these two 
lists, they do not appear in this directory.  All institutions in this population were 
sent a survey.   
The population sampled was selected using three criteria: 
1.  private for profit or non-profit colleges or universities 
2.  offer four-year baccalaureate awards 
3.  enrollment of between 500 and 5000 students 
Data Sources 
Data needed to test the hypotheses were collected from several sources.  
These sources include a telephone survey, mail survey, archival data, and 
interview data.  The protocol for the telephone survey is presented in Appendix A.  
The mail survey instrument described below is presented in Appendix B.  Tables 
2, 3, 4, and 5 describe the variables, measures, and sources for dependent, 
independent, and control variables. 
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Background Interviews:  Background data on public relations and the role 
of public relations in private colleges and universities were collected from a series 
of semi-structured interviews with public relations practitioners and researchers in 
a variety of positions, industry sectors, and regions of the nation.  These semi-
structured interviews were conducted with thirteen individuals. 
These individuals worked in organizational impression management in the 
following areas: online training, computer systems and services, public relations 
agency work, university public relations, and national nonprofit organizations.  
They were located in Arizona, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington D.C.  
Interviews were either conducted over the phone or in person.  Interviews lasted 
between 30 and 60 minutes. 
The interviews served three purposes.  First, they provided valuable 
background information used during the development and operationalization of 
the hypotheses.  Second, they provided support for the research and help in 
developing the contacts necessary to develop semantically correct survey items 
for items specific to this research setting.  Third, the interviews provided a rich 
source of qualitative data to aid in the interpretation of the quantitative data 
analysis. 
Telephone Survey:  A telephone survey (see Appendix A) was used to 
develop items for the mail survey.  This survey was conducted with a convenience 
sample of 18 chief public relations officers at private colleges and universities 
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from my sample.  These interviews lasted approximately 30 minutes.  They were 
held with individuals located in California, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington D.C., and Wisconsin.  These 
respondents were the individuals at their institutions who had the highest titles 
related to impression management work.   
During semi-structured interviews, respondents were asked to describe 
common organizational impression management activities and rate them on 
frequency of use and strategic importance.  Based on these responses, a set of 
strategic and tactical activities was chosen for inclusion in the mail survey.  The 
activities that were chosen as a result of these interviews were the following: 
news releases, media relations, print publications, electronic media, community 
relations, and government relations. 
These individuals were also asked whether these activities were strategic 
or tactical in nature.  Due to the popular use of these terms in workshops and the 
business press and the incorrect association of tactical with incomplete and 
ineffective efforts and strategic with complete and effective efforts, I was not able 
to get an accurate assessment of which activities were strategic or tactical in 
nature from these individuals.  Many individuals instead answered that they 
believed that they all should be used strategically.  Therefore, I make this 
distinction empirically from the responses to the specific items included in the 
survey rather than from comments made in the telephone survey. 
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Respondents were also asked to describe common institutional events that 
could disrupt or significantly effect organizational impression management work.  
The events that they identified most often and that I included in the final survey 
were the following: new president or vice-president, new public relations or 
communications leader or reporting structure, significant change in the public 
relations or communications budget, significant and unusual campus-related 
crisis, and a significant change in academic programs and offerings.  Other events 
were mentioned such as capital campaigns, but these were determined to be too 
frequent to be included in this measure, which was designed to capture events that 
would have an unusual and significant effect on organizational impression 
management work.  The telephone survey aided in the development of these items 
for the mail survey described below.  
Mail Survey:  A questionnaire (see Appendix B) was mailed through the 
U.S. Postal Service to the individual, at all 962 institutions meeting the criteria 
detailed above, that had the highest title related to impression management work 
(i.e., Director of College Relations, Director of University Relations, Director of 
Institutional Relations, Director of Communications, Director of Public 
Information, Director of Public Relations, or Vice President for Advancement).  A 
cover letter from the National Association of Independent Colleges and 
Universities (NAICU) recommending participation was included with the survey.  
A copy of this cover letter is presented as Appendix C. 
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This survey collected data on the strategic and tactical organizational 
impression management activities, identified in the telephone survey, that the 
institution participated in for the academic years included in the study.  It also 
collected data on the perceived effectiveness of these organizational impression 
management activities for the last year of data collection only, to improve the 
quality of respondents’ recall for these items.  In addition the survey collected a 
list of agency partners that had been used for the last five years and the duration 
of each of these relationships.  The following control variables were also collected 
in the survey: size of organizational impression management function, target 
population whether national or regional, and major institutional changes as 
defined from the telephone survey. 
The first mailing of surveys went to all 962 institutions identified by the 
three criteria detailed above and listed in the 2002 Higher Education Directory.  
Additionally, an e-mail was sent about the same time to all members of NAICU, 
through an internal listserve maintained and operated by that organization.  The 
survey was also posted on a website with multiple file formats available for 
download.  This was mentioned in the cover letter sent with the survey and in the 
listserve.  The website allowed all respondents either a traditional paper format or 
an electronic format for submitting their survey response.  After sufficient time 
had passed since the first mailing an e-mail reminder was sent to approximately 
500 of the institutions for which e-mails were available.  Soon thereafter a follow 
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up letter was sent to all the respondents requesting that they return the survey and 
redirecting them to the website if they had misplaced their original copy of the 
survey.   
These efforts resulted in 118 returned surveys.  One survey was unusable 
because it was completely blank, and on two others the name of the institution 
was not included and could not be determined.  After removing these three 
unusable responses there remained 115 usable responses or an overall 12% 
response rate.  This relatively low response rate could have been due in part to 
Anthrax mail scares in late 2001 that led to increased security measures and lower 
tolerance for bulk mailing.  It also may have been due to the nature of the 
schedules of the individuals that were targeted by the study.  As chief public 
relations officers, many of these individuals are responsible for a large scope of 
tasks and have, from my returned responses, an average of only 4.5 FTEs in their 
offices to accomplish these tasks.   
To determine the nature of the differences between respondents and non-
respondents, I completed a t-test with each of the following variables:  highest 
degree level offered, surrounding locale whether urban or rural, number of 
faculty, spending on faculty.  There were no significant differences between 
respondents and non-respondents on any of these measures.  Thus I believe that 
my sample is relatively representative of the larger population from which it was 
drawn.  In addition, as explained in detail later, the Heckman (1979) procedure 
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was used to correct for possible sample selection bias resulting from the relatively 
low response rate. 
Archival Data:  In addition to the survey, archival data were collected 
from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), the core 
postsecondary education data collection effort of the U.S. Department of 
Education sponsored by the National Center for Education Statistics.  Data for 
IPEDS are collected from approximately 12,000 postsecondary institutions, and it 
is the most comprehensive source for these institutions.  Archival data were also 
collected from Peterson’s Guide to Four-Year Colleges to supplement the data 
gathered from the mail survey.  These data were used for dependent variables and 
control variables as outlined below in those sections. 
The procedure described by Heckman (1979) was used to control for 
sample selection bias, both due to non-response and to missing data from IPEDS 
and Peterson’s.  To conduct the sample selection bias analyses, I gathered archival 
data for 952 institutions that were also listed in the IPEDS database.  The ten 
institutions that were not in IPEDS were either part of a larger campus, sold off 
during the study period, or were distance learning or online facilities that were not 
listed in IPEDS.  I did not receive surveys from these ten institutions. 
In addition to IPEDS and Peterson’s, data were collected from five sources 
measuring some aspect of the reputation of colleges and universities.  These lists 
are detailed in Table 2. 
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Measurement of Variables 
In the next sections, I provide an outline of the measures for the 
dependent, independent, and control variables included in this study.  More details 
on the variables, measures, and sources for the dependent, independent, and 
control variables are available in Tables 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 
Dependent Variables 
Reputation:  The measure of reputation was developed from multiple 
sources.  Five lists that measure some aspect of reputation and are produced by 
sources external to private colleges and universities were used in the creation of 
this measure.  These lists were Kiplinger’s top 100 values in private colleges, 
Princeton Review’s the best colleges ranked by students, top American research 
universities published by TheCenter at the University of Florida at Gainesville, 
US News and World Report’s college rankings, and Yahoo! Internet Life 
America’s most wired colleges.  From these lists, the mean percentile of the 
rankings was calculated for all the lists in which a school was listed. 
Quality of Incoming Students:  Since reputation is a fairly static attribute 
of an organization containing information about the past of the organization 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), it may be difficult to find an effect for all of the 
hypotheses with a measure of reputation in the relatively short period of the 
current study.  Therefore, I also used quality of incoming students as a dependent 
variable.  The first reason for the selection of this variable was that it is used in 
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lists that rank the reputation of colleges and universities.  In addition, researchers 
have found this to be closely related with reputation (Astin, 1982; Astin and 
Solmon, 1979; Matthews and Hadley, 1993; Theus, 1993).  Finally, in the 
interviews with public relations professionals with experience in colleges and 
universities, I asked them how they measured the reputation of their college or 
university and they responded that the quality of students admitted was one of the 
measures that they used.   
However, since student quality is included in the formulas that determine 
reputation for many lists of college’s and university’s reputations, I expect that 
this measure will precede future changes in reputation on these lists.  Therefore, 
for this study it should not be viewed as a direct measure of reputation, even 
though practitioners use it in this way.  Instead it should be viewed as a measure 
of a key determinant of reputation for this setting. 
Data for the measure of student quality were gathered from Peterson’s 
Guide to Four-Year Colleges.  Items used to construct this measure included: 
average GPA of admitted students, percent of freshmen from top 10 percent of 
their high school class, and percentage of students admitted that achieved 500 or 
higher on the verbal portion and 500 or higher on the math portion of the SAT 
college admissions test.  Some of these values were not reported in the archival 
source for all the institutions represented by my respondents, and so this measure 
is provided for fewer of the institutions than the other dependent variables.   
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These measures were combined using factor analysis to create a single 
standardized measure of incoming student quality.  The results of this analysis are 
shown in Table 6.  The proportion of the variance explained by the student quality 
factor was .72 and all loadings were positive and between .77 and .94 in 
magnitude.  I also included the percentage admitted in this analysis, but it did not 
load well (-.18) on the student quality measure when compared with the other 
measures.  It did however load well as a separate factor (.97) and so I decided to 
include the percentage admitted as a separate dependent variable.  The analysis 
for percentage admitted is also included in Table 6. 
Perceived Effectiveness of Organizational Impression Management 
Activities: The final dependent variable was a measurement of the perceived 
effectiveness of organizational impression management activities.  This measure 
took into account the perceived effectiveness of an activity on the following 
dimensions: quality of working relationships between people involved in the 
project, use of funds, use of time, and achievement of activity objectives.  The 
specific items are included in Table 3.  This measure was useful since perceptions 
of effectiveness may affect decisions about future outsourcing more than actual 
effectiveness, which can be hard to determine.  These data were only collected for 
the final year of the period for the study so as to increase the accuracy of the 
respondents’ memory of their perceptions of activity effectiveness.  This variable 
was measured as a Likert scale with 7 points from Strongly Disagree (1) to 
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Strongly Agree (7).  The variable was constructed as the mean of the individual 
perceived effectiveness for all six activities.  The inter-item reliabilities 
(Cronbach’s alphas) for these scales were .73 for news releases,  .75 for media 
relations, .78 for print publications, .89 for electronic media, .73 for community 
relations, and .83 for government relations. 
Independent Variables 
In this section, I describe the independent variables that I used in my 
study. 
Strategic and Tactical Organizational Impression Management Activities:  
In the mail survey, respondents were asked to describe the existence and 
outsourcing of the following six activities for all years of the study:  news 
releases, media relations, print publications, electronic media, community 
relations, and government relations. 
For this study, the following classification system of activities as either 
strategic or tactical was used.  Since the nature of the actual use by the department 
is a good determinant of whether an activity is strategic or tactical, I classified 
activities based on answers to ten questions about each activity by each survey 
respondent.  This classification included a general item assessing overall 
importance of the activity, and items assessing the impact, complexity, and 
uncertainty of the activity.  These items are included in detail in Table 7. 
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The final classification was determined by comparing the means in an 
ANOVA and reviewing the Scheffe test results to determine significant 
differences in means between the activities.  These results are presented in Table 
8.  The Scheffe test reported that electronic media and print publications, which 
were significantly different from each other, were also significantly greater than 
the remaining activities in their strategic use.  The remaining activities were not 
significantly different from each other.  Thus, I assigned electronic media and 
print publications as strategic in nature and news releases, media relations, 
community relations, and government relations as tactical in nature.  These 
tactical activities are those that these institutions, with relatively small staffs are 
unable to approach strategically. 
These divisions do not fit with the a priori distinctions that I formulated 
when selecting these activities.  My conceptual division would have placed media 
relations, electronic media, and government relations as strategic activities and 
news releases, print publications, and community relations as tactical activities.  
This may have occurred for several reasons.  First, because I have not captured 
the level to which the activity was an important part of their plan for 
organizational impression management work.  Second, because the perceptions of 
my respondents about the use of these activities over the past five years is 
inaccurate, or they had different understanding of the scale items than I intended 
and are interpreting them differently in this setting than I anticipated.  One 
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possibility is that they may have been considering their intended use of the 
activity rather than its actual impact.  Another possibility is that they mentally 
allocated important actions that affected multiple activities to those activities that 
they felt were most important.  However, using the data gathered in this study, I 
cannot determine post hoc the actual reason for the unexpected classification of 
strategic and tactical activities. 
The level of outsourcing of strategic and tactical organizational impression 
management activities was measured as the proportion of the work for strategic 
and tactical organizational impression management activities outsourced by the 
client for each year of the study gathered from the chief public relations officer as 
an informed subjective estimate due to difficulties with specific metrics being 
hard to interpret.  For example, if dollars had been used as the metric for 
measuring the proportion outsourced for print publications, then most clients 
would have reported exaggerated levels of outsourcing because almost all of the 
expense in this area occurs in the final stages when the colored brochures are 
printed. 
Duration of Client-Agency Relationships:  The duration of client-agency 
relationships was analyzed in this study as the mean number of years that a 
private college or university used all agencies for the six organizational 
impression management activities reported in the mail survey.  The aggregation of 
the relationships across all activities was necessary due to the method of reporting 
 105
which did not ask respondents to specify the total number of years that they had 
used an agency for a particular activity.  This decision to ask only the total usage 
of an agency was made because the ability of respondents to recall the accurate 
total number of years that they used an agency for a given activity was suspect.  
This decision was also made to limit the length of the survey, which was already 
over 20 pages in length.  Thus this trade off was made to increase the accuracy of 
reporting and to improve the response rate to the survey.  The disadvantage to this 
type of aggregation is that variance is lost and the relationship between this 
variable and other aggregated variables may be overestimated due to aggregation 
bias. 
Number of Agency Partners:  This variable was calculated as the mean of 
the total number of partners mentioned by the private college or university for all 
years across all activities.  This aggregation was also made to decrease the length 
and complexity of the survey for respondents and suffers the same disadvantages 
as those mentioned above for the duration of client-agency relationships. 
Outsourcing Intensity:  The mean proportion of all activities outsourced 
was calculated for each year of the study. 
Control Variables 
Organizational Size.  This is an important variable not included in my 
hypotheses that could affect the reputation of a private college or university.  
Researchers have found that size affects judgments of college and university 
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reputation, especially because it is so strongly related to library collections, 
research funds, assets, and overall faculty quality (Astin, 1982; Theus, 1993).  
Since this variable has the potential to influence judgments of reputation, I used 
this variable as a control and reduced its variance by limiting my analysis to 
institutions that have between 500 and 5000 students.  I included a measure of the 
log of the number of faculty in the analyses.  I used the log of the number of 
faculty in my models after noting during descriptive analysis that the distribution 
of the faculty variable was positively skewed with several institutions having 
many more faculty than the main body of the sample. 
Affiliation:  Affiliation was assessed as either religious or non-religious.  
In certain regions of the country one religious affiliation may have a greater 
following than another and this may affect the quality of students that a particular 
institution receives.  There may also be other effects on reputation based on 
religious affiliation.  For example, the reputation of the religion may imperfectly 
transfer to the reputation of the school.  I collected this variable, but did not 
include it in the final analyses because 60% of the schools were religiously 
affiliated and when included with other variables in the analyses the models did 
not converge due to excessive collinearity between this and other dummy 
variables.  I performed a t-test to determine if this variable was different for 
respondents and non-respondents and there was no significant difference. 
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Profit or Non-Profit:  Whether or not a school is for profit or not for profit 
may affect the view of potential students of the school about its motivations for 
operation.  For this reason, this variable was considered to be included as a 
control variable.  Among my respondents only four were for profit institutions 
and this variable was not included in any of the analyses due to lack of variance. 
Endowment:  I collected the size of the endowment in thousands of 
dollars.  This control was important, since institutions that are historically better 
funded may have better reputations, and a good historical reputation may also 
have prompted past contributions.  For example, researchers have found evidence 
of a strong tie between financial performance and reputation in private-sector 
industry from Fortune’s annual lists of the most admired companies (Brown and 
Perry, 1994; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Hammond 
and Slocum, 1996).  For my analyses I used the log of the endowment in millions 
of dollars.  I used the log of the endowment in my models after determining, 
during descriptive analysis of the endowment measure, that the distribution of the 
endowment measure was positively skewed with several institutions having an 
endowment many times greater than the main body of the sample. 
Size of organizational impression management function:  The size of the 
organizational impression management function was collected using two items. 
The first was the size of the budget for organizational impression management 
work.  The second was the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) positions that 
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were included in organizational impression management work.  The size of this 
function has a potentially large effect on outsourcing decisions and the scope and 
reach of activities that can be attempted.   
However, the response for these two variables was poor, and even 
institutions that did respond, usually only responded for selected years of the 
study.  Thus the reduction in the institutions included in the models was too great 
when these variables were included.  Overall there were 254 firm-year 
observations of the budget variable out of 690 possible and 355 firm-year 
observations of the FTE variable.  However, since the budget and FTE items were 
not completed for all years by many of the respondents at the institutions, the loss 
of cases created by including these variables in the model was even greater than 
these numbers would indicate.  This was due to the fact that a missing value for 
any year would exclude that schools information for all years. 
Target population:  Whether an institution is targeting a regional or 
national audience may be important to their reputation and to the decisions they 
make about outsourcing organizational impression management work.  For these 
reasons, I collected a control variable for the target population.  However, only 
31% of the sample had a national target population and as mentioned above, this 
created problems for model convergence so this control was not included in the 
sample.  An alternative measure of the percent enrolled from out of state was 
collected, but was only available for a small segment of the population for all five 
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years of the study and thus was not included in the models either.  I did not 
perform a t-test for this variable, since it was only collected for the responding 
institutions. 
Age:  The age of a college or university can affect the perceived reputation 
of the institution with older institutions often being viewed as more prestigious 
than newer institutions (Theus, 1993).  This variable was measured as the year of 
founding.  
Major institutional change:  If there were major institutional changes 
within the college or university that affected the institution’s organizational 
impression management activities these were included in the analysis.  As 
mentioned above, several events were identified in the telephone survey and 
included in the mail survey.  This variable was coded as the sum of the number of 
events that occurred for each institution for each year.  Thus all events were 
treated as equal in importance for this control.   
Estimation Method 
I analyzed the models that involved the perceived organizational 
effectiveness with OLS regression, since these data were collected for only one 
year of the study.  I used the generalized estimating equations (GEE) method in 
the SAS GENMOD procedure (SAS Institute, 1997) to estimate all other models.  
This was necessary because my study used a pooled cross-sectional time-series 
design.  This design created the potential of bias due to non-independent 
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observations.  The analysis of correlated data as though they were independent 
can reduce the size of standard errors and lead to inefficient estimators (Diggle, 
Liang, and Zeger, 1994).  GEE adjusts for non-independence of observations by 
modeling the within-organization covariance structure while treating between 
organization observations as independent (Liang and Zeger, 1986).   
Some of the advantages of GEE are that it makes very few assumptions 
about heterogeneity across organizations, the estimators are not biased and are 
relatively efficient, the results are relatively conservative in avoiding Type 1 
errors, it does not assume normal distributions, and unlike fixed-effects models it 
can estimate time-invariant effects and preserve across organization variance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter includes the results of my empirical analyses.  I first give a 
brief overview of the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in my 
analyses.  To answer the first research question from Chapter One, I report the 
effects that strategic and tactical outsourcing have on the reputation of private 
colleges and universities.  I also report the effects that strategic outsourcing has on 
the perception of the effectiveness of the institution’s organizational impression 
management activities.  To answer the second research question, I report the 
effects that outsourcing intensity has on the reputation of private colleges and 
institutions.  To answer the third research question, I report the effects that 
duration of the relationship between a college or university and its agencies has 
on the reputation of the college or university and on the perception of the 
effectiveness of the institution’s organizational impression management activities.  
I also report the effects that the interaction between the duration of the 
relationship between the college and its agencies and the outsourcing of tactical 
activities has on the reputation of the college.  Finally, to answer the fourth 
research question, I report on the effect that the number of organizational 
impression management outsourcing partnerships used by a college has on the 
reputation of the college and the effect that the interaction between the number of 
organizational impression management outsourcing partnerships used by the 
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college and the outsourcing intensity of organizational impression management 
work has on the reputation of the college. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 reports descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the 
analyses.  For this table, there are a maximum of 690 possible firm year 
observations, although some variables have fewer observations due to missing 
data.  Reputation percentile was the variable used to measure reputation.  This 
variable ranged from 0-100 and was reverse scored so that 100 was the best 
ranking for ease of interpretation.  The mean of the reputation percentile variable 
is 19 percent, meaning that the average college or university that responded to my 
survey was ranked relatively low on the lists included in my analyses.  Two 
different variables were used to measure student quality as a precursor to 
reputation: a factor of test scores and class placement as described in Chapter 
Four, and percent admitted.  The percent admitted variable should be interpreted 
with lower values being indicative of higher reputation.  This is because a more 
selective school can turn away more of its applicants.  So the mean of 73 percent 
also confirms that many of the institutions were relatively low in reputation. 
Other highlights from this table are that the mean level of the percent of 
work outsourced for strategic activities was 26 percent, while the mean level of 
the percent of work outsourced for tactical activities was only five percent.  The 
lower level of outsourcing for tactical outsourcing may be due to the nature of the 
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departments handling this work at these institutions.  For the most part these are 
relatively small institutions with few employees dedicated to these tasks; 
therefore, it may be that it is easier for them to complete tactical activities 
internally than it is to complete strategic activities internally.  The duration of 
relationships between partners was fairly short being, on average, only just over 
three years and the mean number of partners used by an institution was just over 
one.  Correlations between all of the variables included in the analyses are also 
provided in Table 9. 
The relatively low means for both strategic and tactical outsourcing are 
due to the fact that 23% of the respondents did no strategic outsourcing at all and 
63% of the respondents did no tactical outsourcing at all.  This suggests that there 
may be two decisions involved in outsourcing; first a decision about whether to 
outsource at all, and second a decision about what level of outsourcing to use.  To 
examine this possibility, I ran zero-inflated models.  However, these were not 
significant, which means that institutions reporting zero outsourcing did not affect 
the results presented here.   
Since I use multiple measures for reputation, Tables 10 to 12 contain the 
results of the models used to determine the effects of strategic and tactical 
outsourcing on reputation.  The dependent variables for Tables 10 to 12 are 
reputation percentile, student quality, and percent admitted respectively.  Before 
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reviewing the models below, three comments about overall model specification 
are in order. 
First, as mentioned in Chapter Four, I used the Heckman (1979) procedure 
to control for sample selection bias due to non-respondents in my sample.  The 
selection bias control variable was calculated using this procedure.  To calculate 
this variable, I ran a logistic regression on all 962 institutions in the sampling 
frame predicting the probability of survey response.  The overall fit of this model 
was good (χ2=24.01, p<.001).  The predicted values from this model were 
included as a control in the models below.   
However, I did not use a direct measure of reputation in the Heckman 
(1979) procedure and so it is possible that the correction for non-response did not 
completely correct for a possible difference in reputation between respondents 
and non-respondents in my population.  In support of this, the mean of the 
reputation variable was rather low as mentioned previously.  However when 
running the Heckman (1979) procedure, I included such variables as number of 
faculty and spending on faculty which while not direct measures of reputation are 
variables that control for size and resources which are important determinants of 
reputation in this setting.  This suggests that I have controlled for any difference 
between respondents and non-respondents at least for these important 
determinants of reputation in my models and therefore the effect of this omission 
on my results should be minimal.  When respondents that do not appear on any of 
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the lists I collected for reputation are excluded from my sample the mean for 
reputation percentile is 47%.  This suggests that these schools are of relatively 
average reputation, which presents further evidence of non-response bias.  It 
would be important to include reputation in the Heckman model for future work 
in this area to fully address this issue. 
Second, since the outsourcing intensity variable is a combination of the 
strategic outsourcing and tactical outsourcing variables, these variables and the 
interactions that they are predicted to affect are contained in different models.  
This is due to a high level of correlation (0.79 for strategic outsourcing and 0.72 
for tactical outsourcing) between these variables and outsourcing intensity and the 
danger of multi-collinearity if they are included in the same model.  Thus, Models 
7 and 9 in Tables 10 to 12 contain the strategic and tactical outsourcing variables 
with the other predictor variables and the interaction between tactical outsourcing 
and duration and Models 8 and 10 in Tables 10 to 12 contain outsourcing intensity 
with the other predictor variables and the interaction between outsourcing 
intensity and number of partners. 
Third, unless otherwise specified in the text, all variables that were not 
time invariant were lagged one year so that for example the outsourcing from the 
academic year 1999-2000 was contained in the same model as the reputation 
results for the academic year 2000-2001.  This lag was used based on the 
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assumption that the work done in 1999-2000 was likely to affect the reputation in 
the following year. 
Control Variables 
The control variables were described in more detail in Chapter Four.  
Model 1 in Tables 10 to 12 provides the results for the models with only the 
control variables present.  The coefficients of the control variables provide some 
expected findings and some surprises.  I will look only at Models 7 to 10 in 
Tables 10 to 12 for interpretations of the control variables, since the earlier 
models do not contain all of the predictor variables.  Analysis of the sample 
selection control for most models in Tables 10 to 12 indicates that controlling for 
other factors, my respondents were higher in status and therefore more likely to be 
concerned with reputation.  For example, the coefficients for sample section 
control are positive and significant for Models 8 and 10 in Table 10 for the 
reputation percentile variable and positive and significant for Models 7 to 10 in 
Table 11.  Thus schools that responded to the survey have better placement on 
reputation lists and have higher quality students than those that did not.  This 
gives evidence for a liberal test of my hypotheses.  Additionally when it is 
significant, the coefficient for year of founding is negative.  Therefore, schools 
with earlier founding dates have greater reputations.  This finding is not 
surprising.  The coefficient for the measure of the endowment is also positive; 
schools with greater endowments, therefore, have higher reputations.  The only 
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exception to this when the dependent variable is percent admitted.   In this case, 
the coefficient for endowment is negative.  Since admitting a higher percentage of 
an institution’s applicants is seen as indicative of schools with lower reputations, 
these findings are fully consistent with findings from the other models. 
For the reputation percentile variable, the measure of size (log of number 
of faculty) is significant and positive only for the models including outsourcing 
intensity, and excluding strategic and tactical outsourcing.  Therefore, for these 
models a greater number of faculty is associated with a higher reputation.  This 
result is not surprising.  However, for the student quality dependent variable, the 
coefficient for the number of faculty is significant and negative.  This is a 
surprising result, since it suggests that the schools in the sample with a greater 
number of faculty have a lower quality of students.  However, this may be due to 
the fact that these schools are not as selective of those they admit, since they are 
enrolling more students than smaller schools.  The student quality measure does 
not measure the best students enrolled, but only average capabilities of students 
enrolled from year to year.  Thus it may be biased towards smaller schools as 
suggested by this result. 
Effects of Strategic and Tactical Outsourcing on Reputation 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that outsourcing a greater proportion of strategic 
activities would be associated with lower levels of reputation.  Model 7 in Tables 
10 to 12 contains the results for the regressions used to test this hypothesis.  For 
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the reputation percentile measure, outsourcing of strategic activities did reduce 
the reputation of the institution as predicted.  However, for the student quality 
variable the percent of outsourcing of work for strategic activities had no effect.  
Finally, for the percent admitted variable the effect is significant and negative.  
However, as previously mentioned this should be interpreted to mean that if more 
strategic outsourcing is completed, then the percentage of the applicants that are 
accepted to the institution decreases.  This finding is in the opposite direction 
predicted by the hypothesis.  It may be that while strategic outsourcing targets the 
desired student population it still harms the overall reputation of the school due to 
potential effects on other constituents, since percent admitted is only one 
determinant of reputation in this setting.   
One interesting note for the effect on reputation percentile of strategic 
outsourcing is that it is not significant when put in the model by itself, but is 
significant in the full model.  During investigation into this effect, I found a 
significant and negative interaction between strategic outsourcing and duration.  
Thus the effect of strategic outsourcing is non-significant until duration is 
included in the model and then becomes significant due to the negative interaction 
between duration and strategic outsourcing.  This suggests that once the beneficial 
effects of longer duration relationships are accounted for, strategic outsourcing 
has a negative effect on reputation. 
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A similar pattern is found for strategic outsourcing with the percent 
admitted variable, where in isolation strategic outsourcing is also non-significant.  
However, when placed in the full model it becomes significant and negative.  
While exploring this result, I discovered a positive interaction between strategic 
outsourcing and duration.  As above and as further detailed below in the section 
on the effect of duration on reputation, this result states that institutions with 
longer relationships that outsource more strategic activities admit more of their 
applicants.  When this finding is considered with the result for percent admitted 
discussed above, it suggests that when strategic activities are outsourced over a 
longer period of time that they may improve the ability of the institution to target 
the applicant pool that they desire.  However, as previously mentioned this 
improved fit is not the only determinant of reputation. 
In supplemental analyses that I do not fully report here, I included a 
measure of strategic outsourcing squared in all of the analyses to determine if 
there was a curvilinear effect of strategic outsourcing on reputation.  For all of the 
models, I only found effects for Models 7 and 9 in Table 11 with the student 
quality dependent variable.  In both of these models the coefficient for strategic 
outsourcing squared is significant and negative.  In addition, the coefficient for 
strategic outsourcing is positive and significant.  The only other difference 
between these models and those reported in Table 11 is that for Model 7 the 
coefficient for number of partners is negative and significant.  These results are 
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interesting, but do not show systematic evidence of strategic outsourcing on 
reputation.  This could be an area for further exploration in future studies. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that outsourcing a greater proportion of tactical 
activities would be associated with higher levels of institutional reputation.  
Model 7 in Tables 10 to 12 contains the results for the regressions used to test this 
hypothesis.  The model indicates that for the student quality measures this 
hypothesis is supported; outsourcing tactical activities improves the reputation of 
the institution through attracting higher quality students.  However, for the 
reputation percentile and percent admitted measures this hypothesis is not 
supported.  I also ran supplementary analyses including a measure of tactical 
outsourcing squared to determine whether there were any curvilinear effects on 
reputation from outsourcing tactical activities.  There were not significant results 
for this variable. 
For all analyses of the effects of strategic and tactical activities on 
reputation I also completed supplemental analyses including the reputation of the 
institution for the year previous to the data collection of the study as a control for 
prior reputation.  The results discussed above were unchanged by the inclusion of 
this control. 
Effect of Strategic Outsourcing on Perception of Effectiveness 
Table 13 presents the results for the models using the perceived 
effectiveness of organizational impression management activities as the 
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dependent variable.  All of the models in this table use OLS regressions, since the 
effectiveness variable was collected from the respondents for only the last year of 
the data and there is no risk of correlation between years such as presented for the 
longitudinal analyses in Tables 10 to 12. 
Hypothesis 1b predicted that outsourcing a greater level of strategic 
activities would lead to a lower level of perceived effectiveness of organizational 
impression management activities.  I tested this hypothesis with both a one-year 
lag and a two-year lag.  Models 4 and 6 in Table 13 indicate that outsourcing 
strategic activities had no effect on the perceived effectiveness of organizational 
impression management activities for the one-year lag, but that it had a negative 
effect as predicted for the two-year lag.  This result is surprising and if accepted 
suggests that the perception of the effectiveness of organizational impression 
management activities is more stable than I had originally supposed.  Perhaps, 
chief public relations officers recognize that there is little chance for change to 
occur in the reputation quickly and thus more heavily base their perceptions on 
work that was done farther in the past when judging the effectiveness of the work.  
However, when one considers the escalation of commitment literature and the 
effect of new data on learning, this effect of the permanence of older learning is 
not as surprising (March, Sproull, and Tamuz, 1991; Staw and Ross, 1987). 
However, when the controls are removed from the model, both the one-
year and the two-year lag for strategic outsourcing are negative and significant 
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and the overall model F is significant also for these models.  Thus, I believe that 
the inclusion of too many non-significant variables may be the cause for the lack 
of support for this hypothesis.  I also ran tests for a curvilinear effect of strategic 
outsourcing on perceived effectiveness, but did not find any significant effects. 
Effect of Outsourcing Intensity on Reputation 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that for higher levels of outsourcing intensity that 
the reputation of the institution will be lower.  Model 8 in Tables 10 to 12 
contains the results for Hypothesis 3.  This hypothesis is not supported for any of 
the dependent variables.  As detailed above, I included a control for prior 
reputation in all of these models.  The results were unchanged due to the inclusion 
of this additional control. 
Effect of Duration of Outsourcing Relationships on Reputation 
Hypothesis 4a predicted that for institutions with longer durations for their 
organizational impression management outsourcing relationships their reputation 
would also be stronger.  Models 7 and 8 in Tables 10 to 12 contain the results for 
the regressions used to test this hypothesis.  For both the reputation percentile and 
student quality variables, an increase in duration of these relationships does 
improve the reputation of the institution.  However, for the percent admitted 
variable the result is in the opposite direction than predicted with an increase in 
duration increasing the percentage that are admitted.  This may be due to factors 
such as improved fit between the applicants and the schools due to better 
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organizational impression management work although as previously discussed 
this improved fit is not the sole determinant of reputation.  It is also possible that 
successful relationships have longer durations and that it is the success of the 
relationship that is driving the longer duration.  My study does not allow me to 
determine the causality of this relationship.  However, since there is no effect of 
duration on perceived effectiveness as I will discuss below, it appears more likely 
that duration drives success than success drives duration, at least if I assume that a 
successful relationship would be perceived as more effective by the respondent. 
In supplemental analyses, I also ran models including a squared term of 
duration to determine if there were any curvilinear effects of duration on 
reputation and only found one effect for Model 9 in Table 11 with the student 
quality variable.  In this case, the squared duration coefficient was significant and 
positive and the interaction for tactical outsourcing and duration was negative and 
significant.  The main effect of duration in this model was not significant.  This 
finding was the only significant finding for duration squared and gives no 
systematic evidence of a curvilinear effect of duration on reputation.  This may be 
in part due to the restriction of range on relationship duration in this sample. 
As previously described above, I included a measure of the prior 
reputation for the analyses detailed here.  The effects described above were robust 
to this inclusion and only one change was noted for Model 9 in Table 12 where 
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the coefficient for duration was no longer significant after the inclusion of this 
control.  It was however, still significant for Model 7 in Table 12. 
Effect of Duration on Perception of Effectiveness 
Hypothesis H4b predicted that for longer relationships between 
institutions and their outsourcing partners that the perception of the effectiveness 
of the organizational impression management work would be more positive.  
Models 4 and 6 in Table 13 show that relationship duration has no impact on 
perceived effectiveness of the organizational impression management work.  I 
also tested for a curvilinear effect of duration on the perception of effectiveness, 
but did not find any evidence of this type of relationship. 
Effect of the Interaction of Duration and Tactical Outsourcing on Reputation 
Hypothesis H4c predicted that the interaction of longer relationships 
between colleges and agencies and higher levels of tactical outsourcing would 
have a joint positive effect on the reputation of the college.  Model 9 in Tables 10 
to 12 contains the regressions used to test this hypothesis.  From these models, 
there was no effect of this interaction on the reputation of the college.  This was 
unchanged by the inclusion of prior reputation as a control in supplemental 
analyses. 
Effect of Number of Partners on Reputation 
Hypothesis 5a predicted that a greater number of partnerships would have 
a negative effect on the reputation of the college.  Model 7 and 8 in Tables 10 to 
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12 contain the regressions used to test this hypothesis.  The hypothesis is 
supported for the percent admitted dependent variable.  Here Models 7 and 8 in 
Table 12 show a significant positive effect, which should be interpreted to mean 
that as the number of partners increases a greater percentage of those applying are 
admitted to the school.  Thus in this case, an increase in the number of partners 
increases the percentage admitted and thus either reduces the reputation of the 
institution or reduces the fit between the applicant pool and the institution, 
supporting the hypothesis. 
However it is important to note that for the colleges in this sample, the 
mean number of partners is just over one partner that a college or university is 
working with across all activities during the years of this study.  Table 14 shows a 
frequency distribution of this variable that reveals that all but three of the 
institutions in my sample had a mean of three or fewer partnerships across these 
activities during the years of the study, and so overall my sample would not be 
expected to demonstrate the issues that were originally hypothesized for a larger 
number of partners.  Thus further work in this area is necessary to provide a better 
test of this hypothesis.  In supplemental analyses, I included a measure of prior 
reputation as a control for these analyses.  There were no changes in the results 
detailed above, due to this inclusion. 
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Effect of the Interaction of Number of Partners and Outsourcing Intensity on 
Reputation 
 
Hypothesis H5b predicted that there would be a joint negative effect of the 
number of partners and outsourcing intensity on the reputation of the college.  
Model 10 in Tables 10 to 12 contains the results of the regressions that test this 
hypothesis.  From these models, there was no effect of this interaction on the 
reputation of the college.  This is not surprising, given that there was no main 
effect of outsourcing intensity.  The inclusion of prior reputation as a control did 
not affect these results. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study examined the important question of outsourcing effectiveness 
in the area of professional services.  As previously mentioned, outsourcing of 
services is an important step for an organization, because usually there is a large 
impact on the human resources and capacities of an organization when a service is 
outsourced.  This large impact on human resources is likely to increase the inertial 
effects of outsourcing decisions.  These decisions may be hard to enter into and, 
once entered into, it may be difficult to exit from them.  However, despite the 
consequences of such decisions and the frequency of such arrangements, there is 
very little empirical research that looks at when a service should be outsourced 
and when it should be completed internally.  This research begins to answer this 
question. 
This study focused on two issues of importance when making an 
outsourcing decision.  First, what tasks will be outsourced?  Second, to whom will 
we outsource the work?  To answer the first question, I studied the differential 
effects of outsourcing strategic and tactical tasks on outsourcing effectiveness.  To 
answer the second question, I studied the effects of the duration of outsourcing 
relationships and the number of outsourcing partners on outsourcing 
effectiveness.  The context in which I studied these issues was organizational 
impression management work at private colleges and universities. 
 128
I argued that strategic tasks should be completed within an organization 
and that outsourcing these tasks would decrease the reputation of the client 
organization.  I posited that tactical tasks should be completed outside an 
organization and that the reputation of the client organization would increase if 
these tasks were outsourced.  I predicted that at higher levels of outsourcing 
intensity the client’s reputation would decrease and when more outsourcing 
relationships were carried on simultaneously the client’s reputation would be 
harmed.  However, I hypothesized that clients with longer relationships with their 
outsourcing partners would see an increase in reputation.  Finally, I argued that 
strategic outsourcing would decrease the client’s perception of the effectiveness 
of organizational impression management work and that longer relationships with 
outsourcing partners would improve the internal perception of organizational 
impression management work. 
Thus my arguments suggest that only a few partners be chosen and that 
they be given tactical activities to complete and that they be retained over time so 
that relationships can develop between the personnel of the client and the 
agencies.  Finally, my arguments suggest that the overall level of outsourcing be 
kept low.  According to my arguments, if these principles are followed reputation 
will be better than if they are not.  Finally, according to my arguments, employees 
of the client organization will view the work done by outsourcing partners most 
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favorably if they have developed a long relationship with the outsourcing partner 
and will view it less favorably if the nature of that work is strategic. 
Nature of the Work  
The findings of this study provided partial support for my arguments.  I 
found that a higher level of strategic outsourcing led to a lower level of client 
placement on reputation lists.  It had no effect on the student quality at the school 
but was associated with a lower percentage of applicants admitted from the 
applicant pool.  Although a smaller percent of applicants admitted may indicate 
an increase in reputation, another possible explanation for the decrease in the 
percentage of applicants admitted is that higher levels of strategic outsourcing 
with agencies may confuse the message that is reaching potential applicants so 
that it is unclear and applicants have trouble self-selecting such that the applicant 
pool does not fit well with the needs of the institution.   
On the other hand, a higher level of tactical outsourcing improved student 
quality but did not affect the placement on reputation lists or the percent admitted 
to the school.  This pattern of results suggests that reputation percentile and 
percentage admitted are perhaps more long-term in nature and thus affected by 
strategic outsourcing.  As mentioned before, the activities classified as tactical 
were used in a tactical manner by the colleges and universities in this sample, 
according to their survey responses, and this classification does not mean that 
these activities are inherently tactical in nature.  Therefore, tactical outsourcing, 
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which is more targeted in its approach and focused more on short-term effects, 
does not affect reputation or percentage admitted, but does affect student quality. 
At the same time, overall outsourcing intensity had no effect on the 
reputation of the client.  This is not surprising considering that strategic and 
tactical outsourcing have somewhat opposite effects on reputation and student 
quality.  Therefore, the evidence indicates that the overall level of outsourcing is 
not as important as what tasks are chosen for outsourcing. 
Nature of the Relationship  
When looking at the results of this study in regard to my arguments about 
the relationships between the client and its agencies, the evidence is again mixed.  
The duration of the relationships with agencies had a positive effect on the 
placement on reputation lists.  The duration of these relationships also had the 
expected effects on student quality, which was higher with longer relationship 
duration.   
However, longer duration also increased the percentage of student 
applicants that were admitted.  This result is in the opposite direction than I 
hypothesized.  It may be that longer duration relationships improve the message 
and increase the fit between the applicant pool and the client’s needs.  This seems 
a reasonable explanation given the strong results for this variable for both student 
quality and reputation percentile. 
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The finding for number of partners for reputation percentile and student 
quality is null.  As previously mentioned, many of the arguments put forth in 
Chapter Three had to do with a large number of partners and most of the clients in 
this sample did not have very many partnerships.  Therefore it is not surprising 
that this hypothesis was not supported for these variables.   
However, for the percent admitted variable the hypothesis for the number 
of partners received support.  Thus for organizations with more partners the 
percentage admitted was also higher.  If we follow the logic presented for the 
previous hypotheses it may be that with more partners we present a better 
message about who we are and applicants are then able to self-select either into or 
out of our applicant pool with greater accuracy.  This seems likely given the 
pattern of results that exist in the data and the fact that the variance on this 
variable is quite limited so as to avoid the negative effects that were hypothesized 
earlier.  Another possible explanation is that with more partners a client is able to 
reach a wider market and increase the number of potentially acceptable applicants 
in their applicant pool.  The positive effect of number of partners on student 
quality suggests that this might be the case. 
However, the results for the number of outsourcing partners are limited in 
their generalizability due to the limit in the number of partners that any one client 
maintained in my sample, thus restricting the range of this variable.  The extent of 
the restriction in range for this variable is noted in Table 14 with only three clients 
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maintaining more than three relationships on average.  For this reason, I feel that 
my test of this hypothesis is limited in its application to only settings where all 
clients have few partners.  Testing this hypothesis in a setting where there was 
greater variance in the number of partners used by clients would be a fruitful area 
for future studies.  Therefore, interpreting the results from this study, the evidence 
argues that outsourcing relationships should be longer in duration, but no general 
predictions can be made about a number of partners greater than three. 
Perceived Effectiveness of Organizational Impression Management Work 
The results for the internal perception of the organizational impression 
management work that is outsourced failed to show evidence that either duration 
or the outsourcing of strategic activities has any effect on this perception.  
However, when the outsourcing of strategic activities is lagged by two years, 
there is a negative effect as hypothesized.  This two-year lagged effect is 
surprising, especially considering that respondents were asked to only consider 
the activities from the most recent year when answering these questions.  Perhaps, 
this is an indication of a more general perception of effectiveness and an inability 
to separate out just one year’s activities when responding.  In addition, it may 
suggest that the respondents believe that recent actions are not likely to affect 
reputation quickly.   
This may be due to the fact that many other relatively stable attributes of 
the work are considered in determining whether or not the work completed is 
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effective.  For example, the amount of power or status bestowed on the 
department and its employees by a particular activity or the difficulty of 
interactions with specific personnel from the agency could affect this perception 
of effectiveness and have little to do with the nature of the task or the nature of 
the relationship at the macro level.  Finally, the perceived effectiveness variable, 
except for one respondent, was reported at four or higher on a 7-point scale and it 
may be that restriction of range in the variable contributed to this lack of results. 
However, it is important to remember that when the control variables are 
removed as reported in Chapter Five, there is a strong negative effect for strategic 
outsourcing for both the one-year and two-year lags.  Thus, I believe that it is due 
to the inclusion of non-significant controls that this effect fails to be supported 
and that there actually is an effect of the level of strategic outsourcing on the 
perception of the effectiveness of organizational impression management work. 
Hypothesized Interactions 
Neither of the two interactions that were hypothesized was supported.  
Hypothesis 4c argued that duration and tactical outsourcing would interact to 
increase the reputation of the organization.  It is not surprising in retrospect, that 
this hypothesis was not supported given that there tactical activities are sporadic 
and short-term in nature and thus not as affected by longer duration relationships.  
These activities most likely do not warrant relationship-specific investments on 
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the part of either the client or the agency and thus increased duration does not 
improve tactical outsourcing. 
Hypothesis 5b argued that outsourcing intensity and the number of 
partners would have a joint negative effect on the reputation of the organization.  
The lack of support for this hypothesis is also not surprising given that the 
predicted effects of outsourcing intensity were not supported for any of the 
dependent variables and number of partners was only significant for the percent 
admitted variable and was in the opposite direction than hypothesized. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This research examines the relationship between outsourcing 
organizational impression management activities and the reputation of private 
colleges and universities.  Examining this relationship adds to our understanding 
of the role of outsourcing in a service setting.  This study is also an early 
empirical study both in the area of organizational impression management and 
outsourcing.  The results from this study contribute to the evolution of theory and 
research in both of these areas.   
This study provides new understanding of how the nature of the task and 
the attributes of an interorganizational relationship influence the effectiveness of 
outsourcing.  In the area of organizational impression management, this study 
provides understanding of the role that organizational impression management 
activities play in the formation of organizational reputation.  From this study, 
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there is empirical evidence that these activities do affect the reputation of a client, 
even in a relatively short period of time.   
In addition this study adds to limited research in the areas of the effects of 
duration and the number of partnerships on the effectiveness of 
interorganizational relationships.  These two areas have only been the subjects of 
limited empirical work, even though researchers remain interested in the 
effectiveness of interorganizational relationships and in the antecedents of 
effective interorganizational relationships.  Most of the work involving these 
variables has focused on the dissolution and persistence of relationships and not 
specifically the effectiveness of the relationships (Baker et al., 1998; Broschak, 
1999; Fichman and Levinthal, 1991; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Seabright et 
al., 1992).  The evidence from this study would suggest that, in general, longer 
interorganizational relationships are more effective at improving reputation than 
shorter relationships.  This finding may not be true for other outcome measures 
such as profit, stock price, or return on assets.  However for reputation, which is 
relatively stable, a relationship that matches the nature of the desired outcome 
seems to be important.  Also from the evidence of this study, more partners are 
associated with higher levels of admittance from the pool of student applicants.  
This is true, even when controlling for some measures of resources common to 
private colleges and universities such as size, age, and endowment.  While it is 
difficult to determine if this is due to a decrease in reputation or an increase in the 
 136
fit of the applicant pool, it is interesting that clients with more partners are 
accepting a greater number of their applicants.  If one believes that this is due to 
an improved fit between the applicants and the needs of the client, then this result 
may indicate that a greater number of partners place the client in a network of ties 
held by their outsourcing partners that increase the client’s effectiveness (Hui, 
2003).  This may also be due to a restriction in range for the predictor variable.  
However, I believe that for the limited range of relationships such as reported in 
this study, the finding is valid. 
This study adds more detail to and in some cases challenges the popular 
notion that all peripheral activities should be outsourced and that only core 
competencies should remain within an organization.  According to this study, 
activities that are strategic, not only core competencies, in nature (defined as 
having great impact, being high in complexity, and high in uncertainty) should be 
retained within an organization.  Therefore, some activities that are peripheral 
should not be outsourced.  However, it is unlikely that a core competency will not 
be strategic and so these results merely expand our knowledge of what activities 
should remain within an organization.  This finding may explain why, in some 
cases, organizations return outsourced activities to the control of the organization 
at great cost, or decide not to outsource these activities in the first place, and even 
why some outsourcing activities seem more effective than others.  This study 
 137
begins to answer these questions by looking at the nature of the activities that are 
outsourced, specifically whether they are strategic or tactical in nature.   
Where the hypotheses are supported for the nature of activities, this study 
suggests support for the arguments of transaction cost economics, and resource 
dependence theory.  For the following arguments it is important to note that even 
though I did not measure the intervening variables, such as the level of firm-
specific knowledge that was transferred, my findings are consistent with the 
processes described in these two theories.  Therefore in this case, findings are 
consistent with the idea that transaction costs are higher for strategic activities 
than tactical activities, and therefore control for these activities should remain 
within the organization, and competence in these areas should be developed 
internally rather than purchased on the market.  This may be due to the high level 
of firm-specific knowledge that must be transferred to succeed in this type of 
outsourcing effort.  Due to this high level of firm-specific knowledge transfer, 
opportunism is a potential threat and contracts are particularly complex for these 
types of relationships.  This increases the transaction costs associated with this 
type of outsourcing (Williamson, 1985).  Tactical activities on the other hand do 
not face these same barriers and thus transaction costs may be lower for these 
activities.  Thus in this way, the findings support this proposition of transaction 
cost economics.  The findings for the nature of the activity also support the 
resource dependence theory since activities that are strategic in nature depend on 
 138
developing resources internally that are not easily substitutable and therefore 
more critical to an organization.  On the other hand, tactical activities, which 
utilize substitutable resources, are better targets for outsourcing by the institution. 
The results for the duration of outsourcing relationships support the idea 
that transaction costs can be reduced in ways that increase the effectiveness of 
interorganizational relationships over time.  For example, many common 
interactions may have structured procedures put in place that reduce transaction 
costs and lead to transactions that are closer to internal transactions in their nature.  
Other reductions may take place through the decrease of opportunism due to 
increased trust between personnel that have worked together for extended periods 
and understand the culture and requirements of their partner organization.  When 
partners in a relationship have both invested in relationship-specific assets the 
transaction costs of continuing the relationship are reduced.  It appears that these 
types of investments can lead to long-term benefits for the client. 
Managerial Implications 
Since reputation is an important concept for most organizations, this study 
makes important contributions to managers of organizations.  During my 
preliminary interviews I asked my respondents to describe to me how they 
measured the success of the organizational impression management work that 
they engaged in.  For the most part, these individuals exhibited frustration and 
concern that there were few ways to determine whether their activities were 
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successful and that many of the methods currently in use were inaccurate and 
inadequate.  This study documents the effects of organizational impression 
management activities on reputation, which is an important outcome variable for 
managers. 
Second, outsourcing is a decision that many managers face on multiple 
occasions.  This study provides an empirical test of the effectiveness of 
outsourcing based on factors that can be measured by managers before the 
decision is made (i.e., the nature of an activity or the nature of a relationship with 
a potential outsourcing partner).  In this way, the results from this study help 
managers make more informed decisions about which activities, especially 
services, to outsource and which to develop internally.  These analyses provide a 
more fine-grained set of tools that managers can use to make this decision beyond 
the popular notion of outsourcing whatever is not your core competency. 
This ability to make a more informed decision before a relationship is 
formed is important, since the costs involved in reversing an outsourcing decision 
are high.  To redevelop internal expertise that has been outsourced can be a long 
process and trust between management and employees is usually reduced after a 
decision to outsource has been implemented.  In addition, contracts with agencies 
may have expensive penalties for early termination.  On the other hand, 
outsourcing an existing internal function can also be delayed or made more 
expensive by political or legal battles due to changes in hiring practices and 
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current power struggles among managers, which are often affected by 
outsourcing.  Thus it is important that tools are available to determine which 
outsourcing options will have the highest likelihood of effectiveness before 
investing in their formation. 
Finally, for professionals in private colleges and universities, the results of 
this study suggest how outsourcing organizational impression management work 
can be used to improve student quality at an institution.  First of all, outsourcing 
tactical activities was shown to be associated with higher quality incoming 
student classes.  Second, maintaining longer relationships with outsourcing 
partners also showed this pattern of association with higher quality incoming 
classes.  Thus professionals in this area should consider outsourcing in these areas 
and maintain longer relationships with their partners to improve the quality of 
their incoming classes. 
Limitations 
One limitation of the current research is to external validity due to the 
population selected for study.  This study looks at the relationship between 
outsourcing decisions for organizational impression management work and 
reputation in the setting of private colleges and universities.  As mentioned 
before, this setting provides a liberal test for the hypotheses in this study, and thus 
the results may not generalize to other settings where reputation is less visible or 
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malleable.  This limitation should be addressed in future studies now that initial 
findings have been established by this study. 
Another limitation of the current study is that, due to data requirements, 
much of the data are analyzed at the organizational level or the level of the 
activity.  This allows for preliminary understanding of the relationships in the 
hypotheses.  However, in future studies it would be preferable to analyze the 
hypotheses with more fine-grained data collection at the dyadic level.  This level 
of analysis, however, would be labor intensive and was not justified with the 
previous understanding of these areas within the literature. 
A final limitation is that the definition of strategic activities that I develop 
and use in the mail survey does not acknowledge specifically whether or not the 
activity in question is part of an overall plan for organizational impression 
management work.  This is only captured for the overall strategy of the 
responding institution and it would have been better to include this aspect for each 
activity.  Thus, what I may have measured instead of a difference between 
strategic and tactical activities was perhaps a measure of the perceived importance 
of the activity to the respondent.  When answering the survey, the respondent may 
have associated the types of actions and events that I asked about as most closely 
being connected to those activities that were perceived as most important.  This 
additional element should be included in future studies of this distinction between 
strategic and tactical activities. 
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Directions for Future Research 
One possible direction for future research would be to look at how 
outsourcing organizational impression management work affects internal 
constituents and their assessments of the reputation of the organization.  For this 
study, I chose to only examine the reputational effects for external constituents.  
In future studies, it would be interesting to address how internal constituents react 
to these outsourcing decisions.  In this study, I began to look at this with the 
perceived effectiveness of organizational impression management activities, but 
this only looked at the perceived effectiveness for one respondent within the 
organizational impression management function.  It would be interesting to look 
at this for other internal constituents, more generally for employees, or in the case 
of the current setting for students, faculty, and staff. 
In fact, it is disappointing that this study does not provide a greater 
understanding of how outsourcing decisions affect the perception of internal 
employees about the effectiveness of the outsourced work.  This is an especially 
important contribution for organizational impression management work, since the 
results of organizational impression management are often not easily or rapidly 
discernable.  This should be developed in future research.  Different predictors 
could be studied with the effect of perception on future decision-making about 
outsourcing, such as a more detailed measurement of the quality of relationships 
between client and agency personnel including a measure of the length of 
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relationships and a measure of the frequency of unproductive conflict between 
client and agency personnel.  Perhaps as indicated by this study, there is only 
limited effect of perception on future outsourcing decisions, however, I believe 
that given the effects of perception on decision-making documented in the 
literature that such an effect should exist in this type of setting. 
A second direction for future study would be to do a similar test from the 
agency’s point of view.  This study only looks at the effect on the reputation of 
the client and the perceived effectiveness from the client’s point of view.  Within 
the literature review and the hypothesis generation, there are references to the 
agency and its role in this process.  However, there is no testing of effects of 
outsourcing decisions on the reputation of the agencies.  What forms of 
outsourcing are most effective for increasing the reputation of agencies and 
therefore potential future business? 
Indeed, it would be interesting if such a study were to find that agencies 
benefit from different forms of outsourcing than clients, and thus that agencies 
desired different forms of outsourcing than clients.  If this were found to be true, 
another follow-up study could look at these outsourcing relationships and attempt 
to predict the balance of power or the probability of dissolution between an 
agency and a client by the nature of the outsourcing that was done between them. 
A third future study could explore additional substitute variables for 
reputation, which could predict future changes in reputation.  If changes in these 
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variables, due to the outsourcing of organizational impression management work, 
could be observed in a shorter time frame than changes in reputation, this would 
allow for better decision making about the continuation or discontinuation of 
these relationships in a shorter time frame and with less investment.  An improved 
ability to more quickly predict the effectiveness of these relationships should 
improve the effectiveness of outsourcing organizational impression management 
work, since this ability would allow organizations to retain effective relationships 
and terminate those that would not be effective.  Also since effects were found 
with reputation, which tends to be somewhat inertial, it would be interesting to 
test these hypotheses in a setting where profit, return on investment, revenues, or 
some other more dynamic outcome measure was used. 
Finally, another potential future study could address the next step in this 
process.  While this study looks at some important determinants of the potential 
effectiveness of outsourcing relationships, it does not address the requirements for 
setting up an effective relationship after the potential has been determined.  Thus 
the current study suggests that one partner is better than another or one activity is 
better for outsourcing than another, but it does not inform us about how to 
effectively organize or maintain an outsourcing relationship to gain the potential 
benefits of effectiveness that should be greater in certain relationships than others. 
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Conclusion 
To summarize, the current study addresses issues that are important to 
theory and practice and are understudied in existent organizational research.  Both 
outsourcing and management of organizational reputation are areas that are 
coming to the forefront in theory and practice.  Thus research in these areas is 
theoretically timely and has a potential for impact on practice in these areas.  In 
addition, both outsourcing and reputation address important theoretical questions.  
Research on outsourcing contributes to research on organizational design and 
scope.  Research on reputation contributes to research on intangible assets and 
their effects on organizational performance.  This study is one attempt to address 
how an organizational design decision affects the formation and persistence of a 
critical intangible asset. 
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Table 1.  Summary of Hypotheses  
 
# Hypothesis 
Outsourcing strategic organizational impression management activities 
H1a 
There will be a negative relationship between the level of outsourcing of strategic 
organizational impression management activities to agencies and both the client’s 
reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
H1b 
There will be a negative relationship between the level of outsourcing of strategic 
organizational impression management activities to agencies and the perceived 
effectiveness of organizational impression management activities. 
Outsourcing tactical organizational impression management activities 
H2 
There will be a positive relationship between the level of outsourcing of tactical 
organizational impression management activities to agencies and both the client’s 
reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
Outsourcing intensity 
H3 There will be a negative relationship between the outsourcing intensity of a client and both the client’s reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
Duration 
H4a There will be a positive relationship between the mean duration of a client’s relationships with its agencies and both the client’s reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
H4b 
There will be a positive relationship between the mean duration of a client’s relationships 
with its agencies and the level of perceived effectiveness of organizational impression 
management activities. 
H4c 
The mean duration of a client’s relationships with agencies and the level of outsourcing 
of tactical organizational impression management activities will have a joint positive 
effect on both the client’s reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
Number of partners 
H5a There will be a negative relationship between the number of agency partners maintained by a client and both the client’s reputation and the quality of incoming students. 
H5b 
The number of agency partners maintained by a client and the level of outsourcing 
intensity will have a joint negative effect on both the client’s reputation and the quality of 
incoming students. 
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Table 2.  Description of Sources for Reputation Measure 
 
Name of 
Source 
Years 
Available 
# of Schools 
Included* Details 
Kiplinger’s top 
100 values in 
private colleges 
1999 100 
Data from Peterson’s and Wintergreen-Orchard 
House, which gathers statistics each year from 
more than 1,800 schools.  Eliminated non-U.S. 
schools and specialty schools that award degrees 
only in medical sciences or fine arts.  Narrowed 
the list to the 175 colleges and universities that 
are the most selective, based on entrance-exam 
scores of the freshman class and on the percentage 
of applicants admitted. 
Princeton 
Review’s the 
best colleges 
ranked by 
students 
pre 1997-
2002 311-345 
The initial list was built through consultation with 
a variety of expert sources, including fifty 
independent educational consultants from 
throughout the nation.  Approximately the top 10 
percent are included.  Any college in the guide 
must agree to allow anonymous student surveys to 
be completed on campus. 
Top American 
research 
universities 
1998- 
2001 200 
Institutions that have more than $20 million in 
annual federal research expenditures and that rank 
within the top 25 on at least one of nine measures 
fall into the definition of a top research university. 
They also present a second group of institutions—
those ranking 26-50 on the same nine measures.  
Published by The Center at the University of 
Florida at Gainesville. 
U.S. News and 
World Report 
college rankings 
pre 1997-
2002 1400 
U.S. News has based its ranking categories on the 
Carnegie system since 1983, the year they began 
publishing college rankings.  U.S. News uses the 
Common Data Set (CDS) from the CDS initiative, 
a collaborative effort among data providers in the 
higher education community and publishers as 
represented by the College Board, Peterson’s—
Thomson Learning, U.S. News & World Report, 
and Wintergreen/Orchard House. 
Yahoo! Internet 
Life America’s 
most wired 
colleges 
1997-
2001 200 
Survey was conducted in partnership with 
Peterson’s, the nation’s leading provider of 
education information in print and online. All 
3,631 open-enrollment accredited undergraduate 
two-year and four-year institutions in the U.S. 
were invited to participate in 2000, 2001 survey. 
* Numbers vary from year to year and in some cases are approximations.  Number of schools is 
the number of institutions that are actually reported on the list whether or not they are part of the 
population that I am sampling for this study. 
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Table 3. Dependent Variables, Measures, and Sources 
 
Variable Measure Source(s) 
Reputation 
1. Mean percentile rank across all lists 
that an institution appears on for each 
year the list is published. 
1. Kiplinger’s top 100 values 
2. Princeton Review 
3. American research universities 
4. U.S. News and World Report  
5. Most wired colleges 
Quality of 
incoming students 
1. Factor comprised of: 
a. Average GPA of admitted students 
b. Percentage of freshmen from  
top 10% of high school class. 
c. Percentage of freshmen with high 
admissions test scores (SAT 
verbal/math scores over 500). 
2. Proportion of applicants admitted. 
1. Peterson’s Guide to Four-Year 
Colleges 
2. Peterson’s website 
(http://www.petersons.com) 
Perceived 
effectiveness of 
organizational 
impression 
management 
activities 
Collected for 2001-02 only.  Scale 
created from the following items: 
1. Individuals involved in this activity 
worked together effectively. 
2. Funds allocated to this activity were 
spent poorly. 
3. Projects for this activity were 
usually completed in an appropriate 
amount of time. 
4. This activity was effective in 
reaching its goals and objectives. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
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Table 4. Independent Variables, Measures, and Sources 
 
Variable Measure Source 
Outsourcing of 
strategic 
organizational 
impression 
management 
activities 
1. Proportion of the work for strategic 
organizational impression management 
activities for which outsourcing was used 
per year. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
Outsourcing of 
tactical 
organizational 
impression 
management 
activities 
1. Proportion of the work for tactical 
organizational impression management 
activities for which outsourcing was used 
per year. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
Outsourcing 
intensity 
1. Proportion of the work for all activities 
for which outsourcing was used per year. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
Duration of client-
agency relationship 
1. Mean duration of all client-agency 
relationships for all years of the study. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
Number of agency 
partners 
1. Mean number of agencies used by a 
client for all activities for all years. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
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Table 5. Control Variables, Measures, and Sources 
 
Variable Measure Source 
Organizational Size 1. Log of the number of faculty employed. 
1. Peterson’s Guide to Four-
Year Colleges 
Affiliation 
1. Dichotomous variable indicating 
whether a school has a religious affiliation 
(1 = yes). 
1. IPEDS 
Profit or Non-Profit 
1. Dichotomous variable indicated 
whether a school is for profit or not  
(1 = yes). 
1. IPEDS 
Endowment 1. Log of endowment in millions of dollars. 
1. Peterson’s Guide to Four-
Year Colleges 
Size of 
organizational 
impression 
management 
function 
1. Size of budget in dollars. 
2. Number of FTEs employed. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
Target population 
1. Dichotomous variable indicating 
whether an institution has a regional focus 
or a national focus (1 = national). 
2. Percentage of students enrolled from 
the state within which the institution is 
located. 
1. Peterson’s Guide to Four-
Year Colleges 
2. Peterson’s website  
3. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
Age 1. Year in which an institution was founded. 
1. Peterson’s Guide to Four-
Year Colleges 
2. Peterson’s website  
Major institutional 
change 
1. Count indicating whether six major 
institutional changes affecting 
organizational impression management 
work occurred during each year of the 
study: new president or vice president, 
new PR leader or reporting structure, 
change in PR budget, unusual campus 
crisis, change in academic programs, and 
other changes specified by the respondent. 
1. Mail survey sent to study 
population 
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Table 6.  Factor Analysis for Student Quality Measures 
 
Items Rotated Factor 1 Loading 
Rotated Factor 2 
Loading 
Factor 1 Student Quality 
Verbal SAT over 500 0.94 -0.15 
Math SAT over 500 0.94 -0.16 
Top 10% of High School Class 0.77 -0.51 
High School GPA 0.84 -0.26 
Factor 2 Percent Admitted 
Percent of Applicants Admitted -0.18 0.97 
 
Proportion of Variance Explained 0.72 0.16 
Eigenvalue 3.59 0.81 
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Table 7.  Items Used to Assess Strategic or Tactical Use of Activities 
 
Importance Item* 
Indicate the typical importance of work performed for (activity name), for the 97-
98 to 01-02 academic years, to your office’s overall public relations and 
communications efforts. 
Complexity Items** 
To perform this activity, new procedures were put in place. 
Multiple methods were considered or attempted before selecting the actual 
procedure used to perform this activity. 
Impact Items** 
New assets (e.g., physical assets, software, subscriptions, etc.) were purchased to 
support this activity. 
People or resources from other departments within our institution performed 
significant portions of the work on this activity. 
Reporting relationships were changed to facilitate performance of this activity. 
People were hired or fired to facilitate performance of this activity. 
Uncertainty Items** 
The central administration was frequently consulted to clarify expectations for 
this activity.  
Employees working on this activity complained about not knowing what they 
were expected to do. 
Significant changes were made to either the size or scope of this activity during 
this period. 
* 1-7 scale ranging from very unimportant to very important. 
** 1-7 scale ranging from not at all to to a large extent. 
 153
Table 8.  ANOVA Analysis for Strategic and Tactical Activities 
 
Activity Strategic Use* Scheffe Test** Cronbach’s α 
Electronic Media 4.90 A 0.84 
Print Publications 4.29 B 0.78 
Government Relations 3.54 C 0.69 
Community Relations 3.42 C 0.72 
Media Relations 3.30 C 0.73 
News Releases 3.20 C 0.73 
* Mean score on 10 items (all on 7 point scale). 
** Results of Scheffe test for differences between means.  Means with different 
letters are significantly different from each other at p<.05 (df=523, F=36.23, 
p<.0001). 
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Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Reputation 
Percentile 690 .19 .26      
2.  Student 
Quality 285 .00 .99 .56**     
3.  Percent 
Admitted 508 .73 .19 -.25** -.46**    
4.  Perceived 
Effectiveness 115 5.60 .70 .20* .25* .00   
5.  Strategic 
Outsourcing 486 .26 .26 -.24** -.24** .18** -.15  
6.  Tactical 
Outsourcing 521 .06 .15 .03 -.03 .04 .05 .18** 
7.  Outsourcing 
Intensity 540 .14 .16 -.12** -.15* .18** -.07 .79** 
8.  Duration 498 3.29 1.92 .20** .25** .10 .08 .12* 
9.  Number of 
Partners 690 1.13 1.10 -.02 -.13* .21** -.08 .25** 
10.  Log of # of 
Faculty 534 4.94 .62 .35** .38** -.20** .11 -.12** 
11.  Year of 
Founding 666 1884 44.15 -.43** -.42** .29** -.10 .14** 
12.  Log of 
Endowment 480 3.38 1.74 .55** .71** -.49** .04 -.33** 
13.  Institutional 
Changes 570 1.08 1.07 .04 -.10 -.03 -.05 .04 
*p<.05, **p<.01. 
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Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
(continued) 
 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Reputation Percentile        
2. Student Quality        
3. Percent Admitted        
4. Perceived Effectiveness        
5. Strategic Outsourcing        
6. Tactical Outsourcing        
7. Outsourcing Intensity .72**       
8. Duration .22** .24**      
9. Number of Partners .47** .45** .16**     
10. Log of # of Faculty .07 -.00 -.06 -.01    
11. Year of Founding -.04 .09* .03 -.05 -.26**   
12. Log of Endowment .03 -.18** .15** -.04 .43** -.63**  
13. Institutional Changes .16** .12** -.06 .13** .12** -.07 -.01 
*p<.05, **p<.01. 
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Table 10.  Generalized Estimating Equations Models with Reputation 
Percentile Dependent Variable* 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strategic 
Outsourcing  
-.05 
(.06)     
Tactical 
Outsourcing   
.22* 
(.10)    
Outsourcing 
Intensity    
.08 
(.09)   
Duration     .04**** (.01)  
# of Partners      .02 (.01) 
Tactical 
Outsourcing 
x Duration 
      
Outsourcing 
Intensity x # 
of Partners 
      
Selection 
Bias Control 
.11* 
(.05) 
.11 
(.06) 
.12* 
(.06) 
.13* 
(.06) 
.17** 
(.06) 
.11* 
(.05) 
Log of # of 
Faculty 
.05* 
(.02) 
.05 
(.03) 
.03 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
.07* 
(.03) 
.05* 
(.02) 
Year of 
Founding 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
Log of 
Endowment 
.05**** 
(.01) 
.06**** 
(.01) 
.06**** 
(.01) 
.06**** 
(.01) 
.03** 
(.01) 
.05**** 
(.01) 
Institutional 
Changes 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
Firm-Years 368 310 331 346 275 368 
-2LL -16.54 -4.50 -2.78 -1.81 -27.07 -18.55 
χ2** 146.49*** .58 4.80* .92 26.15*** 2.01 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values are 1-tailed for hypotheses and 2-tailed for controls.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001. 
** χ2 calculated for improvement in model fit over previous model using constrained models with 
same N as actual model to present accurate improvements in model fit and retain all potential 
data. 
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Table 10.  Generalized Estimating Equations Models with Reputation 
Percentile Dependent Variable* 
(continued) 
 
Variable 7 8 9 10 
Strategic Outsourcing -.20** (.07)  
-.20** 
(.07)  
Tactical Outsourcing .18 (.13)  
.21 
(.25)  
Outsourcing Intensity  -.01 (.10)  
-.09 
(.20) 
Duration .04**** (.01) 
.04**** 
(.01) 
.04**** 
(.01) 
.04**** 
(.01) 
# of Partners -.01 (.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.03) 
Tactical Outsourcing x 
Duration   
-.01 
(.03)  
Outsourcing Intensity x 
# of Partners    
.06 
(.14) 
Selection Bias Control .12 (.08) 
.21* 
(.08) 
.12 
(.08) 
.20* 
(.08) 
Log of # of Faculty .06 (.03) 
.07* 
(.03) 
.06 
(.03) 
.07* 
(.03) 
Year of Founding -.00* (.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00* 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
Log of Endowment .03 (.01) 
.03* 
(.01) 
.03 
(.01) 
.03* 
(.01) 
Institutional Changes -.01 (.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
Firm-Years 233 263 233 263 
-2LL -15.96 -17.74 -15.98 -17.94 
χ2** 29.26*** 25.20*** .02 .20 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values are 1-tailed for hypotheses and 2-tailed for controls.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001. 
** χ2 calculated for improvement in model fit over previous model using constrained models with 
same N as actual model to present accurate improvements in model fit and retain all potential 
data. 
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Table 11.  Generalized Estimating Equations Models with Student Quality 
Dependent Variable* 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strategic 
Outsourcing  
-.44* 
(.26)     
Tactical 
Outsourcing   
.35 
(.39)    
Outsourcing 
Intensity    
-.25 
(.33)   
Duration     .11*** (.04)  
# of Partners      -.18*** (.06) 
Tactical 
Outsourcing 
x Duration 
      
Outsourcing 
Intensity x # 
of Partners 
      
Selection 
Bias Control 
.50 
(.29) 
.50 
(.29) 
.67* 
(.29) 
.47 
(.29) 
3.58**** 
(.73) 
.20 
(.30) 
Log of # of 
Faculty 
-.02 
(.11) 
-.06 
(.11) 
-.10 
(.11) 
-.05 
(.11) 
-.37** 
(.13) 
-.00 
(.11) 
Year of 
Founding 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Log of 
Endowment 
.36**** 
(.05) 
.36**** 
(.05) 
.35**** 
(.05) 
.37**** 
(.05) 
.21*** 
(.06) 
.39**** 
(.05) 
Institutional 
Changes 
-.14** 
(.05) 
-.14** 
(.05) 
-.15** 
(.05) 
-.14** 
(.05) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
Firm-Years 196 176 182 193 144 196 
-2LL 424.26 378.80 387.24 411.80 279.48 414.17 
χ2** 128.35*** 2.94 .80 .55 9.80** 10.09** 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values are 1-tailed for hypotheses and 2-tailed for controls.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001. 
** χ2 calculated for improvement in model fit over previous model using constrained models with 
same N as actual model to present accurate improvements in model fit and retain all potential 
data. 
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Table 11.  Generalized Estimating Equations Models with Student Quality 
Dependent Variable* 
(continued) 
 
Variable 7 8 9 10 
Strategic Outsourcing .06 (.28)  
.03 
(.28)  
Tactical Outsourcing 1.26** (.51)  
4.18* 
(2.49)  
Outsourcing Intensity  .25 (.36)  
.09 
(.77) 
Duration .12*** (.04) 
.11*** 
(.04) 
.13*** 
(.04) 
.11*** 
(.04) 
# of Partners -.06 (.06) 
-.09 
(.06) 
-.05 
(.07) 
-.10 
(.10) 
Tactical Outsourcing x 
Duration   
-.89 
(.74)  
Outsourcing Intensity x 
# of Partners    
.12 
(.54) 
Selection Bias Control 3.75**** (.81) 
3.25**** 
(.77) 
3.68**** 
(.81) 
3.27**** 
(.78) 
Log of # of Faculty -.45*** (.13) 
-.36** 
(.13) 
-.46*** 
(.13) 
-.36** 
(.13) 
Year of Founding -.00 (.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Log of Endowment .21*** (.06) 
.23*** 
(.06) 
.22*** 
(.06) 
.23*** 
(.06) 
Institutional Changes -.12** (.05) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
Firm-Years 128 144 128 144 
-2LL 242.33 277.31 240.91 277.26 
χ2** 16.07** 11.97** 1.42 .05 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values are 1-tailed for hypotheses and 2-tailed for controls.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001. 
** χ2 calculated for improvement in model fit over previous model using constrained models with 
same N as actual model to present accurate improvements in model fit and retain all potential 
data. 
 
 160
Table 12.  Generalized Estimating Equations Models with Percent Admitted 
Dependent Variable* 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strategic 
Outsourcing  
.02 
(.04)     
Tactical 
Outsourcing   
.07 
(.07)    
Outsourcing 
Intensity    
.12* 
(.06)   
Duration     .01** (.00)  
# of Partners      .04**** (.01) 
Tactical 
Outsourcing 
x Duration 
      
Outsourcing 
Intensity x # 
of Partners 
      
Selection 
Bias Control 
-.16**** 
(.04) 
-.21**** 
(.04) 
-.20**** 
(.04) 
-.19**** 
(.04) 
-.12** 
(.04) 
-.14**** 
(.03) 
Log of # of 
Faculty 
.03 
(.02) 
.05* 
(.02) 
.03* 
(.02) 
.03* 
(.02) 
.02 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
Year of 
Founding 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Log of 
Endowment 
-.04**** 
(.01) 
-.05**** 
(.01) 
-.05**** 
(.01) 
-.05**** 
(.01) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
-.04**** 
(.01) 
Institutional 
Changes 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
Firm-Years 358 304 323 337 270 358 
-2LL -270.04 -240.72 -247.84 -263.57 -266.64 -291.86 
χ2** 118.42*** .28 1.05 4.17* 6.43* 19.82*** 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values are 1-tailed for hypotheses and 2-tailed for controls.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001. 
** χ2 calculated for improvement in model fit over previous model using constrained models with 
same N as actual model to present accurate improvements in model fit and retain all potential 
data. 
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Table 12.  Generalized Estimating Equations Models with Percent Admitted 
Dependent Variable* 
(continued) 
 
Variable 7 8 9 10 
Strategic Outsourcing -.07* (.04)  
-.07* 
(.04)  
Tactical Outsourcing -.04 (.08)  
-.07 
(.15)  
Outsourcing Intensity  .02 (.06)  
.10 
(.13) 
Duration .01* (.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01* 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
# of Partners .03** (.01) 
.03** 
(.01) 
.03** 
(.01) 
.04** 
(.02) 
Tactical Outsourcing x 
Duration   
.00 
(.02)  
Outsourcing Intensity x 
# of Partners    
-.06 
(.09) 
Selection Bias Control -.17*** (.05) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
-.17** 
(.05) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
Log of # of Faculty .02 (.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
.02 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
Year of Founding -.00 (.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Log of Endowment -.03*** (.01) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
-.03*** 
(.01) 
Institutional Changes .00 (.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
Firm-Years 231 258 231 258 
-2LL -244.91 -268.78 -244.96 -269.28 
χ2** 14.95** 13.42** .05 .50 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values are 1-tailed for hypotheses and 2-tailed for controls.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001. 
** χ2 calculated for improvement in model fit over previous model using constrained models with 
same N as actual model to present accurate improvements in model fit and retain all potential 
data. 
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Table 13.  OLS Results with Perceived Effectiveness Dependent Variable* 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strategic 
Outsourcing 00-01 
 -.77** 
(.32) 
 -.64* 
(.32) 
  
Strategic 
Outsourcing 99-00 
    -.87** 
(.32) 
-.83** 
(.30) 
Duration   .03 
(.03) 
.03 
(.04) 
 .05 
(.04) 
Selection Bias 
Control 
.29 
(.28) 
.19 
(.28) 
.49 
(.29) 
.42 
(.30) 
.18 
(.27) 
.28 
(.29) 
Log of Endowment -.00 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.05) 
-.08 
(.04) 
-.13* 
(.05) 
-.07 
(.05) 
-.13* 
(.05) 
Institutional 
Changes 
.03 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.06) 
.08 
(.06) 
-.01 
(.06) 
.01 
(.07) 
.09 
(.07) 
N 98 85 73 66 76 60 
Overall model F .63 1.79 1.83 2.04 2.39 2.99* 
Adj. R-squared -.01 .04 .04 .07 .07 .14 
*Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values are 1-tailed for hypotheses and 2-tailed for controls.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001. 
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Table 14.  Mean Number of Partners: Frequency Distribution 
 
Mean Number of Partners Number of Institutions 
0 14 
0.1-1.0 54 
1.1-2.0 34 
2.1-3.0 10 
3.1-4.0 0 
4.1-5.0 2 
5.1-8.0 0 
8.1-9.0 1 
Total Institutions 115 
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Figure 1.  Diagram of Hypotheses 
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APPENDIX A.  SEMI-STRUCTURED TELEPHONE SURVEY PROTOCOL 
 
 
 
Which public relations activities are most frequently taken at private colleges and 
universities? 
 
What times of year are not as busy for PR professionals at colleges and 
universities and thus would be better for filling out a survey? 
 
What are common organizational events (like a change in administration) that are 
likely to affect PR work at a university? 
 
What is the range of discretion that PR officers have over outsourcing decisions? 
 
What would be a good way to define public relations work in my survey? 
 
What is the best measure that I could request of the percent of PR work that is 
outsourced (i.e., budget, time worked, etc.)? 
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Appendix B.  Mail Survey of Chief Public Relations Officers 
 
 
 
Dear Public Relations and Communications Professional: 
 
I am studying the outsourcing of public relations and communications work in 
higher education to determine the situations in which outsourcing is most 
effective.  I am conducting this research as part of my dissertation at the 
University of Texas at Austin.  I am mailing this survey to approximately 1000 
small to medium-sized private colleges and universities in the United States. 
 
In discussions with public relations and communications professionals working at 
private colleges and universities, I have come to recognize that your time is 
valuable.  For this reason, I have spent hours refining this survey in discussion 
with your colleagues from around the country.  I have also spoken with 
representatives of the Council for Advancement and Support of Education 
(CASE) and they have indicated interest in reviewing the results of my research 
for possible publication in either the International Journal of Educational 
Advancement or CURRENTS magazine. 
 
However, to receive the most accurate results, it is essential that as many people 
as possible participate in the survey and provide candid responses to the 
requested information.  There are no right or wrong answers to the survey items.  
Based on my pretesting, this survey should take between 30 and 45 
minutes to complete.  You are not obligated to participate in this research nor 
must you answer every question.  If you choose not to participate, it will not affect 
your current or future relationships with The University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Your responses to this survey will be completely confidential.  Return your 
survey in the business reply envelope provided by Friday, October 18, 2002.  All 
information gathered as part of this project will be treated in strictest confidence 
and kept under conditions of security.  I will provide only a summary of general 
trends and statistical relationships across all the institutions participating in this 
study.  Specific individuals, jobs, and institutions will not be named in this 
summary.   
 
If this survey reached you by mistake, please forward this survey to the individual 
at your institution that would best be able to respond to questions about the 
following areas:  news releases, media relations, print publications, electronic 
media (including website development), community relations, and state and 
federal government relations. 
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Thank you for your willingness to complete this important study about 
outsourcing practices for public relations and communications activities in higher 
education.  If you would prefer to complete the survey electronically, it can be 
downloaded in either Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat Reader formats at 
http://www.bus.utexas.edu/faculty/Kevin.Dickson/survey.htm and returned 
to me by e-mail.  If you want a brief summary of the results e-mailed to you by 
the Fall of 2003, send me your e-mail address and a request for the results.  If 
you have any questions about this survey, contact me, or my dissertation 
supervisor, directly. 
 
 
 
Kevin Dickson Alison Davis-Blake 
Doctoral Candidate Professor and Department Chair 
Department of Management Eleanor T. Mosle Fellow 
McCombs School of Business Department of Management 
University of Texas at Austin McCombs School of Business 
512-232-7539 (voice) University of Texas at Austin 
512-471-3937 (fax) 512-471-0826 (voice) 
ked@mail.utexas.edu Alison.Davis-
Blake@bus.utexas.edu 
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PUBLIC RELATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS OUTSOURCING SURVEY 
 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
 
What if I am unsure how you are defining a term in the survey or my 
institution defines a term differently than you do? 
In many cases, terminology varies between institutions.  If you are unsure of the 
meaning of a term in the survey or define a term differently than the definition 
provided here, use the definitions provided in the survey when answering to keep 
responses comparable.  Definitions are intended only as clarification for this 
survey and not as general usage definitions.  All definitions will be formatted 
within a box like the three general definitions provided here. 
 
Outsourcing:  The use of outsourcing partners (either individuals or 
organizations) contracted to perform work for your institution.  This does not 
include work done by other offices within your institution.  Outsourcing refers 
exclusively to the use of individuals that are not officially employees of your 
institution. 
 
Outsourcing partner:  An organization or individual that does work for your 
department, whether they are paid out of your budget or not.  This can include 
consultants, agencies, free-lancers, contractors, etc.  This would not include part-
time employees. 
 
Public relations and communications work:  Refers only to work in the six 
areas covered in this survey: news releases, media relations, print publications, 
electronic media, community relations, and state and federal government 
relations.  These activities are only some of the activities that can be classified as 
either public relations or communications work.  They were selected because 
professionals working in private colleges and universities identified them as 
important aspects of their work.  A specific definition of each activity precedes the 
section of the survey that asks about each activity. 
 
What if I work in some of the areas, but others are performed by other 
offices on campus? 
If you do work in more of these areas than any other single office on campus, fill 
out the sections handled by your office and leave the other sections blank.  If 
another office on campus handles more of these areas than you do, please 
forward the survey to them. 
 
What if I wasn’t here for all the years covered in the survey? 
The survey asks you to report on six specific activities in the area of public 
relations and communications for the academic years 97-98 to 01-02.  If you 
were not working in your current position during this entire period, fill in the 
information for the years you were there and gather the information for the years 
you were not there as well as you can using records and information from your 
current staff that worked in your office during this period. 
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Do I report on just outsourced work or do I include work done by my own 
office? 
For all questions, unless specifically stated, the survey asks for both work done 
by outsourcing partners and work done by your own office.  Report on both 
together when you answer the questions about each activity. 
 
When the survey mentions you or your, who is it referring to? 
Unless otherwise specifically stated, the survey refers to your office and the staff 
and budget of that office.  It does not refer to work done by individuals in other 
offices in your institution unless specifically stated. 
 
The survey begins on the next page. 
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SECTION I.  YOU AND YOUR INSTITUTION 
1. How long have you worked in public relations and/or communications? 
     years 
 
2. What college or university do you work for?    
 
3. How long have you worked for this college or university?   
     years   months 
 
4.  Do you view your college or university as primarily reaching out to a national 
or regional/local student base? (Mark only one box.)   
 
National Regional/Local 
? ? 
 
5. What is the title of the department that you work in?   
 
6. What is your current job title?    
 
7. How long have you had this job title?    years   months 
 
For items 8 to 10, consider how well articulated and how well utilized your overall 
strategy is for public relations and communications work, whether completed 
within your office or through outsourcing efforts. 
 
8.  Does your office have an explicit public relations and communications 
strategy? 
 
Yes.  If yes, answer 9 and 10 below. No.  If no, skip to 11 below. 
? ? 
 
9. How well articulated is your current public relations and communications 
strategy? 
 
Not well articulated Partially articulated Very well 
articulated
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
10. How well is your current public relations and communications strategy 
followed? 
 
Not followed Partially followed Closely followed
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
11. What is the length of your budgetary cycle in months?    months 
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12. Indicate your total office budget in dollars and the number of full-time 
equivalent (FTE) positions in your office for the academic years below (indicate 
n/a if not available). 
 
Year Budget FTEs Year Budget FTEs 
97-98 $  00-
01 
$  
98-99 $  01-
02 
$  
99-00 $     
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SECTION II.  MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL EVENTS 
 
 
1. Indicate whether each of the items occurred in your institution and the 
academic year(s) in which it occurred.  If you are unsure of the definition used in 
the survey for one of these items, refer to the definitions provided below the 
question. 
 
 
Event 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 
a. New president or vice-president ? ? ? ? ? 
b. New PR/comm leader or reporting 
structure ? ? ? ? ? 
c. Change in PR/comm budget ? ? ? ? ? 
d. Significant and unusual campus-
related crisis ? ? ? ? ? 
e. Change in academic programs ? ? ? ? ? 
f. Other (specify): ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
New president or vice-president:  A change in the administration of the 
institution at the presidential or vice-presidential level. 
 
New PR/comm leader or reporting structure:  A new chief public relations or 
communications officer at the institution or a change in the direct reporting 
structure of the chief public relations or communications officer. 
 
Change in PR/comm budget:  A change in the budget of the institution that 
either significantly increases or decreases the resources available for public 
relations and communications work.  This may be an increase or decrease in a 
budget originating outside your department.  This could also be a change in the 
availability of funds.  For example, new requirements for approval of funds could 
be implemented that decrease the likelihood of approval for expenditures. 
 
Significant and unusual campus-related crisis:  A significant and unusual 
crisis within your institution.  For example, a threatened strike by staff or serious 
injury or death of a student.  This does not include national or regional crises, but 
only those crises that affect your campus specifically.  This also does not include 
more routine events that require your immediate attention. 
 
Change in academic programs:  A significant change in the academic offerings 
of your institution.  For example, the addition of night classes for non-traditional 
students or the addition of new majors or departments. 
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SECTION III.  PUBLIC RELATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES 
Activity 1:  News Releases 
News releases:  Releases either in paper or electronic form that are created and 
distributed for the purpose of sharing information about the actions of your 
institution with various audiences. 
 
 
If your office did not participate in news releases, as defined above, for the 
academic years 97-98 to 01-02, mark the box below and skip to Activity 2 Media 
Relations. 
 
?  MY OFFICE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN news releases FOR THE ACADEMIC YEARS 97-
98 TO 01-02. 
 
 
1. Mark the boxes for the academic years your office participated in news 
releases and estimate the percentage of work for this activity that your office 
outsourced for each academic year. 
 
Mark the years that outsourcing partners for this activity were chosen either by 
you or another staff member within your office and the years they were selected 
by an individual outside of your office.  Select both c and d below if both apply for 
a particular year. 
 
News Releases 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 
a. Participated in this 
activity ? ? ? ? ? 
b. Estimated percent 
of work for this activity 
outsourced  %  %  %  %  %
c. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by staff in my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
d. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by an individual 
outside my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
2. List a unique abbreviation for up to the five most important outsourcing 
partners (agencies, consultants, free-lancers, etc.) your office used for news 
releases.  If you use the same partner for more than one activity, please be 
consistent with abbreviations across activities. 
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Enter the total number of years that your office has worked with each partner on 
any public relations or communications activity, and mark the academic years 
that your office used each partner for news releases. 
 
Partner Total Years 
Used in 
97-98 
Used in 
98-99 
Used in 
99-00 
Used in 
00-01 
Used in 
01-02 
a.  ? ? ? ? ? 
b.  ? ? ? ? ? 
c.  ? ? ? ? ? 
d.  ? ? ? ? ? 
e.  ? ? ? ? ? 
 
3. If your office used more than five partners during the academic years 97-98 to 
01-02 for news releases, list the total number of partners that your office used. 
 
Total outsourcing partners from 97-98 to 01-02 for news releases:   
  partners 
 
 
4. Indicate the typical importance of work performed for news releases, for the 
97-98 to 01-02 academic years, to your office’s overall public relations and 
communications efforts. 
 
Very unimportant Average importance Very important
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
For items 5-14, mark the box that best describes to what extent each statement 
typically applies to work performed for news releases between the 97-98 and 
01-02 academic years. 
 
Statement Not at all 
To 
some 
extent 
To a large 
extent n/a
5. To perform this activity, new 
procedures were put in place. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
6. New assets (e.g., physical 
assets, software, subscriptions, 
etc.) were purchased to support 
this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
7. The central administration was 
frequently consulted to clarify 
expectations for this activity.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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8. Multiple methods were 
considered or attempted before 
selecting the actual procedure 
used to perform this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
9. Significant changes were made 
to either the size or scope of this 
activity during this period. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
10. People or resources from other 
departments within our institution 
performed significant portions of 
the work on this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
11. Employees working on this 
activity complained about not 
knowing what they were expected 
to do. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
12. Reporting relationships were 
changed to facilitate performance 
of this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
13. It was easy to determine the 
success of this activity. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14. People were hired or fired to 
facilitate performance of this 
activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
News Releases Academic Year 2001-2002 ONLY 
 
Items 15-18 deal with work performed for news releases in the academic year 
01-02. Mark the box that best describes how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement in regard to work performed for news releases in the academic 
year 01-02. 
 
If your office did NOT participate in news releases in the academic year 01-02, 
skip to question 19 below. 
 
Statement Strongly Disagree Neutral
Strongly 
Agree n/a
15. Individuals involved in this 
activity worked together 
effectively. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
16. Funds allocated to this 
activity were spent poorly. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 176
 
17. Projects for this activity were 
usually completed in an 
appropriate amount of time. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
18. This activity was effective in 
reaching its goals and objectives. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
 
19. If you want to include more information about your answers for news 
releases, use this space to clarify any of the answers given for this activity. 
  
  
  
 
Activity 2:  Media Relations 
Media relations:  Work done with the purpose of creating, maintaining, and/or 
utilizing relationships with media personnel and organizations.  This does not 
include news releases. 
 
 
If your office did not participate in media relations, as defined above, for the 
academic years 97-98 to 01-02, mark the box below and skip to Activity 3 Print 
Publications. 
 
?  MY OFFICE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN media relations FOR THE ACADEMIC YEARS 
97-98 TO 01-02. 
 
 
1. Mark the boxes for the academic years your office participated in media 
relations and estimate the percentage of work for this activity that your office 
outsourced for each academic year. 
 
Mark the years that outsourcing partners for this activity were chosen either by 
you or another staff member within your office and the years they were selected 
by an individual outside of your office.  Select both c and d below if both apply for 
a particular year. 
 
Media Relations 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 
a. Participated in this 
activity ? ? ? ? ? 
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b. Estimated percent 
of work for this activity 
outsourced  %  %  %  %  %
c. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by staff in my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
d. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by an individual 
outside my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
2. List a unique abbreviation for up to the five most important outsourcing 
partners (agencies, consultants, free-lancers, etc.) your office used for media 
relations.  If you use the same partner for more than one activity, please be 
consistent with abbreviations across activities. 
 
Enter the total number of years that your office has worked with each partner on 
any public relations or communications activity, and mark the academic years 
that your office used each partner for media relations. 
 
Partner Total Years 
Used in 
97-98 
Used in 
98-99 
Used in 
99-00 
Used in 
00-01 
Used in 
01-02 
a.  ? ? ? ? ? 
b.  ? ? ? ? ? 
c.  ? ? ? ? ? 
d.  ? ? ? ? ? 
e.  ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
3. If your office used more than five partners during the academic years 97-98 to 
01-02 for media relations, list the total number of partners that your office used. 
 
Total outsourcing partners from 97-98 to 01-02 for media relations:   
  partners 
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4. Indicate the typical importance of work performed for media relations, for the 
97-98 to 01-02 academic years, to your office’s overall public relations and 
communications efforts. 
 
Very unimportant Average importance Very important
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
For items 5-14, mark the box that best describes to what extent each statement 
typically applies to work performed for media relations between the 97-98 and 
01-02 academic years. 
 
Statement Not at all 
To 
some 
extent 
To a large 
extent n/a
5. To perform this activity, new 
procedures were put in place. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
6. New assets (e.g., physical 
assets, software, subscriptions, 
etc.) were purchased to support 
this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
7. The central administration was 
frequently consulted to clarify 
expectations for this activity.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
8. Multiple methods were 
considered or attempted before 
selecting the actual procedure 
used to perform this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
9. Significant changes were made 
to either the size or scope of this 
activity during this period. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
10. People or resources from other 
departments within our institution 
performed significant portions of 
the work on this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
11. Employees working on this 
activity complained about not 
knowing what they were expected 
to do. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
12. Reporting relationships were 
changed to facilitate performance 
of this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
13. It was easy to determine the 
success of this activity. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14. People were hired or fired to 
facilitate performance of this 
activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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Media Relations Academic Year 2001-2002 ONLY 
 
Items 15-18 deal with work performed for media relations in the academic year 
01-02. Mark the box that best describes how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement in regard to work performed for media relations in the academic 
year 01-02. 
 
If your office did NOT participate in media relations in the academic year 01-02, 
skip to question 19 below. 
 
Statement Strongly Disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree n/a
15. Individuals involved in this 
activity worked together 
effectively. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
16. Funds allocated to this 
activity were spent poorly. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
17. Projects for this activity were 
usually completed in an 
appropriate amount of time. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
18. This activity was effective in 
reaching its goals and objectives. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
 
19. If you want to include more information about your answers for media 
relations, use this space to clarify any of the answers given for this activity. 
  
  
  
 
Activity 3:  Print Publications 
Print publications:  Publications distributed in print form, created or overseen 
by your office, to communicate and improve the image and reputation of your 
institution and/or influence constituencies to act so as to benefit your institution.  
These publications may also be distributed through electronic media but should 
be primarily created for distribution in print form. 
 
If your office did not participate in print publications, as defined above, for the 
academic years 97-98 to 01-02, mark the box below and skip to Activity 4 
Electronic Media. 
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?  MY OFFICE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN print publications FOR THE ACADEMIC 
YEARS 97-98 TO 01-02. 
 
1. Mark the boxes for the academic years your office participated in print 
publications and estimate the percentage of work for this activity that your office 
outsourced for each academic year. 
 
Mark the years that outsourcing partners for this activity were chosen either by 
you or another staff member within your office and the years they were selected 
by an individual outside of your office.  Select both c and d below if both apply for 
a particular year. 
 
Print Publications 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 
a. Participated in this 
activity ? ? ? ? ? 
b. Estimated percent 
of work for this activity 
outsourced  %  %  %  %  %
c. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by staff in my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
d. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by an individual 
outside my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
 
2. List a unique abbreviation for up to the five most important outsourcing 
partners (agencies, consultants, free-lancers, etc.) your office used for print 
publications.  If you use the same partner for more than one activity, please be 
consistent with abbreviations across activities. 
 
Enter the total number of years that your office has worked with each partner on 
any public relations or communications activity, and mark the academic years 
that your office used each partner for print publications. 
 
Partner Total Years 
Used in 
97-98 
Used in 
98-99 
Used in 
99-00 
Used in 
00-01 
Used in 
01-02 
a.  ? ? ? ? ? 
b.  ? ? ? ? ? 
c.  ? ? ? ? ? 
d.  ? ? ? ? ? 
e.  ? ? ? ? ? 
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3. If your office used more than five partners during the academic years 97-98 to 
01-02 for print publications, list the total number of partners that your office 
used. 
 
Total outsourcing partners from 97-98 to 01-02 for print publications:   
  partners 
 
 
4. Indicate the typical importance of work performed for print publications, for 
the 97-98 to 01-02 academic years, to your office’s overall public relations and 
communications efforts. 
 
Very unimportant Average importance Very important
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
For items 5-14, mark the box that best describes to what extent each statement 
typically applies to work performed for print publications between the 97-98 and 
01-02 academic years. 
 
Statement Not at all 
To 
some 
extent 
To a large 
extent n/a
5. To perform this activity, new 
procedures were put in place. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
6. New assets (e.g., physical 
assets, software, subscriptions, 
etc.) were purchased to support 
this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
7. The central administration was 
frequently consulted to clarify 
expectations for this activity.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
8. Multiple methods were 
considered or attempted before 
selecting the actual procedure 
used to perform this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
9. Significant changes were made 
to either the size or scope of this 
activity during this period. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
10. People or resources from other 
departments within our institution 
performed significant portions of 
the work on this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
11. Employees working on this 
activity complained about not 
knowing what they were expected 
to do. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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12. Reporting relationships were 
changed to facilitate performance 
of this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
13. It was easy to determine the 
success of this activity. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14. People were hired or fired to 
facilitate performance of this 
activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Print Publications Academic Year 2001-2002 ONLY 
 
Items 15-18 deal with work performed for print publications in the academic 
year 01-02. Mark the box that best describes how much you agree or disagree 
with each statement in regard to work performed for print publications in the 
academic year 01-02. 
 
If your office did NOT participate in print publications in the academic year 01-
02, skip to question 19 below. 
 
Statement Strongly Disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree n/a
15. Individuals involved in this 
activity worked together 
effectively. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
16. Funds allocated to this 
activity were spent poorly. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
17. Projects for this activity were 
usually completed in an 
appropriate amount of time. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
18. This activity was effective in 
reaching its goals and objectives. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
 
19. If you want to include more information about your answers for print 
publications, use this space to clarify any of the answers given for this activity. 
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Activity 4:  Electronic Media 
Electronic media:  Publications distributed through electronic media (including 
video, radio, television, CD, DVD, internet, etc.) created or overseen by your 
office, to communicate and improve the image and reputation of your institution 
and/or influence constituencies to act so as to benefit your institution.  This 
includes your institution’s website.  These publications are usually not distributed 
through printed media and are primarily created for electronic distribution. 
 
 
If your office did not participate in electronic media, as defined above, for the 
academic years 97-98 to 01-02, mark the box below and skip to Activity 5 
Community Relations. 
 
?  MY OFFICE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN electronic media FOR THE ACADEMIC YEARS 
97-98 TO 01-02. 
 
 
1. Mark the boxes for the academic years your office participated in electronic 
media and estimate the percentage of work for this activity that your office 
outsourced for each academic year. 
 
Mark the years that outsourcing partners for this activity were chosen either by 
you or another staff member within your office and the years they were selected 
by an individual outside of your office.  Select both c and d below if both apply for 
a particular year. 
 
Electronic Media 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 
a. Participated in this 
activity ? ? ? ? ? 
b. Estimated percent 
of work for this activity 
outsourced  %  %  %  %  %
c. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by staff in my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
d. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by an individual 
outside my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
2. List a unique abbreviation for up to the five most important outsourcing 
partners (agencies, consultants, free-lancers, etc.) your office used for 
electronic media.  If you use the same partner for more than one activity, please 
be consistent with abbreviations across activities. 
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Enter the total number of years that your office has worked with each partner on 
any public relations or communications activity, and mark the academic years 
that your office used each partner for electronic media. 
 
Partner Total Years 
Used in 
97-98 
Used in 
98-99 
Used in 
99-00 
Used in 
00-01 
Used in 
01-02 
a.  ? ? ? ? ? 
b.  ? ? ? ? ? 
c.  ? ? ? ? ? 
d.  ? ? ? ? ? 
e.  ? ? ? ? ? 
 
3. If your office used more than five partners during the academic years 97-98 to 
01-02 for electronic media, list the total number of partners that your office 
used. 
 
Total outsourcing partners from 97-98 to 01-02 for electronic media:   
  partners 
 
 
4. Indicate the typical importance of work performed for electronic media, for the 
97-98 to 01-02 academic years, to your office’s overall public relations and 
communications efforts. 
 
Very unimportant Average importance Very important
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
For items 5-14, mark the box that best describes to what extent each statement 
typically applies to work performed for electronic media between the 97-98 and 
01-02 academic years. 
 
Statement Not at all 
To 
some 
extent 
To a large 
extent n/a
5. To perform this activity, new 
procedures were put in place. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
6. New assets (e.g., physical 
assets, software, subscriptions, 
etc.) were purchased to support 
this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
7. The central administration was 
frequently consulted to clarify 
expectations for this activity.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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8. Multiple methods were 
considered or attempted before 
selecting the actual procedure 
used to perform this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
9. Significant changes were made 
to either the size or scope of this 
activity during this period. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
10. People or resources from other 
departments within our institution 
performed significant portions of 
the work on this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
11. Employees working on this 
activity complained about not 
knowing what they were expected 
to do. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
12. Reporting relationships were 
changed to facilitate performance 
of this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
13. It was easy to determine the 
success of this activity. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14. People were hired or fired to 
facilitate performance of this 
activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Electronic Media Academic Year 2001-2002 ONLY 
 
Items 15-18 deal with work performed for electronic media in the academic year 
01-02. Mark the box that best describes how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement in regard to work performed for electronic media in the 
academic year 01-02. 
 
If your office did NOT participate in electronic media in the academic year 01-
02, skip to question 19 below. 
 
Statement Strongly Disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree n/a
15. Individuals involved in this 
activity worked together 
effectively. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
16. Funds allocated to this 
activity were spent poorly. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
17. Projects for this activity were 
usually completed in an 
appropriate amount of time. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
18. This activity was effective in 
reaching its goals and objectives. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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19. If you want to include more information about your answers for electronic 
media, use this space to clarify any of the answers given for this activity. 
  
  
  
 
Activity 5:  Community Relations 
Community relations:  Work done with the purpose of creating, maintaining, 
and/or utilizing relationships with community constituencies important to your 
institution, excluding the media and state and federal governments.  For 
example, this may include residents of local cities, counties, states, K-12 schools, 
local city government, local county government, local and area businesses, and 
trade or professional associations. 
 
 
If your office did not participate in community relations, as defined above, for 
the academic years 97-98 to 01-02, mark the box below and skip to Activity 6 
State and Federal Government Relations. 
 
?  MY OFFICE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN community relations FOR THE ACADEMIC 
YEARS 97-98 TO 01-02. 
 
1. Mark the boxes for the academic years your office participated in community 
relations and estimate the percentage of work for this activity that your office 
outsourced for each academic year. 
 
Mark the years that outsourcing partners for this activity were chosen either by 
you or another staff member within your office and the years they were selected 
by an individual outside of your office.  Select both c and d below if both apply for 
a particular year. 
 
Community 
Relations 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 
a. Participated in this 
activity ? ? ? ? ? 
b. Estimated percent 
of work for this activity 
outsourced  %  %  %  %  %
c. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by staff in my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
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d. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by an individual 
outside my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
 
2. List a unique abbreviation for up to the five most important outsourcing 
partners (agencies, consultants, free-lancers, etc.) your office used for 
community relations.  If you use the same partner for more than one activity, 
please be consistent with abbreviations across activities. 
 
Enter the total number of years that your office has worked with each partner on 
any public relations or communications activity, and mark the academic years 
that your office used each partner for community relations. 
 
Partner Total Years 
Used in 
97-98 
Used in 
98-99 
Used in 
99-00 
Used in 
00-01 
Used in 
01-02 
a.  ? ? ? ? ? 
b.  ? ? ? ? ? 
c.  ? ? ? ? ? 
d.  ? ? ? ? ? 
e.  ? ? ? ? ? 
 
3. If your office used more than five partners during the academic years 97-98 to 
01-02 for community relations, list the total number of partners that your office 
used. 
 
Total outsourcing partners from 97-98 to 01-02 for community relations:   
  partners 
 
 
4. Indicate the typical importance of work performed for community relations, 
for the 97-98 to 01-02 academic years, to your office’s overall public relations 
and communications efforts. 
 
Very unimportant Average importance Very important
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
For items 5-14, mark the box that best describes to what extent each statement 
typically applies to work performed for community relations between the 97-98 
and 01-02 academic years. 
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Statement Not at all 
To 
some 
extent 
To a large 
extent n/a
5. To perform this activity, new 
procedures were put in place. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
6. New assets (e.g., physical 
assets, software, subscriptions, 
etc.) were purchased to support 
this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
7. The central administration was 
frequently consulted to clarify 
expectations for this activity.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
8. Multiple methods were 
considered or attempted before 
selecting the actual procedure 
used to perform this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
9. Significant changes were made 
to either the size or scope of this 
activity during this period. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
10. People or resources from other 
departments within our institution 
performed significant portions of 
the work on this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
11. Employees working on this 
activity complained about not 
knowing what they were expected 
to do. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
12. Reporting relationships were 
changed to facilitate performance 
of this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
13. It was easy to determine the 
success of this activity. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14. People were hired or fired to 
facilitate performance of this 
activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Community Relations Academic Year 2001-2002 ONLY 
 
Items 15-18 deal with work performed for community relations in the academic 
year 01-02. Mark the box that best describes how much you agree or disagree 
with each statement in regard to work performed for community relations in the 
academic year 01-02. 
 
If your office did NOT participate in community relations in the academic year 
01-02, skip to question 19 below. 
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Statement Strongly Disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree n/a
15. Individuals involved in this 
activity worked together 
effectively. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
16. Funds allocated to this 
activity were spent poorly. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
17. Projects for this activity were 
usually completed in an 
appropriate amount of time. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
18. This activity was effective in 
reaching its goals and objectives. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
 
19. If you want to include more information about your answers for community 
relations, use this space to clarify any of the answers given for this activity. 
  
  
  
 
Activity 6:  State and Federal Government Relations 
State and federal government relations:  Work done with the purpose of 
creating, maintaining, and/or utilizing relationships with state or federal 
government constituencies important to your institution.  This includes any 
departments of the state and federal governments.  This will be hereafter referred 
to as government relations. 
 
 
If your office did not participate in government relations, as defined above, for 
the academic years 97-98 to 01-02, mark the box below and skip to Section IV 
General Comments. 
 
?  MY OFFICE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN government relations FOR THE ACADEMIC 
YEARS 97-98 TO 01-02. 
 
 
1. Mark the boxes for the academic years your office participated in government 
relations and estimate the percentage of work for this activity that your office 
outsourced for each academic year. 
 
Mark the years that outsourcing partners for this activity were chosen either by 
you or another staff member within your office and the years they were selected 
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by an individual outside of your office.  Select both c and d below if both apply for 
a particular year. 
 
Government 
Relations 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 
a. Participated in this 
activity ? ? ? ? ? 
b. Estimated percent 
of work for this activity 
outsourced  %  %  %  %  %
c. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by staff in my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
d. Outsourcing 
partners were selected 
by an individual 
outside my office 
? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
2. List a unique abbreviation for up to the five most important outsourcing 
partners (agencies, consultants, free-lancers, etc.) your office used for 
government relations.  If you use the same partner for more than one activity, 
please be consistent with abbreviations across activities. 
 
Enter the total number of years that your office has worked with each partner on 
any public relations or communications activity, and mark the academic years 
that your office used each partner for government relations. 
 
Partner Total Years 
Used in 
97-98 
Used in 
98-99 
Used in 
99-00 
Used in 
00-01 
Used in 
01-02 
a.  ? ? ? ? ? 
b.  ? ? ? ? ? 
c.  ? ? ? ? ? 
d.  ? ? ? ? ? 
e.  ? ? ? ? ? 
 
3. If your office used more than five partners during the academic years 97-98 to 
01-02 for government relations, list the total number of partners that your office 
used. 
 
Total outsourcing partners from 97-98 to 01-02 for government relations:   
  partners 
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4. Indicate the typical importance of work performed for government relations, 
for the 97-98 to 01-02 academic years, to your office’s overall public relations 
and communications efforts. 
 
Very unimportant Average importance Very important
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
For items 5-14, mark the box that best describes to what extent each statement 
typically applies to work performed for government relations between the 97-98 
and 01-02 academic years. 
Statement Not at all 
To 
some 
extent 
To a large 
extent n/a
5. To perform this activity, new 
procedures were put in place. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
6. New assets (e.g., physical 
assets, software, subscriptions, 
etc.) were purchased to support 
this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
7. The central administration was 
frequently consulted to clarify 
expectations for this activity.  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
8. Multiple methods were 
considered or attempted before 
selecting the actual procedure 
used to perform this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
9. Significant changes were made 
to either the size or scope of this 
activity during this period. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
10. People or resources from other 
departments within our institution 
performed significant portions of 
the work on this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
11. Employees working on this 
activity complained about not 
knowing what they were expected 
to do. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
12. Reporting relationships were 
changed to facilitate performance 
of this activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
13. It was easy to determine the 
success of this activity. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14. People were hired or fired to 
facilitate performance of this 
activity. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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State and Federal Government Relations Academic Year 2001-2002 ONLY 
 
Items 15-18 deal with work performed for government relations in the academic 
year 01-02. Mark the box that best describes how much you agree or disagree 
with each statement in regard to work performed for government relations in 
the academic year 01-02. 
 
If your office did NOT participate in government relations in the academic year 
01-02, skip to question 19 below. 
 
Statement Strongly Disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
Agree n/a
15. Individuals involved in this 
activity worked together 
effectively. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
16. Funds allocated to this 
activity were spent poorly. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
17. Projects for this activity were 
usually completed in an 
appropriate amount of time. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
18. This activity was effective in 
reaching its goals and objectives. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
19. If you want to include more information about your answers for government 
relations, use this space to clarify any of the answers given for this activity. 
  
  
  
 
SECTION IV.  GENERAL COMMENTS 
If you desire to make any other comments about this survey or the outsourcing of 
public relations and communications work at small to medium-sized private 
colleges, I would welcome them.  Either use this page, attach additional pages, 
or e-mail me directly. 
  
  
  
 
Thank you for completing the survey. 
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Appendix C.  NAICU Letter Recommending Study Participation 
 
 
 
September 12, 2002 
 
Dear Colleague: 
 
Kevin Dickson is a doctoral candidate studying the outsourcing of public relations 
and communications services at small- to medium-sized private colleges and 
universities.  His research attempts to determine the situations in which 
outsourcing of public relations and communications work is most effective at 
these institutions.  Kevin is completing this study for his dissertation as part of his 
Ph.D. at the University of Texas at Austin. 
 
As a colleague in higher education public relations/communications, I both 
appreciate and support public relations research—an essential tool if we are to 
serve our institutions effectively.  I am confident that the outsourcing study will 
benefit independent colleges and universities, particularly at a time when we must 
allocate our limited resources more carefully than ever. 
 
This survey provides an opportunity for advancing our knowledge in this 
important area, and I encourage you to complete the survey. 
 
Thank you in advance for your participation. 
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